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The problems of characterizing rational belief are fewer than is
the case with knowledge, though we presumably believe more things
than we know. Knowledge is often defined as a special kind of
justified true belief. Fallibilism urges that any of the conditions
for knowledge may fail. In the case of rational belief we are
dealing with fewer conditions, and withdrawal in the event of failure
is less drastic. 2. Talk of beliefs involves problems of
intensionality (referential opacity) and intentionality (allusion to
believing subjects). But talk of beliefs is not clearly dispensable.
Reference both to conscious mental states and to dispositions is
needed to account for belief. If belief is to be rational it requires
at least adequate evidential support. Belief should largely be
determined by evidence but there is a voluntary element which we
cannot exclude. Rational belief is not all or nothing acceptance.
Paradox results if we do not proportion belief to evidence. 3. We
need to consider the rationality of complexes of beliefs. Here two
such sets of beliefs are selected for study in their own right, and
for purpose of comparison. One comprises beliefs about the
historical past, the other, metaphysical theistic beliefs. Mitchell
argues for an analogy between them, and that in each case upholders
of such beliefs construct a cumulative case in their defence. This
raises complex issues of which the most important is that of the
criteria to be used. 4. Beliefs about historical events use theory
and observation to give an account of what is not directly
accessible. Rival theories are assessed by criteria as in other
disciplines. The extent to which the criteria used here differ
from those used in science is considered in relation to two problems
One is the special character of historical explanation. The other is
5"
the debate between realists and anti-realists with regard to the
historical past, and the role of implicit prediction here. Though
there are differences from science, the rational assessment of beliefs
about the historical pa3t has identifiable similarities with science in
its methods and criteria. 5* In "til© case of metaphysical beliefs
examples are selected from recent writing on theistic belief by Swinburne.
Some, both theists and non-theists, differentiate sharply between
metaphysical and other beliefs. Criticism is here made of those who
emphasize incommensurability and commitment as precluding rational
scrutiny. Hick's -view is more cautious, and we must admit that people
do use rational criteria yet differ in their conclusions. Swinburne
is perhaps over-confident in using Bayes' theorem here, with
consequential over—emphasis on prior probabilities. 6. We need to
consider several criteria and their appropriateness for assessing
metaphysical beliefs. i) Internal consistency is one, as is consistency
with other beliefs. ii) Swinburne places too much emphasis on
simplicity, though it is one criterion amongst others. iii) Explanatory
power is also relevant, though gains in explanatory power take different
forms, and some gains are of an unusual type. iv) Pruitfulness in
making successful prediction plays a large role in science, and is
implicit in historical study. It should not he excluded here, though
appeal to it requires careful assessment. v) Accuracy is also
important, and should be ranked higher than simplicity, though assessing
accuracy here has problems of its own. We can therefore use these
criteria to assess the rationality of metaphysical as of other
beliefs, but in some cases, here as elsewhere, clashes of criteria
leave ground for continuing conflict.
<s
Introduction
We all of us reveal by our actions and our words that
we act on certain beliefs. Most of us claim that at least
some of our beliefs are rational. Eut why do some of us,
some of the time, claim that some beliefs are more rational
than others? It is this question with which this work is
concerned. The question can be stated simply and briefly,
perhaps too briefly and a little carelessly. But it is a
very searching question. It will take several chapters even
to explore and to tease out some carefully selected issues
raised by the question. To specify with complete accuracy
what in any context it is rational to believe is almost
certainly beyond human capacity. Yet to explore why in
certain contexts we hold that it is more rational to believe
one thing than another is of great importance. In order to
consider this question of why it is held to be more rational
to believe some things than others I wish to select a set of
more specific issues which will help to focus the discussion,
and help to specify those areas within the vast numbers of
our beliefs with which I am especially concerned.
The nature of belief itself is integral to the discussion
as a whole. It is not just a preliminary matter. Unless we
have at least some notion of the distinction between belief
and knowledge we are liable to great confusion when discussing
particular sets of beliefs. My examples of particular sets
of beliefs will chiefly be drawn from the areas of history
and metaphysics. But even within discussions of the
methodology of science one finds instances of this confusion
over the relation "between knowledge and "belief. Scientific
theories and hypotheses are revised. This process is often
spoken of in terms of the growth of scientific knowledge. But
such a phrase is prone to mislead the unwary. It suggests
progressive accumulation of knowledge. But if a theory or
a hypothesis in any field is deemed to "be false, and is replaced
with another deemed to be more worthy of belief, it is not
wholly accurate to speak of the growth of knowledge. What
is happening is the replacement of one set of beliefs about
reality with another set. The second is similar, to a greater
or less extent, to the first. But the crucial point is that
we consider the second to be more worthy of belief or more
rational than the first. Discussion of the relation between
belief and knowledge is therefore essential to our enterprise.
It is not a mere preliminary. It is a vital part of the whole
enterprise. This issue therefore will be given prominence in
the opening chapters along with the equally central and
necessary discussion of the character of belief itself.
I am not proposing, except perhaps in isolated hints
and in occasional lapses, to say what it is that one should
believe. I hold that many make such assertions too hastily,
though it is a temptation to which I may be prone from time
to time and I hope the reader will have enough natural
curiosity to feel that an occasional hint of this kind is
not too serious a blemish in a work officially devoted to
studying methods of comparing the rationality of sets of
beliefs.
I am proposing to focus on just why it is that we do
?
(and perhaps should) hold that certain beliefs or sets of
beliefs are more rational than other beliefs or other sets
of beliefs. I am aware that other people have interested
themselves in the question and in print, I hope to allude to
some of the works that have helped me most or provoked me most,
though failure to mention a work does not mean that I do not
value it or have not read it, (though it may mean that). An
enormous discussion has focussed on the rationality of scientific
theories. Forks with titles such as 'The Rationality of Science',
or 'The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes' or 'The
Logic of Scientific Discovery' all in one way or another are
concerned with why it is deemed more rational to believe some
scientific theories than others. But this work is not concerned
with the natural sciences. What I am concerned with is the
rationality of beliefs about other matters. The two chief
areas of belief with which I am concerned are why it is
rational to hold some specific beliefs about the past, and why
it might be rational to hold (or not to hold) some metaphysical
beliefs rather than other metaphysical beliefs.
These areas of belief about the historical past and
belief in propositions of a metaphysical character are not
unrelated. They share in common a tendency to 'deviate' to
a greater or less extent from beliefs about those matters
considered to fall within the province of natural science.
Indeed one influential writer (Basil Mitchell) has argued
at length that one can defend the rationality of metaphysical
beliefs at least to some extent by an analogy which makes
an appeal to the methods we use to argue that beliefs about
historical past are rational.
Some readers may "be put off "by the fact that I am even
willing to consider that there might he ways of arguing
that some metaphysical beliefs are more rational than others.
I discuss this issue in more detail later and there defend my
stance. Here I briefly assert that philosophers of science
are now much less confident than they once were that one can
rigidly exclude all metaphysical beliefs from either the set of
scientific beliefs or the set of rational beliefs. If some
metaphysical beliefs are necessary elements in either of these
other sets, then we had better explore overtly the question
of how to determine which of these it is most rational to hold.
Other quite different readers may hold that the only
beliefs which it is really of ultimate importance to hold
(or to choose rationally) are metaphysical beliefs. Such
readers may feel impatient with the earlier chapters and argue
that they are only a time consuming preliminary. To such I
would wish to make two replies. The first is that it is not
frivolous to maintain that patience in such matters is a
virtue. The second reply is a little longer. It is widely
held that some metaphysical beliefs and especially theistic
beliefs are near to or on the far side of the limits of
rational belief. It is therefore very important to say-
clearly and carefully why one holds that there are methods
of arguing that some of these metaphysical beliefs are
rational and/or more rational than other such beliefs
or sets of beliefs. That is the end point of my discussion.
But the rest is not merely preliminary. There is an
argument which runs through the whole and which must he
assessed as a whole. Belief and knowledge must he compared
and differentiated or confusion will ensue. The character
of belief itself is a necessary element in considering the
character of rational belief. The rationality of beliefs
about the historical past offers an excellent area to test
the permissibility of deviation from scientific method in
assessing rational belief. And finally the question of
metaphysical belief raises the question of whether some
metaphysical beliefs are inescapable in our total set of beliefs,
and whether we can give a good account of methods for setting
limits to rational belief or at least for preferring to hold
(or not to hold) some metaphysical beliefs rather than others.
This is the programme of this work. This introduction has
of course been written, as it should be, as the writing
of the work as a whole comes towards its end. But I most
strongly urge the reader to read and indeed reread this
introduction. A seasoned traveller arriving in a city
understands the wisdom of obtaining a map at the first opportunity.
Chapter One Rational Belief and, the Question of Knowledge
Rational belief is our concern in the pages which follow.
I propose to begin by making some comparisons between the
problems of rational belief and the problems of knowledge.
In current philosophical discussion there is much debate over
the attempt to define knowledge in terms of belief. We shall
see in due course that one such influential attempt specifies
four conditions. According to this view knowledge is
undefeated (or indefeasible) justified true belief. The
greatest controversy at present surrounds the attempt to define
the notion of a defeasibility condition. This is commonly
referred to as 1 the fourth condition', the others being that
what is known must be justified, must be true, and must be
believed. Because the debate about knowledge has been so
prominent in philosophical writing it has tended to overshadow
the topic of rational belief. But the latter is of great
interest in its own right. A look at some aspects of the
relation between the two areas will therefore be an appropriate
place to begin, I intend to maintain that most of us would
say that what we claim to know consists of a smaller set than
the set of what we believe. (if knowledge can indeed be
defined in terms of belief then what we know (if anything) is
a subset of what we believe). But the problems of knowledge
are more extensive than the problems of belief. By this I
do not have in mind the problems raised by the great number
of things that we believe. I mean that the debate over the
problem of knowledge raises all the issues connected with
rational belief and some additional ones. If this is correct
then to focus on the question of rational belief is, in this
sense, more specific than focussing on the problems of
knowledge. But it would also be relevant to, and a contribution
towards, the discussion of the problem of knowledge. One way
of putting this would be to say that a concern with rational
belief is a concern with what it is to believe, and with what
it is for us to claim that at least some of our beliefs are
justified. There are however certain difficulties about the
use of the term 'justified1. For reasons that will, I hope,
become clear, attention will be focussed on the notion of
rational belief, and an attempt made to tease out some of the
problems of rational belief. Specific attention will be directed
to the question of criteria for rational belief in the fields of
history and of metaphysics. But more of that anon.
There are things which we think that we know, but which it
is not certain that we know. We think that we know that we as
human persons evolved by natural selection. But we do not have
absolute guarantees that it is truly knowledge. It is not
certain that we know it. But we do claim, or many of us claim
that it is rational to believe that we evolved by natural
selection. Similarly we may know that our present universe
began between ten and twenty thousand million years ago. But
it is not certain that we know this. Whether we do in fact
know it will depend on various factors, of which one of the
most important is whether it is in reality the case that our
universe began when we think it did. But we do claim, or
many of us claim, or at least I am not alone in claiming,
that it is rational to believe that it began in the period
specified above. The problem of knowledge and the problem of
rational belief are related, but they can be distinguished.
My chief concern in this present work is with the philosophical
problem of rational belief. But it is appropriate to approach
that problem by means of a skirmish with the problem of
knowledge.
I have begun with a series of assertions^ and I now wish to
provide some of the arguments which lead me to make these
assertions. I propose to argue that our claims to have knowledge
are vulnerable/ and that this accentuates the importance of our
claims to rational belief. I do not claim that we have no
knowledge, merely that our claims to have knowledge are vulnerable,
llor do I claim that there is a single category of rational belief,
merely that the questions of epistemic and doxastic probability
are in need of elucidation. For example I would say that it is
rational to believe that p if there is strong or adequate
evidential support for p. But this proposal opens up further
questions. What kind of evidential support is relevant to
different classes of statement, and how do we assess the strength
or weakness of such evidential support? The discussion of these
questions opens the way to yet more questions, so an extensive
discussion will be necessary. This discussion must eventually
consider the criteria for rational belief. These may vary
from one domain to another. The criteria for rational beliefs
about electrons may differ from the criteria for rational
beliefs about Caesar's conquests in Gaul, and the criteria for
rational beliefs about what is just may differ yet again. In
the case of metaphysics some might argue that there are beliefs,
but that these are incapable of rational justification. This
view might be taken by upholders of metaphysical beliefs as well
as by opponents. For example some theologians might maintain
that one ought to believe in God even though one could not
provide adequate evidential support for such a belief. Whether
or not this domain is an appropriate field for the application
of rational criteria of evidential support is a matter of
vigorous debate, and that debate will be considered in this work
in due course. But our initial starting point was a vague
assertion that our claims to knowledge are vulnerable, and I must
soon attempt to give greater precision to that assertion.
The problem of rational belief comes to the fore when we
maintain that most claims to knowledge are fallible. ¥e may
think that we know that p, but our claim to know it can fail for
a variety of reasons. Chief amongst these is simply the
realization that p is false. If p does turn out to be false
then our claim to know has to be withdrawn. We are obliged to
eat our words. I said that I knew that p, and I thought I knew
that p, but now I realize that I did not know that p, and that
p is false. But though it may later turn out that my claim to
know that p was false, this does not necessarily detract from it
having been reasonable for me to believe that p. Of course if
p turns out to be false then it is no longer reasonable to
believe that p, but it does not necessarily cease to have been
reasonable to believe that p on the evidence previously available.
In this way claims to hold a belief rationally differ from
claims to know. This difference means that the whole question
of rational belief deserves to be treated as a topic related to,
but different from, the problem of knowledge. The question of
rational belief needs to be looked at in its own right, and
also in relation to the question of knowledge, and especially
in relation to the fallibility of claims to knowledge.
The problems of knowledge are made most acute by the impact
of sceptical questioning. It is the various forms of scepticism
which reveal problematical features in epistemology. Against
radical scepticism it has been argued^ that a doubt which doubts
everything is not a doubt. This counter argument against
radical scepticism has a certain force. It notes that doubt
depends for its expression on certain assumptions. This reply
to scepticism maintains that one cannot formulate or articulate
a doubt without making some assumptions. Some things have to
be held steady so that others can be tested. But this counter
argument fails to defeat one of the main points which a sceptic
can put forward. The sceptic may not argue that we could be
mistaken about everything. A more limited challenge may be
presented. This can still be quite serious. It is the
argument that any one of our beliefs, or claims to knowledge,
may turn out to be mistaken. This challenge is quite sufficient
to throw doubt on every tenet that we hold, as it leaves us
uncertain which is, and which is not, in fact true. We realize
that this weakened sceptical challenge does not suggest that
every member of our belief set is false, but it does cast
doubt on each individually and on very many subsets of our total
set of beliefs.
Our confidence in what we claim to know or in what we
merely believe is undermined by sceptical questioning. Our
u
tenets are open to correction. It may therefore turn out that
though we think we know that p, yet p may he false after all and
our claim to know that p may he undermined. One response to
this weakened sceptical challenge is to attempt to find some
beliefs which are incorrigible. Obviously if there is no way
in which p can possibly be false then our claim to know that p
cannot be undermined in this manner. If p is an incorrigible
statement then there is no risk of p being false, but there may
be other reasons why we do not after all know that p.
To err is human and the contention of fallibilism is that
we often err, or that there is almost always a possibility that
we are in error. It is therefore the view that we are almost
always prone to error, rather than the view that we are almost
always mistaken. If the fallibilist challenge is correct, then
it has considerable consequences for any theory of knowledge.
We only know that p, if several conditions for knowledge are
met, including the prime condition that p be true. If we are
always prone to error then any one of these conditions may fail
and our supposed knowledge degenerate into mistaken belief or
inadequately grounded belief.
Claims to knowledge can fail not only because p turns out
to be false, but because some other condition for knowledge is
not met. For example a fellow walker may say, after a quick look
at the sky at the start of a ten mile walk, that he is going to
take a chance on the weather and leave his waterproof clothing
behind. At the end of a sunny morning he says 'There^ I knew
it wouldn't rain'. It is clear that he hoped that it wouldn't
rain, but by no means clear that he knew it. If he had at the
start said that he knew it wouldn't rain because he had
listened to the local weather forecast, I might be less inclined
to doubt his claim at the end of the morning (even though I
fear that the forecast is not regularly updated, and suspect
that sometimes the announcer will continue to predict a dry day
when rain is beating upon his studio window). But a quick look
at the sky really was an inadequate justification. I think
that he may have (confidently) believed that it wouldn't rain,
and had some evidence to support his belief but I don't really
think that he knew. Had he said that he knew that the walk
across the hills was only seven miles and not ten because he
had measured it on the map, I would accept his claim, as long
as I had reason to believe that he was an experienced map
reader. It is necessary for knowledge that p is true, that
someone (confidently) believes that p and has good ground for
believing it. A further condition may also be necessary but
for the moment three will suffice. If any of these three fail^
then we may have an instance of confident but mistaken belief,
or of a lucky guess that turns out to be true, or of confident
true belief that was inadequately justified, but not of knowledge
My main concern is with those cases where the claim to know
fails because p later turns out to be false, but these other
factors must be noted.
The factors other than the truth of p are complex, and the
failure of any one of them may undermine a claim to know.
Suppose my companion says at the outset that the walk is only
seven miles but is not confident about his map reading. He use
a pedometer and at the end of the morning it reads seven miles
exactly. He may say 'I knew it', and it is quite in accordance
with normal usage to say such a thing. But it is also in
accordance with normal usage to have reservations about such
a claim. Hesitant true belief is not really knowledge even if
we tolerate the loose usage of the term 'know' in such instances
It has been claimed that we use the word 1 know1 in a strong and
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in a weak sense. But this view is not without its difficulties
It might be better to say that we use the word know' in several
senses, some weaker and some stronger. This would capture the
fact that in some instances we tolerate the claim 'I knew it',
though on a more rigorous examination of the claim we would
reject it. There is a discrepancy or apparent contradiction her
in the way in which the word 'know' is allowed to slither in
ordinary language. The context makes it clear to the speaker
of ordinary language that the claim 'I knew it' is not to be
subjected to the demands of questioning as to whether hesitant
true belief really amounts to knowledge. This shift of sense
or connotation can be disturbing to those who wish to capture
the sense of natural languages in a formal system. But it
need not be a sign of inconsistency. In the study of one's
own language or other natural languages a good dictionary or
lexicon will list and classify different senses of a word by
citing them in context. Thus the difference between knowing
a fact and being acquainted with a person will be marked out.
There is no reason to think that formal systems cannot be
adjusted to take account of this vital feature of natural
languages. Just as the lexicon codes the different uses or
senses of a word, so a formal system can distinguish between
11
, kg, k^ and so on. Indeed unless a formal system has some
means of coping with vagueness in natural language, it is likely
to be the formalization which introduces confusions which a
competent linguist would be able to untangle.
In the case in question 'I knew it* is equivalent to 'I was
right' rather than to ' It was an instance of real knowledge
from the outset'. But the example indicates an inconsistency in
our usage of the term know, only if we admit the premiss that
all uses of the same word must have the same sense. But this
latter premiss is evidently false. We do use words in different
senses, and this is also the case with the word 'know'. In
saying this I am not committing myself as yet on further
distinctions between different senses of the word 'know', nor on
whether these create or resolve epistemological problems.
Except in the weaker sense just identified, we do not count
hesitant true belief as knowledge. This fact may have a bearing
on another issue^ namely the awareness of whether one is or is not
confident about a particular belief. It could be argued that if
one knows as against merely believes that p,then one must at
least be confident that p, and that each of us knows whether
or not we are confident in a given case. Suppose that we grant
that we know whether or not we are confident in any given case.
This would entail that if we are not confident, then we know
that we do not know that p, for we know that we only believe
that p. But the converse would not be entailed. Though we
might know that we were confident that p, it would not follow
from this that we knew that p, and we might know that we were
confident that we knew that p but not know that we knew that
7-0
p. So we might know that we were confident that we knew that
p, hut not know that we knew that p. In order to know that
we knew that p other conditions would need to he satisfied, such
as an adequate justification. So only limited inferences could
he drawn from the assumption that we know whether or not we are
confident in a given case. We can know that we don1t know that
p, if we know that we lack confidence. But even if we knew
that we were confident, we would only know that we were confident,or
we would only know that we were confident that p, not necessarily
know that we knew that p.
It may he different however with incorrigible propositions.
In the case of some mathematical equations there is no risk that
the proposition will turn out to he false. In a very complex
equation there is a risk of error. But in very simple ones such
as 2 + 2 = 4, there might he a risk that we might misread one of
the figures, hut there is no risk that sane, healthy, and
intelligent adult citizens will he liable to error as to its
truth or falsity. In the case of such an incorrigible mathematical
truth one might argue that merely to he confident that it is true
is sufficient for one to know it, and to know that one knows it.
If this view is correct then there would he at least some cases
in which one not only knew that p, hut also knew that one knew it.
If this view is correct then this situation would obtain, hut
only with a very specialized group of indubitably true
propositions. But is it correct? Malcolm in the second version
of his article 'Knowledge and Belief' reformulated his claim on
this subject. Originally he had written 'Reflection can teach
me that I know something in this [the strong] sense'. Later
2|
he corrected, this to '... reflection can make us realize that
we are using 11 know it' in the strong (or weak) sense in a
particular case'. The second, formulation is more resbicted.
Malcolm's examples included, statements reporting direct
perception as well as simple mathematical equations, so his
correction involves at least two factors. These need separate
discussion, and I propose to take the case of reports of
perception first. Malcolm's examples envisage a situation
like this. A says that he knows there is a sheet of paper
in front of him. He realizes that he is using 'know' in a
strong sense. There is no way he can imagine what he claims
to he false, though others might imagine his claim to he false.
This seems to me to overstate the case. Others may indeed
imagine that A's claim is false, hy, for example, suspecting
that A is deluded. But so might A himself. Malcolm's 'strong
sense' is too strong. I grant that the word 'know' is used in
different senses, and I have already noted an example of a
weaker sense of the word. But there are limits to the inferences
that may he drawn from this linguistic feature, and Malcolm seems
to have overstepped them. I may confidently helieve with good
ground that there is a sheet of paper in front of me, and he
aware that this situation obtains. This may lead me to say
emphatically that I know that there is a piece of paper here.
But even this strong knowledge claim does not wholly exclude
the possibility of error. Malcolm seems to think that the
possibility of error is there, and that others may recognize
this, but that I cannot both say 'I know' in the strong sense
and suppose that anything could disprove p. There is a problem
here, but what is it? It is erroneous to think that I could
justifiably say that there is no possibility of error. If
someone else can conceive of my being mistaken about the
paper, then I can. I cannot exclude the possibility of my
being subject to illusion or delusion. If it is incompatible
both to say 'I know that there is a sheet of paper here' and
to admit under pressure that I cannot exclude error, then it is
the first of these statements which is the source of the trouble.
The strong use of 'know' is running into some of the same
difficulties which afflict weaker uses of the term.
This problem must be explored further. If I do indeed
know that p, then p is true. But it does not follow from my
saying 'I know that p' that I do indeed know that p. It is
possible that p is false. But I cannot coherently say 'I know
that p and I believe that p may be false'. The problem is that
if I say that I know there is a piece of paper here, then I
cannot coherently also believe that I may be mistaken. Yet I
may be mistaken. Clearly I believe that I am not mistaken,
but I am also obliged if subjected to severe sceptical
questioning to admit that I may be mistaken even about matters
of direct perception. The upshot of this line of argument is
that though we may in practice say with emphasis 'I know that
p", this usage is problematical. Even the emphatic use of 'I
know that p' now looks as though at least in some contexts it
means something less than it appears to mean. It now seems in
these cases to be equivalent to 'I confidently claim that p'.
There may still be several senses of 'I know', but even the
supposedly strong sense is not always as strong as was supposed.
The difficulty just noted concerns statements of direct
perception. For the moment I propose to leave aside special
cases such as statements saying 'I know that I exist' and 'I
know that I believe something'. I propose next to consider the
case of claims to know mathematical truths. On the face of it
there is a difference between claims to know that 2+2=4
and claims to know that 99 ^ 99 = 9801. Both mathematical
statements are true. On the customary analysis of knowledge
if I have adequate justification for believing these statements
and confidently believe them, then I know them. It is xmlikely
that I would be hesitant about the first, but I might be
hesitant about the second, in which case I would not know it
though I might correctly but hesitantly believe it. As both
statements are necessarily true it is impossible that they
could turn out to be false. So here there is no question of a
claim to knowledge failing because p turns out to be false. But
there could be a failure of justification in the second case.
My mathematical skills may be very rusty. I believe that I
have correctly calculated 99 x 99 as 9801, but I have in fact
made two errors. The errors cancel each other out. My result
is therefore correct but scrutiny of my method immediately
reveals to you that I have made these two glaring errors.
Though what I claim to know is indubitably true, and though I
confidently believe it, and though I think I have adequate
justification, in fact I do not know it.
But the example just given must be carefully distinguished
from other situations in which a claim to knowledge has failed
or may fail. In other cases hesitation about p, or the falsity
of p, lead to the collapse of a claim to know that p. In this
case there is no possibility of p being false. Yet the claim to
know that p is false. It has failed not because of the falsity
of p, but because of error in the supposed justification for
believing that p. It follows that even if p is necessarily true
and we confidently assert that we know that p, we may still not
in fact know p. The existence of necessary truths is no defence
against the contention that any of our claims to knowledge may
fail.4 ,j
¥e must also, however, bear in mind the case of privileged
knowledge. Here at least we must note an exception. If I
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believe that I believe something, then I do believe something.
If I believe that I exist, then my belief is true. In these
very special cases a claim to knowledge could not fail. I do
know that I believe something, and I do know that I exist. In
neither of these cases can p turn out to be false, nor is my
belief hesitant, nor is it inadequately justified. So there
are some instances where claims to knowledge cannot fail. These
instances are very few. They require, however, that any
statement of epistemic fallibilism be qualified. The contention
of epistemic fallibilism must be formulated not as the view that
any of our claims to knowledge may fail, but that almost any of
our claims to knowledge may fail. But this concession arises
from the existence of privileged knowledge, rather than from the
existence of necessary truths.
If we do in fact know p then it must be the case that p
is true. But it does not follow that necessary truths or
incorrigible propositions are necessary for knowledge. I may
indeed know p simply "because I justifiably believe that p, and
p is in fact true, though not necessarily true. Noij as I have
argued, does it follow from the fact that I believe a necessary
truth that I know it. I may believe that p, when p is a
necessary truth, but my reason for believing that p is quite
erroneous. My erroneous route to the correct conclusion that
99 x 99 = 9801 provides another instance of a failure of claim
to know. This failure is an instance of epistemic fallibilism.
Epistemic fallibilism is different from doxastic fallibilism.
There are ways in which a claim to knowledge may fail which
differ from the ways in which a belief that p may fail. One
version of doxastic fallibilism locates the possibilities of
error either in the possible falsity of p, or in our capacity to
believe not-p when p is necessarily true. Even if this is a
correct description of doxastic fallibilism^ we also need to
note the further possibility of truly believing that p for
erroneous reasons. Any one of the conditions for knowledge
may fail. If we wish to characterize epistemic fallibilism, it
is therefore necessary to set out the conditions for knowledge
and to see how they may fail.
Much recent debate in epistemology focuses on the examples
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put forward by Gettier. His examples pose the problem of a
justified true belief which is dependent on a false statement.
These examples point to the inadequacy of the view that
knowledge is justified true belief. Gettier's examples have
led to a rash of efforts to amplify the three classic conditions
for knowledge by the addition of a fourth. This last is often
a defeasibility condition. If one takes this line, one then
redefines knowledge as non-defectively justified true belief.
Lehxer's 1974 solution to this difficulty was to conclude that
someone knows that p only if completely justified in believing
that p 'in the verific alternative to his corrected doxastic
system'.^ The verific alternative is then defined as a system
in which erroneous beliefs are replaced with their contradictorie
This attempts to ensure that S is completely justified in
believing that p in a way that does not depend on any false
statement. Lehrer's is one of several attempts to add a further
condition which would ensure that non-defectively justified true
belief was knowledge.
Vigorous debate still continues about the examples offered
by Gettier. It would be possible to include further discussion
at this point but it is not necessary to my argument. A further
clause may well need to be added to the definition of knowledge
as justified true belief. But if so that would strengthen and
not weaken my case. Fe would then have further possibilities
for the failure of claims to know. But three are already
sufficient, even if the briefer definition of knowledge as
justified true belief were adequate.
In order to characterize fallibilism I propose a more
complex description than Haack's and one which I hope is less
7vulnerable to the objections brought against Haack's definition.
My strategy is to argue that knowledge claims are vulnerable
because any one of the necessary conditions for knowledge may
fail. Thus Kap may be false either because a does not
(confidently) believe p, or because p is false, or because
a is not justified in believing p. If that is not enough, one
might also add that a may truly and justifiably believe p but
that the justification may depend on a false statement and so
be defective. The version of fallibilism -with which I am
concerned is broad. It is not concerned only with cases where
p turns out to be false, but with any case of the failure of a
claim to know that p.
The version of fallibilism which I have outlined is not
thoroughgoing scepticism. It does not maintain that we are
always mistaken, or even that we are almost always mistaken.
For does it maintain that we are always prone to error, only
that we are almost always vulnerable to error. There are very
few knowledge claims which are incapable of being false, and
incapable of being disbelieved, and incapable of being believed
on inadequate grounds.
This form of epistemic fallibilism is however not too
distant from scepticism. In raying that almost any of our claims
to know may be false, it leaves us vulnerable to doubt as to which
of our purported claims to know is in fact true, and which is
false. Kekes has argued that weak fallibilism will however lead
to the more sceptical strong fallibilism, if the rationality of
scientific methods is not defended. He accuses Popper and
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Kuhn of failure at just this point. He claims that they assert
rather than defend the view that the methods of science are
rational, and that their failure at this point allows weak
fallibilism to lead on to strong fallibilism. His claims are
far reaching and their implications will be addressed at greater
length as this work proceeds. For the moment it will suffice
to say that our account of fallibilism is close to what Kekes
describes as weak fallibilism. Whether or not it eventually
leads to more sceptical conclusions remains to be explored in
due course.
If knowledge requires at least that we have justified
true belief and if any of these conditions may fail, then a
series of possible outcomes may ensue. There is hesitant true
belief. I am presented with evidence which suggests the correct
conclusion that a new particle has been discovered. But I am
incapable of grasping the full force of the arguments, and only
hesitantly accept a view which turns out to be utterly convincing.
Or there is unjustified true belief. I arrive at the truth but I
do not know it, because my reason for believing the true answer
is erroneous. In another instance I may possess strong evidence
that p, and confidently believe that p,but later discover that
p is false. I suppose one calls this justified but false belief,
though the description is not a happy one. The difficulty draws
attention to the variation in meaning of the word 1 justified'
in different contexts.
If more than one condition for knowledge is deficient
then further possibilities arise. I may believe something
without justification and it may indeed be false. False belief
for which there was scanty evidence, or perhaps none at all is
not unknown, I have heard or read people who give every
impression of believing that all inhabitants of a certain
country (say Argentina) are to be despised, or all admired, on
no other evidence than that they are citizens of that country.
There is ample evidence that beliefs of this kind are neither
justified nor true (no matter what the nationality may be).
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Further examples "begin to reveal complexities of "belief not yet
discussed. For example there may be some evidence for p, yet I
may hesitantly believe that p, or even disbelieve p, and p
indeed be false. Or again I may disbelieve p, as I lack
evidence for p, but p may actually be true. And yet again there
may be no evidence for p and I only hesitantly believe p, or
refuse to believe p, and p is indeed false.
Even the examples given in the preceding paragraph may not
exhaust the matter. If knowledge requires a fourth condition,
then the list of examples could be extended. But it is already
evident that my argument needs to look at the character and
variety of beliefs and the■ evidential support for beliefs, and
not solely concern itself with the special (though very complex)
case of claims to knowledge.
There is another and more serious reason for turning to the
question of rational belief rather than that of knowledge. I
only genuinely know that p if (amongst other things) p is indeed
true. But the concept of truth has its own difficulties in this
connection. It is worth starting with a simple example. G is
a secretive and autocratic prime minister and A and B are
members of her cabinet. B firmly believes that there is a
plan to hold an election next year, but that this is a secret
not divulged to A, If A then comes to B and offers detailed
information suggesting that C will ' go to the country in the
spring', B suspects that the secret is out. He says to C
'A knows we are planning a snap spring election'. C has
however no such firm intention. Relative to B's beliefs about
C1s plans, A 'knows' of the early election plan. B says that
A knows p, because amongst other things B firmly believes that
p is true and the other conditions for A knowing p seem to be
met. But p is false, though B does not realize it. If we
suppose that B is garrulous and that D also believes that there
is an early election plan, B will divulge A's information to D,
and B and D will agree that A knows of the early election plan.
The use of the word 'know' is not only tolerated but encouraged
as long as there is agreement between B and D that the belief
in question is true. If it becomes evident later that there
will be no such election, and that C had no such plan, the
statement A knows that p or A knew that p has to be withdrawn.
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In normal conversation the vocabulary of knowledge is
used so long as the speaker and listener agree on the truth of
what is at issue. In the example of the secretive prime
minister, B and D agree that p is true (though it is not) and
so agree in saying that 'A now knows that p'. Relative to
the information available to B and D, p appears to be true, and
so it seems that A knows p. But the subsequent withdrawal of
the vocabulary of knowledge reveals that the language of
knowledge incorporates realist assumptions. A claim to
knowledge may be made, and accepted, so long as the speaker
and hearers agree on the truth of p, but it is not perpetuated
once p is shown to be false. (Of course other factors are also
relevant to knowledge, but in this instance we may ignore them)
There are some areas in which there is no danger of p being
shown false, but many areas where it i_s in jeopardy. The
difficulty posed by the need to revise claims to knowledge is
a serious one. At a much higher level of generalization it
raises issues about the character of reality on which Kuhn and
Popper take very different stances. Popper claims that the
task of criticism is to produce theories of increasing
verisimilitude. As successive conjectures are put forward
in place of earlier refuted conjectures, it is hoped that a
closer approach to reality is being made. Kuhn denied any such
possibility, and argued that truth may be a term with only
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intratheoretic application. But these heady heights of grand
generalization require a longer approach. What is sufficient
for our present purpose is to note that claims to knowledge
are accepted on the basis of intersubjective agreement, but are
withdrawn when it becomes evident that they are incompatible with
an actual state of affairs. Of these two situations the
withdrawal is the more significant. It points to the fact that,
in many cases, knowledge is dependent on states of affairs
beyond the control of those claiming to know.
In the case of the secretive Prime Minister had she said
to B that A knew of her plan for an early spring election then
the truth of p would not be in question (as long as she was
not being Machiavellian). But in the case of statements claiming
knowledge of, say, the age of the universe, then the ultimate
truth of the matter is very much in question. In view of the
need to withdraw claims to knowledge in such areas it is clearly
wise to deal with direct statements rather than with
propositional attitudes. Talk of 'revisable knowledge'
introduces unnecessarily paradoxical features into epistemology.
Claims to know are withdrawn, they are not revised. But it is
simpler to deal with (and if necessary to revise) statements
such as 'The universe is "between ten and twenty thousand
million years old' rather than the more complex 'We know that
or 'our scientific knowledge includes the conclusion
that...'.
There are, however, occasions when propositional attitudes
are at issue, and it is with some of these occasions that I am
concerned. It is appropriate to ask how we know, or whether
we know that certain things are the case. It is also
appropriate and sometimes preferable to ask whether it is
rational to believe that such things are the case and why it
should be rational to believe this. Where propositional
attitudes are at stake there are advantages in focussing on
rationality of belief rather than on knowledge. Chief amongst
these advantages is that already outlined in the argument of
the preceding pages. Claims to knowledge can and do fail for
several kinds of reason, and consequently they need to be
withdrawn. But in the case of rational belief the process of
withdrawal is less complex. If I had good reason at time t^
to believe that p, and at time am presented with a
refutation of p, I may still correctly be able to maintain
that it was then rational for me to believe that p, even though
it no longer is so. Rationality of belief is a function of
the available evidence, whereas knowledge depends on a wider
range of factors. It is also worth considering whether the
concept of knowledge is capable of being defined in terms of
belief. If knowledge were correctly defined as undefectively
justified true belief, then belief would be a more primitive
category than knowledge. But the continuing debate over the
fourth condition of knowledge is only one reason for caution
in pressing this claim. The question of the definition of
belief is itself problematical and one must not too readily
assume from the frequent efforts to define knowledge in terms
of belief that the category of belief is itself clear and
distinct.
In this chapter I have set out what I consider to be one
important feature of the notion of rational belief. This is the
discussion of the relation between the problems of rational
belief and the problems of knowledge. I have argued that in
focussing on the first of these we may be making some contribution
to some of the problems of the second. The desire to know, and
even the desire to know that we know is deep seated. But in
many cases we may have to settle for something less. If we could
at least in such cases defend the view that our beliefs about
these matters are rational, we would have made some progress. So
I propose to consider further what it is to believe, and what is
involved in the claim that there are criteria for defending the
rationality of some of our beliefs.
Chapter Two Belief and. Rational Belief.
If we are to discuss the rationality of a specific set of
our beliefs we need to have some idea of what belief is. A
concern with rational belief involves an exploration of belief
as well as an exploration of the rationality of particular sets
of beliefs. This is not some distant preliminary matter but
one which is central to the whole notion of rational belief.
In discussing the character of belief certain problems will
quickly become apparent. One of these is a distaste in certain
quarters for the whole notion of propositional attitudes. Could
we not confine ourselves to the discussion of statements rather
than beliefs? Or even better limit ourselves to the discussion
of the truth or falsity of sentences? I have stated very bluntly
an objection which is usually made more indirectly. What is
more usually done is to point to the complications which the
language of belief brings with it. I shall indeed very soon
consider some of those complications. They are real and
difficult. But I also propose to set out, perhaps with excessive
brevity, some factors which make me wish to persevere with
language of belief.
Discussing the truth or falsity of sentences is all very
well, but it does not do justice to some of the other factors
involved. Sentences are uttered; they are spoken by people.
Those people may utter the sentences with varying degrees of
conviction. Also if we cannot decide the truth or falsity of
a sentence we might still wish to consider how probable it is.
Such probability is an evidential probability. I shall argue
that this is not to be confused with mathematical probability,
but involves episternic or doxastic factors. Further, sentences
cannot always be considered on their own. Discussion of one
sentence about Caesar involves us in a whole complex of other
statements, sentences, assertions and I would insist, beliefs
about past history. So there is a proper place not only for
the discussion of sentences but also of beliefs.
There are at least two objections to the free use of
language including phrases such as 'a believes that'. One of
these objections is the confusion which can arise as a result of
referential opacity. Let us suppose that Sharp is a philosopher
who knows something about Roman philosophy but has not studied
Roman republican history. In this case Sharp believes that
Cicero studied philosophy. But we will also suppose that Sharp
does not believe that Tully studied philosophy. The identity of
Cicero and Tully happens not to be known to Sharp. The problem
has wider implications. We cannot (quite) say that Sharp believes
p & -p. We have to allow that where propositional attitudes
are concerned the following situation may obtain. Two individuals
may be identical, but the same things cannot be said of them.
Hintikka's proposal was to resolve this"^ by speaking of individuals
in different possible worlds. But this leads us by another
route to just the sort of difficulty that propositional attitudes
have long been seen to produce. It leads to some kind of
commitment to the existence of conceptual entities. Wot only are
there problems because of the obscurity of identity noted above,
but also because the attempt to resolve such problems leads to
a more complex and less economical ontology. Once we start
attempting to analyse beliefs (or other aspects of intensionality)
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we are involved with a wider range of entities. Extensions
can "be analysed in terms of truth values, classes, and relations.
Intensions involve us with objects of thought, or with possible
worlds.
So there are difficulties of formulating procedures for
coping with referential opacity. But the attempt to resolve
these difficulties leads to a more elaborate ontology. This in
turn raises a further problem. It is not clear whether there is
a separate class of intentional sentences which are capable of
being marked off from other sentences. (if there are, then the
existence of such a class of sentences might help to confirm
psychophysical dualism. Philosophers such as Chisholm wish to
maintain just such a view). Sentences of the form 'a believes
that' might then not only be classed as intensional but also
as intentional. Despite Gornman's objections,"^ it is
inherently plausible that we should so classify cognitive
sentences and especially belief sentences. The latter are
sentences which refer to mental activities and therefore intentional.
Those who have reservations about belief statements have
objected to them both on the grounds that they are intensional
and on the grounds that they are intentional. In the former case
they do not permit the substitution of extensionally equivalent
phrases in the clause following 1 a believes that'. They resist
the desire of some philosophers to find an extensional
translation for intensional sentences. This in turn means that
such sentences require a more complex ontology. But if these
sentences are also intentional as well, they raise more basic
difficulties. They refer to mental activities and they cannot
readily be translated into sentences which speak of simple
physical entities and processes. If my argument is to make
positive use of belief sentences then I must at least indicate
in outline why I resist the objections brought against them.
Both objections derive from the quest for a unified science.
In the one case there is the desire to make language about mental
process translatable into sentences about physical processes. In
the other case there is the desire to translate all sentences
into the simpler language of extensional sentences. Once these
objections are starkly presented they can be entitled the
physicalist thesis and the extensionality thesis. The two can
be briefly considered in sequence.
The physicalist thesis put forward, for example, by Hempel
is in any case not the only way to uphold the more important
thesis of the unity of science. All that is necessary is for
statements about mental events to be compatible with statements
about physical events. It is not necessary for the former to be
reducible to the latter. Further the argument could be reversed.
If statements about the mental did in the end turn out to be
irreducible to statements about the physical, this is not
necessarily a ground for calling the former into question. If
irreducibility were ever proved it might favour Chisholm's view
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as against that of Hempel. It might favour psychophysical
dualism. But the argument over this can at present be left to
one side as there is no compelling reason at present to think
that one of these views has prevailed over the others. Belief
statements are an integral part of natural language, and a
necessary part of psychology and this is a sufficient reason,
for the present, to continue to use them. I do not thereby
commit myself to Chisholm's dualism, merely to the rejection
of physicalist reductionism as a ground for calling statements
about belief into question.
The objection arising from the extensionality thesis also
requires discussion here, though it too will inevitably have to
be considered briefly. Quine is one of the chief antagonists in
this regard. He does not propose the abolition of propositional
attitudes, indeed he admits that they are not clearly dispensible.
He says this despite the fact that such sentences involve
intensions and his opinion that intensions are creatures of
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darkness in need of exorcism. There are several problems. One
is ambiguity. 'Ralph believes that someone is a spy' may be
construed in a relational or in a notional sense. In the first
case there is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy. In the
second case Ralph believes that there are spies. The problems
grow when we allow quantification into a belief context. Such
a procedure allows sentences to be true or false depending not
on the individual to which reference is made, but on the
description of that individual. Thus Ralph believes the man
in the brown hat to be a spy. But the man in the brown hat
is Ortcutt whom Ralph does not believe to be a spy. If we are
not careful we say of Ortcutt that Ralph does and does not
believe him to be a spy, Quine and others have discussed the
consequent difficulties at great length. Central to the
difficulties is this. In intensional contexts truth and falsity
seem to depend not on reference to individuals but on the
phrases used to describe individuals. But this leaves us with
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an overpopulated mental universe in which there are as many
entities as there are descriptions. Further we cannot
satisfactorily resolve the question of when two intensions are
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or are not identical. The objections which Quine has raised
certainly reveal that there are obscurities and difficulties
involved in dealing with intensions. But they do not exclude
the use of sentences containing propositional attitudes. Indeed
Quine admits that they are not clearly dispensable. We do need
a better principle for the individuation of attributes but we
should not for that reason reject sentences of the form a
believes that p.
Though some intensions are also intentional some are not.
Modal sentences are intensional and raise similar difficulties
over identity and description, but are not intentional and do
not obviously indicate mental discourse. Belief statements are
both intensional and intentional and do belong to a realm of
discourse which requires reference to mental activity. Chisholm
has maintained that one can specify a set of belief sentences
which have a distinct set of interrelationships. The entailments
and non entailments between them mark off belief sentences as a
distinct set of intentional sentences and these he says are a
16
sufficient condition for identifying the sphere of mental activity.
My argument accepts some of Chisholm,s bold contentions without
requiring all of them. I agree that the relation between sets
of belief sentences is one where attention to entailments and
non entailments is essential. I do not necessarily claim that
a unique set of such relationships obtains in belief contexts.
I neither accept nor reject Chisholm's argument that intentionality
is a sufficient condition for identifying mental activity. But
I do agree that belief sentences entail a reference to a
believing subject. That admission is however open to a series
of possible interpretations in terms of the relation of mental
events to physical events. My argument simply requires that
belief sentences speak of the behaviour of personal agents.
That behaviour may be analyzed in psychological or physiological
language, or by a combination of both, but that issue is one
which goes beyond the scope of the justifiability of using
sentences incorporating the verb 'to believe'. I happen to take
the view that one cannot simply reduce language about persons
and beliefs to language about physical events though one might
coordinate the two sets of discourse. But that issue cannot be
pursued in detail here.
Statements of belief (or of knowledge) require reference
to a believing or knowing subject. Though we sometimes for
brevity write Bp for someone believes that p, we should if
more careful write Bap or Bcp, to say that a or c believes that
p. But this reference to a knowing or believing subject is not
to be overlooked. An interesting argument has been directed by
Haack against Popper. She points out that Popper envisages
knowledge without a knowing subject. But Popper also maintains
fallibilism, and in order to characterize fallibilism one does
need to refer to a subject who may be mistaken. The argument
for a view of fallibilism similar but not identical to that of
Haack is given earlier in this work, and it is worth noting
here that this view of fallibilism also requires a reference
to a knowing or believing subject. Fallibilism is quite widely
held, and it is worth noting, in passing, this argument that
an objection to discussions of sentences with references to
believing subjects would require either the abandonment or
the reformulation of fallibilism as defined above.
In order to discuss rational belief it is necessary to
discuss belief. In order to discuss belief one must first
note difficulties and objections. The problem of extensionality
is one such difficulty which has already been considered briefly.
Whether belief is or is not dispositional is another issue which
has been much debated, and must be considered next. It is natural
to infer from some belief statements that these describe the
actual mental state of an individual person at a particular time.
Thus if I am questioning a colleague, his beliefs may become
more clearly apparent as the discussion proceeds. I may reasonably
infer from his replies that he is actually thinking about the
topic under discussion at the time. So in these circumstances
I may say to a third party, 'It is clear that IT believes in
Platonic abstract entities this afternoon.' If I am expressing
a desire for a more limited ontology and IT is directly mentioning
that he believes in Platonic universals, then it is reasonable
to hold that, at least in this instance, his belief is an active
mental occurrence. But it is also notoriously the case that
not all sets of sentences about belief can be construed in this
manner. It is for example fairly evident from my behaviour
that I believe that the gravitational force of this planet does
not vary dramatically. I do not customarily act in such a way
as to suggest that at any moment the muscular exertion normally
necessary to step over a one metre interval might suddenly
deposit me six metres away. But except when writing this
paragraph no such Belief is consciously or at least verbally
formulated in my mind. Today it is so formulated, but when I
was walking to my office yesterday it was not. The language
of belief is diverse. It may imply a present precisely
formulated mental occurrence or it may imply a disposition
to act in a certain way. There is complexity here and some
attempt to explore it is necessary.
The attempt to say that belief is a mental act is open
to objections. One of these objections is that we say that
someone believes a certain proposition even in cases where we
would also deny that he is currently entertaining that
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proposition. The belief in the constant force of the gravity
of our planet is one such example. But in at least some cases
the belief in a certain proposition at least includes the
mental act of entertaining that proposition. I say proposition
because we do in practice assume that a single belief may be
expressed in different sentences. Let us suppose that I saw
a tall red haired man removing the one and only blue bicycle
from the rack outside the Arts Faculty. One of my colleagues
owns just such a bike, and a few minutes later he expresses
dismay at the disappearance of his machine. I may say either
that I have just seen a tall red haired man removing the blue
bike or that the blue bike was removed a few minutes ago by
a tall man with red hair. The sentences differ but the belief
which gives rise to the similar utterances is more or less
the same. The use of the term proposition is a convenient
way of describing a situation where several slightly different
sentences express largely the same "belief. I "believe a
proposition p, if I entertain one of several sentences which
are closely related to one another in content. I am aware that
some philosophers wish to manage 'without propositions at least
for scientific purposes. But we need some device for coping
with the fact that, having seen what I have just seen, I may
utter any one of a number of similar sentences, each of which
is likely to send my friend in hot pursuit of a red haired
man with a blue bike. I use the term proposition merely to
indicate what it is that I believe about the bike is capable of
being expressed by one of a class of related sentences. I grant
that in the longer run a more satisfactory analysis of, or
replacement for, the notions of synonymity and propositions
is needed, but the quest for such a replacement is likely to
continue for some time.
The case of the stolen bike provides an example where my
belief is a current mental state. But it is difficult to say
just what it is that I am currently entertaining when I believe
that a tall male red head stole the blue bike. I can express
my belief by uttering one of a class of related sentences. In
that case it might be preferable to use just that idiom for
describing what it is that I believe. So I could propose the
following as a description of my current state of entertaining
the belief that p.
CB1 'I believe that p' is virtually equivalent to 'I am
currently about to assert one of a class of related
sentences q, r, and s...'
But this will not do for two reasons, one of which I propose
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to pursue, and one of which I merely note for the present.
The one which I will only note is that I have not specified
just how sentences q., r, and s... are related. But more
serious is my firm conviction that CB1 does not do justice to
my belief. It begins to analyse my current actual belief in
terms of a disposition, but the disposition as described is
neither the whole story nor even essential to it. I would
still believe that the bike has been taken even if its owner
did not appear, and I had no reason to think it stolen, and
so no pressing reason ever in the future to utter any sentence
whatsoever about the bike. So CB1 might be amended to a
counterfactual conditional.
CB2 1 I believe that p' is in this case virtually equivalent
to 'I would assert one of a class of related sentences
q, r, and s ... if asked about what I have just seen.1
But even this does not do justice to the situation. In this
instance there is not only a disposition, but also an actual
entertainment of a proposition. I am actually entertaining
some thought or other about the blue bike. My conviction is
that I introspect, and am aware that I am entertaining a
belief. It is not simply the case that someone else may say
I have a disposition to act in a certain way. At least some
beliefs are actual mental occurrences.
Now I grant that I can verbalize my belief about the
bike. One could therefore argue that my belief insofar as it
is verbalized requires the use of a language which is shared.
But the belief about the bike may be expressed in terms of
different but related sentences. So is the belief itself the
entertainment of one of these sentences, or the class of such
sentences, or the proposition expressed "by each of these
sentences, if 'are are to tolerate the use of language about
propositions? None of these options is without difficulty.
The dispositional element in my belief can be expressed in
terms of any of the sentences or by pursuit of the thief, but
the actual occurrence of the belief is harder to pin down. ¥e
need to satisfy the conviction that introspection leads us to
say that something more is happening than a disposition to
utter some sentence or other (or to engage in some physical
action of another kind).
Perhaps we could try the following strategy and invoke
the mental entertaining of words or imagery. This would
suggest
CB3 'I believe that p' is in this case virtually equivalent
to 'I am entertaining words or images such that if asked
about what I have just seen I would utter one of a class
of related sentences q, r, s ...'
This does not resolve the continuing problem of specifying the
relation between q, r, and s, but it does attempt to articulate
the difference between a belief which is a conscious mental
event and one which is a disposition to act without being a
conscious occurrence. There is also the further question of
whether the dispositional analysis might not itself be
problematical. But at least we have made some progress.
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It might also be possible to make some advance with our
class of related sentences. ¥e need to invoke such a class if
we wish to say that any one of a series of similar utterances
is evidence for the same belief. Let us take a simpler example.
I am now looking at a red pen and I would truthfully answer
'yes' to the question 'Did you just now consciously believe
that there was a red pen on the desk?' But I might express my
belief about the red pen by uttering one of several sentences.
I would certainly assent to each of the following sentences:
(q) 'There is a red pen on my desk', (r) 'This pen has red ink
in it', (s) 'A red pen is in front of me'. (i could of course
also truthfully be said to believe that there was a red pen here
if I were disposed to assent to q v r v s, or just to use the
pen for underlining, even if I had not consciously formulated
the belief). But what is it about the set of sentences (q, r, s)
which leads some people to say that if I assent to q or r or s
then I believe the proposition p to the effect that there is a
red pen here? Synonymity is problematical for several reasons,
one of them being that the three sentences are not always
substitutable salva veritate. Locutions such as 'utterers of
q and r are samesayers' are open to a similar objection.
Perhaps we could argue that q and r and s are substitutable
salva veritate in answer to the question (c) 'Is there a red
pen here?'. (They are so if the question is asked at the
correct time and place). So we could call these sentences
c-synonymous, or c-substitutable, if they are interchangeable
as answers to a question c, (though not so to questions d or e).
The procedure outlined above is an attempt to maintain
that at least some beliefs are mental occurrences, and not
solely dispositions. I have tried to do so without undue reliance
on the problematical supposition that there are propositions.
I merely wish to maintain that there are cases of belief as an
occurrence, and that these are characterized by the entertainment
of words and images. That the further specification of these
words or images requires an appeal to a disposition to utter
one or another of a class of c-substitutable sentences I do
not see as a disadvantage. In wishing to draw attention to an
element of mental activity in the holding of some beliefs, I do
not aim to deny the role of dispositions in any attempt to
characterize belief. I merely wish to argue that the dispositional
account is not the whole story.
Those who emphasize the dispositional element in belief
do so with good reason when they draw attention to certain uses
of the vocabulary of belief, When we see a supposedly non-
interventionist Conservative government intervening in industry,
or in the affairs of Universities, we rightly infer that such a
government does believe in intervention, even if we suspect
that they have not fully considered the implications of their
behaviour, and might even deny that they are doing what it is
evident to others that they are doing. We say that they believe
in intervention because we detect a disposition to intervene,
at least in certain notorious instances. Indeed we could go
further. We see large amounts of money made available to set
up a new industry in Northern Ireland, and large amounts of
money withdrawn in order to close down certain University
departments. Here we have a disposition to intervene. Even
if we were told by those acting in such a manner that they
did not believe in Government intervention we would rightly
be highly sceptical about such protestations. We do in
practice use the -word '"believe* -when we correctly note a
disposition. If the disposition were not present we might
withdraw such an inference, "but we would not do so merely
because those disposed to Government intervention say that
they do not believe that Governments should intervene.
But other examples reveal the complexity of this issue.
There are occasions when we say that a tendency to behave in a
certain manner does more to reveal someone's real beliefs than
their own professions of belief. Thus if I declare that I believe
punctuality to be a virtue, but persistently arrive late for
meetings without good reason, it becomes apparent that I do not
genuinely believe that I ought to be punctual, and so presumably
do not genuinely believe that punctuality is a virtue. On the
other hand if someone else is persistently late despite declaring
a belief in punctuality, and is evidently genuinely upset and
apologetic about these persistent failures, then I would say
that they believed punctuality to be a virtue. There is an
interplay between profession of belief, consciousness of believing
something, and acting as if one believed it. Of course one could
say that a tendency to regret a failure to be punctual is a
disposition which provides evidence for the persistent latecomer's
genuine belief in the merits of punctuality. ¥e are confronted
with conflicting evidence because we detect contrary dispositions.
Another instance of conflicting dispositions results from
the force of habit. Lee cites the example of a long standing
19belief that the local cobbler is dependable. After a recent
series of his failures I may come to believe that he is not
dependable. But after an interval the old disposition may
resurface when I am questioned. When asked if he does a good job
I reply at once 'Yes he's dependable'. The next day I may
remember that I no longer believe this to be true. This example,
adapted from Lee, may show that a disposition continues though
the belief has changed. But that is not the only way to
describe the new situation. A dispositionalist might reply that
though the old disposition survives it has really been replaced
by a new one. The belief is now a new disposition to say after
due reflection that the cobbler is not dependable. But the
clause 'after due reflection' concedes the case that there is
more to belief than mere disposition. This seems as well
established as the argument that belief is not a matter of
conscious reflection alone. The problem which Lee poses is that
we are obliged to say that the belief has changed even though
the old disposition continues. Even if we say that the belief
is now the new dispoation, it is clear that we cannot simply
equate beliefs and dispositions.
The issue of sincerity is also a factor. Let us suppose
that there is a local politician called Slide who has a
disposition to utter sentences declaring his local authority
a 'nuclear free zone' . He vigorously opposes any proposal
to place missiles there, he refuses to take part in civil defence
exercises, and declares that his fellow citizens will be safe as
long as their town is a nuclear free zone. But Slide has his
own place reserved in a fall out shelter under the council
chambers. Do we say that he believes that his town is safe,
and believes that it is a nuclear free zone? Some of his
dispositions favour such an inference. But other of his
dispositions suggest that he really does not believe that there
is any such thing as a nuclear free zone, or at least that he
does not really believe that his town is at all safe from
nuclear attack. In this example it won!t do to say that S
believes p if S acts as if p is true. S acts as if p is true,
and S acts as if p is not true, and we say, if we think that
S is insincere in acting as if p is true, that he does not
really believe p, but really believes not p. In order to
decide which of a set of conflicting dispositions represents a
person's beliefs we require some further specification. S
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believes p if S is sincerely disposed to act as if p is true.
But S is only sincerely disposed to act as if p is true if S
believes that p is true. We have been obliged to invoke the
explanandum in order to explain the explanans.
The language of belief is complex. We can certainly in
some instances say that a belief may be inferred from someone's
behaviour without our assuming that this belief is at that time
consciously held. But at other times we need to assume that he
consciously assents to p if we are to say that he really believes
p. We must remember that this issue is complex when proceeding
to a consideration of the rationality of belief which is the
primary objective.
Belief and evidence.
In the pages which follow we will chiefly be concerned
with the question of rational belief. In most cases we can
proceed with an analysis which assumes that rational belief
can be treated in terms of conscious assent to certain sentences.
But I allow that there are many rational beliefs which do not
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take the form of conscious assent to sentences or classes of
sentences. I normally behave as one who believes that the force
of gravity on this planet is not perceptibly variable to those
walking to their offices. However in order to discuss the
rationality of such a belief, it is fair to assume that a belief
which is dispositional in character could become a consciously
entertained sentence and the evidential support for that
sentence be assessed. I propose,, therefore, to discuss rational
belief in terms of beliefs either in the form of sentences to
which conscious assent is given, or sentences which could be, or
would be, given such assent once debate or disputation arose.
The next task is to explore what is involved in saying
that a certain sentence is rationally believed. In order to
do that I wish to start with a proposed definition which may
require subsequent alteration.
RBI S rationally believes that p if S believes that p and
S has adequate evidential support for p.
He could then, just for the purpose of recalling the development
of the argument so far, compare this with the definition of
knowledge which was debated earlier. There we discussed an
analysis of knowledge which could be expressed as follows
K1 S knows that p if S has an undefeated justified true
belief that p.
He have already noted that K1 is by no means unproblematic.
It will however serve to point up one observation. In order
to say that S rationally believes that p we do not need to say
that p is true, nor do we need to say that the belief which S
has is indefeasible (or whatever). Perhaps we might say that
rational belief is (roughly) equivalent to justified belief.
I am, however, at present of the opinion that such a move would
lead to greater difficulties. The problem is that the term
'justified' can be variously construed. In some contexts we
say that S is justified in believing that p because S has
adequate evidential support for p, but in other cases we mean
that p is true, or that S has conclusive reasons for believing
that p. Indeed this very shift in the meaning of the term
'justified' may well contribute to some of the confusion which
arises in discussions of knowledge as justified true belief. I
do not, however, wholly exclude a link between justification and
evidential support. I simply maintain that it is preferable to
use the language of evidential support in discussing the character
of rational belief.
Another issue is the degree of adequacy which is required
of the evidence. He could insist that one rationally believes
that p only if there is greater support for p than for not p.
This could be expressed as follows:
RB2 S rationally believes that p if S believes that p
and S has greater evidential support for p than for
-P.
But this gives rise to a problem about those cases where the
evidence is evenly balanced. Are we then to say that it is
not rational to believe that p, and not rational to believe
that -p? A variety of options arises here. Perhaps the
simplest is to say that in cases where the evidence is evenly
balanced it is reasonable to suspend judgement. But other
theorists might prefer a different option. One could say in
this case that it is equally rational to believe p or to believe
not p. Or one could say that to suspend judgement is rational,
but to accept either p or not p is not unreasonable. This option
has the disadvantage that what is not unreasonable is differentiated
from what is reasonable. Finally one might say that neither
acceptance nor suspension of judgement is reasonable or
unreasonable, and that either course is arational. The difficulty
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is set out clearly by Lehrer and others in an article published
in 1967.
One tactic would be to supplement RBI with a cautious
definition of adequacy. This would simply state that S had
adequate evidential support for p at least when S had greater
evidential support for p than for not p. This would then leave
open the question of those cases where the evidence for and
against p was evenly balanced. This would be my minimal position.
But it would be better not to shirk the issue of evenly balanced
evidence. I wish to propose that rational and reasonable be
treated as equivalent and also that we regard what is not
unreasonable as reasonable. I would then argue that in
considering rational belief we are for the present to consider
only evidential factors. In considering rational behaviour
other issues may be relevant which do not affect the sense of
the word rational in the contexts which are being considered
here. I therefore favour the view that where the evidence is
evenly matched the rational doxastic procedure is to suspend
judgement.
This decision would mean that I would uphold RB2 and would
wish to supplement it with RB3.
RB3 S rationally suspends judgement with, regard to p if
S has equal evidential support for p and for -p.
My concern with rational belief is a concern which is directed
towards the relation between rational acceptance and the
strength of the evidence. I readily grant that in practical
affairs one may need to decide between two courses of action,
but that is a different issue from the one under consideration
here.
In the preceding paragraphs I have already anticipated
a further point. This is that I have begun to treat belief
and acceptance as roughly equivalent. Here is a further
contentious matter. Lehrer in an article published in 1979
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reviewed his earlier answer to the Gettier problem. In the
course of his reconsideration he recast his description of the
conditions for knowledge and, amongst other changes, substituted
the language of acceptance for the language of belief. In doing
so he explicitly differentiated the two terms. His argument
turns on a comparison of belief and acceptance with desire and
choice. He claims that one 'may refuse to accept what one
cannot help but believe, just as one may refuse to choose what
one cannot help but desire.' The problem here is that we do,
of course, in ordinary language use words like 'believe'
and 'accept' in a variety of different ways. Even if we narrow
the scope of both terms to the kind of examples considered in
this chapter, there is still variation in the precise sense
of the terms. But is it correct or necessary to suppose that
there is such a distinction as Lehrer makes? Are there cases
in which we correctly say that I cannot help believing something
but refuse to accept it? In the case of delusions I would
say not. If someone psychotically believes that his phone is
being personally monitored by Eonald Reagan he will not refuse
to accept this. But suppose someone who is not psychotic
cannot help believing that a certain former associate is not to
be trusted. Is it really the case that we could also say that
he refuses to accept that this person is not to be trusted? If
we did come to say that, would we not then be obliged to say
that he no longer maintains his former belief? Lehrer speaks of
sorting through our beliefs to decide which ones receive our
assent, but surely once we withhold assent from p we no longer
believe that p. Of course there is the phenomenon of lingering
suspicion, but that is not at all the same thing as continuing
to believe that p while refusing to accept p.
Other examples include the case of believing that someone
is well disposed but concluding from the evidence that he is
not, yet so wishing it to be the case that he cannot help
believing it. I would not call this belief but wishful thinking,
or wishing to believe. One may indeed wish to believe somethingj
but if one is confronted with evidence of its falsity, or with
lack of support for its truth( one must either reject it or
withhold assent. If I reject or withhold assent from a sentence
then I do not believe it, even if I most passionately wish it
were true. Conversely if I cannot bring myself to face the
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evidence" that a cherished belief is false then I do continue
to believe it, but I also continue to accept it, though
irrationally. In these contexts I therefore reject Lehrer's
distinction between belief and acceptance.
I grant that there is only a partial overlap between the
language of belief and the language of acceptance. Each of the
terms has a variety of uses. For instance I may believe that
I am mortal, and rationally accept that I am mortal, but not
emotionally accept that one day I will die. Also there are
uses of the language of belief which are not directly translatable
into the language of acceptance. If someone is persistently
late, I may say that he does not believe that punctuality is a
virtue; it is odd (though not perhaps impossible) to say that
he does not accept that punctuality is a virtue. But in what
follows I am chiefly concerned with those areas where the
language of belief and the language of acceptance does overlap.
I therefore propose to use the two terms interchangeably. I
grant that the two are not always interchangeable, but I reject
the view that in these contexts here they are not normally
capable of being substituted for each other. In what follows
I will be concerned with rational belief as rational acceptance
and where the one phrase is used I would normally assent to the
substitution of the other, at least for the present.
Up to this point I have deliberately oversimplified the
issue of rational belief or rational acceptance. I have done
so by considering only the relation between such belief and
what I have loosely termed ' evidence'. But matters are of
course much more complicated than that, and in due course the
analysis must be taken much further. For example, what I
have so far loosely classed as ' evidence' could be broken down
into further factors. There is, for any hypothesis h, a class
of factors which operate in its favour. Some of these are
57
theoretical, and some are observational, though the distinction
between these does not permit a total separation between them.
A higher level hypothesis will incorporate a certain amount
of higher level theory, and also various degrees of lower level
observation, which will themselves rely on lower level theory.
The distinction between higher and lower is here purely formal
and structural, and is related only to the analysis of this
hypothesis in terms of supporting evidential factors. (There
is further complexity here, especially if one were to uphold a
non-foundationalist epistemology.) An example may clarify
some of the points at issue.
Theoretical astronomers are divided between those who hold
that the universe will eventually suffer 'heat death' and those
who hold that there will be a 'big crunch'. On the first
hypothesis there is insufficient matter in the universe for the
gravitational force to prevent ever greater dispersion and loss
of heat. On the second hypothesis there is sufficient natter
for the currently receding galaxies and clusters of galaxies
to cease their expansion and be pulled back by gravitational
force in a process comparable to, but the reverse of, the
earlier expansion. For the moment I will leave aside the
further point that these are rival hypotheses. Each of these
hypotheses is supported by theoretical and observational factors.
For instance they each make certain assumptions about the amount
of matter in the universe, the present distances between the
galaxies and the momentum of their recession. They each try
to exclude reliance on totally novel factors, but rather construct
a hypothesis which draws inferences from available phenomena.
Here we have theoretical and observational factors. The
phenomena are the results of observations. The estimate of
the amount of matter relies on the observation of and
calculation of the mass of the galaxies. But this in its turn
involves further theoretical factors which make these
observations possible. Some of the observations may not be
direct but based on inferences from marks on a photographic
plate, which are interpreted as the result of photcns or other
radiation striking the plate, and coming from a galaxy of a
certain size and distance. Theory and observation are
intertwined.
Our initial assessment was that it is rational to believe
p iff there is more evidence for p than for -p. But it is
now clear that the terms used here are too simple. The term
'evidence' requires much further elaboration. Some people
might wish to restrict the term evidence to observed states of
affairs. But this is not so simple a matter, I grant that
observed states of affairs are relevant evidence. But there
are other factors in evidential support. I propose therefore
that we bear this distinction in mind in assessing whether
or not there is greater evidential support for p than for —p.
It is an issue to which we must return at a much later point
in the argument.
A further factor requiring this recognition is that the
same evidence may support rival hypotheses. For example
evidence e-^ to e^ may be observed. But hypotheses h and h'
may both explain the evidence equally well, and be equally
supported by the evidence. For example Rubens at certain
periods entrusted the execution of parts of his paintings to
his assistants. Let us suppose that Philby is an art lover
who comes across a previously unrecognized work in the style
of Rubens. He knows enough ahout art to know that this painting
is not a later forgery, nor hy any stretch of the imagination
could it be hy Rembrandt or SI Greco. But Philby, though he
can tell the difference between a Rubens and most other painters,
cannot tell the difference between a Rubens painted mostly by
the master and a Rubens painted mostly by the workshop. Ho
doubt to an expert Rubens scholar the evidence is there on the
canvas. But the evidence is not accessible to Philby, or at
least not recognizable by him. He has done well, as an amateur,
to identify the right school. So, for Philby, the evidence he
is capable of interpreting, favours two hypotheses equally well.
One is h 'This is a Rubens', the other is h' 'This is from
Rubens' workshop' . (¥e will interpret h and h' as if they
exclude one another for reasons of convenience). The evidence
that Philby can recognize, includes the sweeping gestures, the
fine drapery, the vivid colours, the resemblance of the faces
to models used by Rubens, and certain characteristic
arrangements of the figures on the canvas. We will suppose
that this is enough to render h more reasonable than any other
hypothesis except h', and to render h' more reasonable than
any other hypothesis except h. Given e-^ to e^ we could then
say it is rational for Philby to hold that h v h' is more
probable than any other hypothesis. But between h and h* he
cannot decide, though others might be able to do so. In this
case we can adopt the procedure of considering the disjunction
h v h' as well as separately considering h and considering h' .
Philby would be rational to say 'This is either a Rubens or
from his workshop*. But Philby would also he rational to
withhold judgement between h and h' .
I have introduced these two examples at the risk of straying
from the current theme, and at the risk of partially but
inadequately anticipating later steps in my argument. But I do
so advisedly, as it is necessary at this point to give some
indication that I am well aware that the matter of evidential
support is much more complex than the initial and highly
provisional analysis offered so far. But a complex analysis
must proceed by stages and has to begin somewhere. My initial,
if admittedly oversimplified starting point, is that rational
belief is a function of degrees of evidential support. In other
words that we assess the amount of support that the available
evidence gives to a hypothesis and this determines whether or
not it is rational to accept that hypothesis. The term evidence
is here used in the wider sense.
My proposal has led from the need to explain the character
of rational belief to the need to explain the notion of
evidential support. Only if some adequate sense can be given
to that notion will it provide any explication of the concept
of rational belief. It is therefore imperative that later
chapters explore further the murky notion of evidential support,
or the explanans will offer no greater clarity than did the
explanandum.
In these opening chapters I have argued that the elucidation
of rational belief is an important part of wider epistemological
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investigation. The theory of knowledge is a very "broad, area
with certain notable problems contained within its boundaries.
Not least of these is the relation between knowledge and belief.
I have accepted many of the arguments of those who maintain that
knowledge can be defined in terms of belief. Or rather I have
argued that belief and rational belief raise a more limited
set of problems than knowledge does, and that in studying them
we are examining some of the components of a theory of knowledge.
I have also argued that rational belief is worthy of investigation
in its own right. Indeed if the argument of this chapter is
correct then establishing that one rationally believes that p
could often be either an acceptable substitute for, or else a
first step towards, establishing that one knows that p. The
problems of rational belief are a subclass of the problems of
knowledge, but what is known is a subclass of what is rationally
believed. By investigating rational belief we address ourselves
to a crucial area within epistemology. In the next chapter I
propose to focus on a particular claim about rational belief
made by Basil Mitchell, This is the claim that there is a
broad analogy between different classes of rational belief.
Mitchell maintains that between scientific and historical and
religious or metaphysical beliefs there are certain affinities,
and that criteria for assessing the rationality of belief
in one of these areas are related to criteria for making
assessments in the others. This claim I wish to examine soon.
We may, however, use the term rational in more than one
sense. So some clarification of the various usages of the
term rational is required. Swinburne lists five different
levels of rationality and thus introduces a series of fine
distinctions and qualifications into the assessment of rational
acceptance. His rationality^ is the lowest level he regards as
worthy of the description rational. 'This merely regards
someone as rational if he holds p, and his belief is probable
given his inductive standards, and given his evidence. This is
indeed a minimal definition of rationality. As Swinburne
himself points out, a belief judged by these standards can only
fail if the person who holds it has failed to recognize an
inconsistency. But a more adequate definition of rationality
would look at other factors. These include whether an adequate
investigation of the evidence has been conducted. They also
would include whether the inductive standards being used are
adequate, or, if one preferred, whether the criteria for
judging the evidence are adequate. As we shall see later some
people use the term inductive in a narrower, some in a wider
sense. Hence my qualification that what we are here concerned
with is a matter of the criteria for judging the evidence not
just inductive standards in the narrower sense. Swinburne's
fifth, and highest, sense of rationality includes requirements
similar to these more exacting ones. In pursuing the question
of rational belief here, I am therefore much more concerned
with whether a belief is rational in the more exacting sense,
than whether it satisfies some easier test.
The various gradations which Swinburne proposes need not
concern us greatly at this point. It is sufficient to note
that his intermediate degrees of rationality represent cases
where the believer has investigated the evidence or criticized
his criteria to an extent which seems adequate to him, hut which
is not to he deemed fully adequate. In other words it is a
question of whether someone's belief is rational where judged
by his subjective standards. I do not propose to linger over
the details of this analysis. The subjective standards of an
individual are clearly not as adequate a test of rationality as
standards which are objectively correct, if it is indeed the
case that we have access to the latter. But that is precisely
one of the chief problems for any theory of rational belief.
Thus, I do not propose to adopt in detail Swinburne's five-fold
analysis of rationality. I do however accept that there is a
distinction to be drawn between beliefs held on the basis of
investigation and criteria which the believer holds to be
adequate, and beliefs held on a basis which is indeed adequate.
This issue is one to which we must return at a later point.
Two further related questions affect our notion of belief.
One is whether there is an 'ethics of belief' the other is
whether belief is or is not voluntary. These issues are related
because if we hold that someone ought to believe a certain
statement or ought not to believe it, then we must hold that
in some sense they are able to believe or not to believe it.
Wow this issue is not as simple as it might seem. At one time
Chisholm held that epistemic concepts are moral concepts. His
views then were similar to, but not identical with, the earlier
views of W.K.Clifford in his classic discussion of the ethics
of belief. But Chisholm's views on the matter were subjected
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to severe criticism by Firth. On the disputed view 1 S has
adequate evidence for h' actually means 'h is more worthy of
A-
belief by S than not-h' . But this is open to the following
objection. ¥e need, to be able to say that h is worthy of
belief because S has adequate evidence for h. But if the
two locutions are identical in meaning we are no longer able to
say that the evidence is the reason for the hypothesis being
worthy of belief. It would, as Firth points ou.t, also be
erroneous to say that 'this steak is tender' means 'this steak
is worth eating because (amongst other things) it is tender'.
All this does not exclude there being an ethics of belief
in some more qualified sense. One could, for example, debate
whether one ought to hold a belief or refrain from holding it
simply on evidential grounds. Let us suppose that a soldier
has been lost in action. His equipment is found scattered on
the battlefield, and there is no record of him having been taken
prisoner by the other side. This and further evidence makes it
reasonable to believe that he has been killed in action. His
wife is told that he is missing presumed dead. Should she
believe that he is dead? On purely evidential grounds let us
suppose that there is good reason for her to believe it. But
there is some slight reason for doubt. Though it is more
likely that his was one of many unidentified bodies given urgent
burial, and though a thorough check has been made amongst the
prisoners of war, let us suppose that there is a slight chance
that he escaped with injuries and is an unidentified casualty
in a foreign hospital. In view of this slight chance we might
well say that his wife ought on the evidence to accept the
view that he is dead, but ought not to act in such a way as
to exclude the possibility of his return. But in that case
we are saying that she ought not to give full assent to the
belief that he is dead. There are at least two factors here,
an evidential factor and a prudential factor. The weight of
the evidence obliges her to take the view that he is dead.
But it is also wise to recognize that the evidence is not
absolutely conclusive and that to take irrevocable action on
the assumption of his death would not be justifiable in the
immediate future. This is not simply a case of making one's
belief proportionate to the available evidence. It is a case
where it seems, that at least on one description, one ought
not to give full assent to p if there is a slight chance that
p is false and if the chance of its being false would be a
matter of considerable importance. The example seems to suggest
that there is an ethic of belief and that it is not merely an
ethic determined by evidential considerations.
A further example is the classic instance of the business
partner who finds strong evidence that a colleague is dishonest.
If he acts on the weight of the evidence he accepts that his
colleague is not to be tiusted. But let us suppose that this
conclusion would lead to the liquidation of the firm. Given
sufficient reasons of this character, we might well judge that
the businessman should not hastily accept a conclusion about
his partner, even if a great deal of evidence favoured it. The
example can be made sharper if we suppose that Williams who made
the discovery of the evidence against his colleague Evans, is
a man who cannot easily disguise his feelings. If he accepts
the conclusion to which the evidence points, he will display
distrust and so precipitate a financial disaster. In these
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circumstances we may well wish to say that he should not accept
or believe the proposition that Evans is dishonest even if the
evidence against Evans seems strong. But to say this entails
the view that belief is not wholly involuntary, and that what
one ought to believe is not decided solely by the currently
available evidence.
The following lines of further investigation, now present
themselves. If there is a moral ground for sometimes failing
to accept a proposition for which there is adequate evidence,
might there not also be an epistemic ground for similar caution.
This issue I wish to defer for the present but it may reappear
much later in a discussion of the role of criticizability in
relation to the acceptance of hypotheses. The second issue is
whether belief can be to some extent under the control of the
believer. The third is whether belief (or acceptance) is a
matter of degree. If it is a matter of degree then it is
misleading to speak simply of the alternative of accepting
or not accepting a hypothesis.
In some of the cases cited above one might invoke the
concept of tenacity. There are undoubtedly instances where
we commend the tenacious maintenance of a hypothesis in the
face of evidence which seems to refute it. Thus both religious
believers and upholders of scientific theories exhort one to
continue to maintain a belief which has sustained a measure
of disconfirmation. In such a situation one might well put the
matter thus. The new evidence obliges us to doubt a proposition
which we previously believed more confidently, but other
factors persuade us to maintain the belief and not to abandon
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it prematurely. We are convinced that there may he further
evidence which would vindicate our tenacity in maintaining
our belief against the odds. Of course the two examples may
not be wholly comparable. The scientist may only decide to
continue to entertain an otherwise discredited hypothesis in
order to carry out further tests. He may in fact suspend
belief in its truth, or even doubt its truth, but judge that
tenacity in entertaining and continuing to test the hypothesis
is desirable so that it can be subjected to more rigorous testing.
The case of the tenacious religious believer might be more
closely comparable to the wife who continues to hope that her
husband will return, or the businessman who continues to trust
his partner in the hope that his integrity will after all be
vindicated. Of course one might need to utter the warning
that one needs to distinguish between those cases that are
comparable to the tenacious loyalty of Penelope to Odysseus,
and those that are instances of a refusal to come to terms with
an unpalatable conclusion.
Nor need the issues only be discussed in negative terms.
There are certain situations where one exhorts a person to
accept a proposition which can only fully be vindicated after
it has been accepted. The obvious example is that of the
reluctant swimmer. The floundering pupil is confronted with
conflicting evidence. Most of his contemporaries can swim, so
it is reasonable to infer that he can learn to do so also.
But all his previous attempts have ended in sudden submersion
and ignominious rescue, so it is reasonable for him to believe
that he cannot swim. Yet only if he can be persuaded to believe
that he will learn to swim has he much likelihood of being
able to do so. In this case only when the belief is accepted
can the evidence which supports the belief (and the swimmer) be
procured. We tell the pupil that he ought to believe that he
will be able to swim, in order to facilitate his achieving
this result. But this implies that one can appropriately tell
someone that they ought to believe something, and therefore
that belief is at least to some extent under their control.
But this is not an issue which can easily be settled.
It is of course beliefs about what is the case that we are
here concerned with. It is not so difficult to say that we
can tell someone that he ought not to believe in cannibalism or
genocide. In matters of this kind there is an element of
voluntary control. But I cannot choose whether or not to believe
that today is Thursday. Given the evidence which usually alerts
one to what day of the week it is, I would be acting in a
perverse manner if I said that I chose to believe that today is
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Monday. To adapt an argument from Swinburne, I believe that
today is Thursday, that I am now in Edinburgh, and that David
Hume lived in the eighteenth century. I cannot just decide to
believe that today is Monday, that I am in California and that
2S
David Hume was a mediaeval poet. Hume himself argued that
belief arises from certain determinate causes and principles
of which we are not masters. Swinburne takes this point
further and maintains that this is a matter of logic rather
than psychology. If I can change my beliefs at will then I
would be aware of doing so. But I trust my beliefs and act
on them because I am convinced that they are formed by factors
independent of my will. So, in outline, Swinburne argues
that if I chose at will to believe that I now see a table, I
would realize that this belief arose from my will and not
from the presence of a table, and I would knovr that I had no
reason to trust my belief and so would not really believe.
I think that Swinburne's argument is largely correct but I do
not wholly accept his claim that this is a logical matter. His
argument seems to me to depend on a blend of introspection,
definition of belief, and inference. It may involve inferential
considerations, but is not purely a matter of logic. He is
saying that we do in fact trust our beliefs, because we believe
that they are formed by external factors and not by our wishes.
As this is so, it would be the case that if we were to create
a belief at will we would not really trust it.
But even if we accept the main point that belief is largely
involuntary, or at least that it is chiefly determined by
matters other than our wishes, what of the language of obligation?
If we say that someone ought to believe, then we imply that they
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are able to do so. The analogy is somewhat misleading. It is
true that if we say someone ought to act justly, then we imply
that it is within their control to choose to act justly. But
the language of obligation in relation to belief functions
somewhat differently. Here when I say that someone ought to
believe something, I usually mean that there is evidence which
would normally induce the belief in a reasonable person. Thus
if a former colleague of mine in Bristol thinks that I can
send a mutual friend by train from Edinburgh to Aberdeen in
one hour, I present him with evidence, when urging him that
he ought to "believe that the journey takes rather longer. I
am not asking him to change his belief at will, I am drawing
his attention to evidence which is highly likely to cause
him to change his "belief. It is therefore misleading to argue
that the language of obligation necessarily implies that
belief is voluntary.
It is, however, one thing to reject the idea that belief
is largely voluntary, and another to conclude that it is wholly
involuntary. People do differ in the conclusions they draw
from evidence. If they did not there would be a singular dearth
of casinos and bookmakers, and a singular uniformity of creeds.
Paced with the same evidence, different scholars arrive at
different conclusions. This is notoriously the case with
textual criticism. Scholars are equally acquainted with the
readings of the manuscripts, and the criteria for assessing
them, but arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions. It is
hard to think that this is the case because external factors
wholly determined the result. This does not in itself prove
that belief is in part voluntary, but it does lead one to
27
conclude that it is not wholly determined by evidence.
There are also the much discussed cases of attempts to
induce belief or to maintain belief in the face of evidence
which fails to support it adequately. This is usually discussed
in terms of a would-be religious believer who wishes to induce
belief, or a practising member of a religious faith who wishes
to maintain belief. But an example could equally well be
drawn from other creeds. A Marxist who in his student days
believed fervently that the dictatorship of the proletariat
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would, soon lead to a socialist Utopia, might gradually find
this belief eroded by increasing recognition of the character
of communist regimes in country after.country. As instance
after instance has to be dismissed as not really an example
of true socialism, he begins to doubt whether the theory he
once held so fervently can be sustained. Yet he wishes to
believe it. He will therefore attempt to focus on those places
where his hopes have not yet been completely dashed, or focus
his attentions on the undeniable horrors of extreme right
wing regimes in order to sustain his crumbling belief in the
ultimate beneficence of communist rule. An acute observer
might well say of him that he can't or won't accept that his
ideological views are mistaken. Indeed she may be quite convinced
he is unable to accept such an unpalatable conclusion. Moreover
he himself might in a candid moment say 'I can't and won't accept
that I was wrong.' So there are linguistic idioms which imply
the existence of an emotional factor, as is noted by Price and
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Palmer. The latter notes that an observer may say of the
tenacious believer that he cannot afford to give up his belief,
but it is very difficult to imagine the believer himself putting
the matter thus. So there is a puzzle about examples in which
the expression 'cannot and will not' appears.
The conjunction of 'I cannot and I will not' seems
paradoxical, but is it? One can imagine a University suddenly
deprived of sufficient funds to run its courses, deciding to
sell some of its art treasures. The Professor of Fine Art
replies to such a proposal that he cannot and he will not comply
with the request to hand over items held in trust. He cannot,
"because it would outrage his sense of honour, his obligations
to those who made bequests, and his commitment to the value of
teaching about art in the presence of original works of art.
The usage 11 cannot and I will not' makes perfectly coherent
sense here. It here means 'I am morally and otherwise obliged
not to do this and therefore I choose not to do this.' But the
case of the tenacious Marxist is different. He recognizes the
force of the arguments against his ideology, yet the spell of
the dream of a classless society makes him reluctant to accept
the evidence that every attempt to realize the dream has failed.
The evidence ought to make him modify his belief, but it does
not. He is unwilling to abandon his belief and so unable to
do so. In one sense his utterance is an admission that he
continues to uphold an ideal despite disconfirmatory instances.
The example shows both that belief is largely a function of
external evidential factors but also that belief is not wholly
involuntary. There is an element of will involved. One cannot
sustain a belief against hopeless odds, but one can tenaciously
cling to a belief despite contrary evidence.
The case of the tenacious ideologue has similarities to
the case of the trusting business partner, or the case of
Penelope believing against the odds that Odysseus will return.
In some cases, and especially when the belief in question is
after all ultimately vindicated we agree that the believer has
managed to will the maintenance of the threatened belief. In
other cases we tend to make comments to the effect that our
ideological colleague does not really believe in his utopia
any more, and that he really knows that the game is up. In
the face of these conflicting usages we must conclude that the
thesis of a voluntary element in believing is at best true in
certain marginal cases.
The case of Luther's famous 'I cannot and will not recant'
is somewhat different from the examples given above. There
was presumably the possibility of acting against his beliefs
by doing what others had done before him and publicly recanting
his dissent, while privately maintaining it. But Luther will
not and cannot act against his conscience. He holds himself
morally obliged to say publicly what he believes privately and
is determined to do so. The public act is morally prescribed
and personally willed. But what of the private belief?
Presumably he might have said of that also, that he could not
and he would not recant. Here the act of believing and the
nature of the obligation differ from the case of public
pronouncement. He would have maintained that given his epistemic
assumptions, the evidence obliged him to the belief he then held,
and that he could not change from it. He assumed that the
utterances ofthe Bible took precedence over the pronouncements
of the Church, and that the text of Paul's Epistles clearly
enunciated the principles which he then accepted. Luther's
public act was personally willed, and was morally prescribed by
his beliefs. But his beliefs were the product of the evidence
presented to him by the biblical texts in conjunction with his
assumptions about those texts. Given the biblical evidence
and Luther's assumptions, his beliefs followed.
But the case of Luther deserves further attention. A
non-protestant critic would no doubt maintain that Luther's
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assumptions about biblical authority were arbitrary, and that
therefore there is after all a voluntary element in his belief.
But this will not do. To the critic of any position it will
seem that the holders of that position have made unwarranted
assumptions. But this does not mean that the believers
voluntarily chose to accept those assumptions in much the same
way that one might choose a Cox's Orange Pippin and reject a
Golden Delicious. In Luther's case the assumption about biblical
authority was accepted and believed for reasons which undoubtedly
seemed to him to be compelling. Such belief is not an instance
of voluntarism.
I have argued that belief is largely an involuntary matter,
although one must concede certain examples where a belief can
be maintained or rejected despite the general tenor of the
evidence. Is there then an ethic of belief? I reject the view
that epistemic concepts are ethical concepts. But this does
not dispose of the issue altogether. Even if, with Firth, we
reject the actual identification of certain epistemic and
ethical terms, there may still be an ethic of belief. The
tradition exemplified by Locke and W.K.Clifford maintained that
one ought to proportion one's belief to the evidence. One of
the tenets of this tradition is that it is always wrong to
believe anything upon insufficient evidence. Its counterpart
is that one ought to believe whatever is supported by sufficient
evidence. This view is now commonly termed evidentialism.
(We are of course, continuing to assume that the beliefs under
discussion here are beliefs about what is the case.)
I have already suggested above that there are cases where
one does deviate from strict evidentialism. If there is at
least a marginal capacity to alter one's belief in special
cases, then there is the possibility of believing something
even though the evidence urges us to do otherwise. If there
is the possibility of marginally resisting the evidence, ought
one to use it or to urge others to do so? The strict evidentialis
would say no. Once we introduce other considerations we are in
grave danger of deserting the disinterested pursuit of truth
for the sake of other values, such as, for example, loyalty to
a person or an institution. This immediately conjures up dark
visions of those who have been urged to deny or hide a plain
but disturbing truth for the sake of the short term advantage
to an institution. It is not that, however, which is at issue
here. The question is rather whether there are instances in
which we ought to act in such a way as to modify our own beliefs
or urge others to do so. We do in practice urge that there are
cases where we ought to give someone 'the benefit of the doubt'.
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The case of the suspect business colleague is one such instance.
Williams has evidence which makes it more probable than not that
Evans has acted dishonestly. But the survival of the business
depends on confidence, and that confidence would be severely
shaken, and great harm done to many innocent parties, if Williams
revealed that he suspected his colleague. But Williams is not
someone who can disguise his feelings. If he does suspect his
colleague, no matter how careful he is, someone will detect
his change of attitude and the business be destroyed. The
partnership is one of long standing, and one can therefore
argue that, out of lojuilty to his colleague and his employees,
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Williams ought not to believe that Evans is dishonest merely
on the balance of the evidence. He ought to give him the
benefit of the doubt at least until the evidence became more
decisive, or the grounds for suspicion turned out to be false.
I therefore grant that there are cases where non-evidential
factors may urge one to demand a higher degree of evidence
before accepting a conclusion than would normally be appropriate.
One suggested way of modifying strict evidentialism is to say
that there is a prima facie case for proportioning our belief
to the evidence, rather than that we should in all circumstances
do so. This seems to do justice to the example cited. On
evidential grounds it is more likely that Evans is dishonest,
but on utilitarian grounds the cost of coming to that conclusion
at once might be considerably greater than the cost of resisting
it for a while. But our main concern is with the epistemic
rationality of belief rather than with estimating the utility
of different courses of behaviour. We must therefore consider
this particular aspect of the evidentialist argument that one
ought to believe only what the evidence suggests. The case of
the ability to modify belief here operates differently.
In this case the obligation is an epistemic obligation.
But it still presumably implies the capacity to modify belief.
A recent political appointee in a large and influential democracy
is discovered to believe that Angola is in South America,
A colleague first verifies that the politician has not simply
made some dreadful slip of the tongue. He then urges him
that he ought to and indeed must, amend his belief, as
Angola is in Southern Africa. In this case the information
not only enables but obliges him to change his belief. To
change one's belief in accordance with the evidence is
normally possible. There is however scope for sentences urging
people to amend their beliefs so as to proportion them to the
evidence. Many people hold beliefs, sometimes passionate beliefs
about matters of great moment, but have spent very little time
evaluating the evidence already available to them, let alone
gathering fresh evidence. It is easy to see that there is
scope for urging people to collect additional information,
and that this will enable and oblige them to change their beliefs.
It is also appropriate to draw to their attention the significance
of evidence already available to them and so make it possible,
and indeed necessary, for them to change their beliefs. In this
sense therefore there is an epistemic obligation, and there is
usually the possibility of belief change, where that change is
in line with the evidence. There is therefore in this more
narrowly epistemic sense an ethic of belief. ¥e may conclude
our observations on this matter with the following summary.
People are able to change their beliefs, but belief is only
marginally under voluntary control. There is however an
appropriate sense in which one may urge other people to modify
their beliefs in line with the evidence adduced which one
cites as providing sufficient reason for the change.
It is a characteristic both of strict, and of the
qualified evidentialism advocated above, that belief should
normally be proportionate to the evidence. This issue of
proportionality now deserves a little attention. I argued
earlier that one should believe or accept p iff p was more
7?
probable than not-p. But this formulation is misleading.
It suggests that we either believe that (accept) p or withhold
p or deny p. 'There is compelling reason for thinking that
this issue is more complex, and this can be seen even from
a simplified version of the lottery paradox. I place three
marbles in a bag. One is red, one green and one blue. One
is drawn by a blindfolded assistant and kept out of my view.
The probability that it is not the red marble is .666.
The probability that it is not the green marble is the same.
So is the probability that it is not the blue one. In theory
then I should believe or accept each of the three propositions
that the red marble is not in my assistant's hand, nor is the
green one, nor is the blue one. But this is impossible. Three
marbles were placed in the bag and one has been drawn. I
cannot therefore accept the conjunction of three propositions
each of which I have sufficient reason to accept. What is
wrong?
One could readily formalize the lottery paradox as a
reductio. All that is required is the principle that the
lottery is fair, that statements with a given degree of
probability above .5 are to be accepted, that the consequence
of any accepted statement are to be accepted, and that the
conjunction of accepted statements is also to be accepted. The
result is that one is faced with the acceptance of a contradiction.
If the lottery is fair one ticket must win, but if the
conjunction principle is used, one accepts the conjunction of
all the propositions that any given ticket will lose. Kyburg's
lottery paradox has been much discussed and formalized in
article after article, so there is no point in merely
reiterating the technicalities which are of less direct interest
to the present discussion.
Some lines of escape can quickly he shown to he implausible.
For instance one may initially think that the problem can he
reduced by raising the degree of probability required for
acceptance. But even if one demanded a probability of .9 one
could still be faced with a paradox in the case of a lottery
with a large enough number of tickets. In the case of a fair
lottery of a thousand tickets there is a probability of .999
that any ticket will lose. A threshold of .999 would in many
cases be regarded as more than sufficient warrant for acceptance
or rational belief. But the paradox requires a modification
somewhere. One suggestion is the abandonment of the principle
of conjunction in the context of rational belief. This would
inhibit the move from ' I accept p' and ' I accept q' to ' I
accept p and q'. But that is too drastic a solution and runs
counter to our intuitions. A more satisfactory solution would
prevent our accepting a conjunction of accepted statements
just in those cases where that probability of the conjunction
fell below our threshold of acceptance. This proposal would
acknowledge that acceptance or rational belief is not an all
or nothing affair. It is rather a matter of degree of
confidence. The degree of confidence should match the
likelihood of the statement in question being true.
In the case of lotteries and games of chance the
probabilities are captured by the classical calculus. But it
is much debated whether evidential probability can be assessed
by classical or even by Bayesian methods. For the present
ire must be satisfied with a limited conclusion. Acceptance
or rational belief is a matter of degrees of confidence. In
the case of beliefs about matters of chance the calculation
will follow classical lines, in other cases a different
procedure may be appropriate. For example in the case of the
conjunction of beliefs about the outcome of the lottery the
conjunction will decrease in probability in accordance with
the law of dependent probabilities. But in the case of
evidential statements which corroborate one another we would
expect the degree of confidence to rise in accordance with some
increase in probability to be assigned to the conjunction
of corroborative statements. But the debate over the appropriate
formula for corroboration need not deflect us from the basic
principle that it is degrees of confidence that are at stake.
Another example of the difficulties about conjunction is
the case of the cautious professor of history. She has just
completed her magnum opus on the social consequences of the
Edict of ITantes. As she reads through the proofs of her book
she cannot avoid reconsidering her assent to its content as
well as looking for printer's errors. Statement after statement
in the book receives her renewed assent as she considers the
conclusions of fifteen years of research. She also renews
her assent to the conclusions drawn from the arguments contained
in each chapter. But if asked whether she believed that her
work contained any false statements she would have to admitj
like other cautious historians, that it is probable that it
did. Only someone who had an unrealistically high estimate
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of such a work would argue that it was unlikely to be wrong
in some detail at some point or other. But to admit the
likelihood of an error in these circumstances is to say that
it is rational to believe each of n statements, where n is a
large positive number, but not to believe the conjunction of
all n statements. This may seem paradoxical but it is a
conclusion that we do intuitively accept. Some might say that
if each of seven inferences on matters of fact has a probability
of .9 then it is reasonable to expect that one of those
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inferences is mistaken. Of course matters will be much more
complicated than this simple calculation suggests. Some of the
probabilities will be dependent, some independent and some
corroborative. The true calculation will therefore be somewhat
different. But that reinforces rather than reduces the impact
of the argument that conjunctions of accepted statements are
not necessarily themselves to be accepted with the same degree
of confidence as their conjuncts.
The question of rational belief is, we conclude, closely
linked with the question of evidential support. But there
are paradoxes which result from some of the attempts to define
the relation between rational belief and evidential support.
These paradoxes warn us that the matter is more complex than
an initial analysis of the problem suggests. This complexity
is especially located in the fact that combinations of
different beliefs sometimes raise and sometimes lower the
degree of confidence which is appropriate. This suggests
strongly that we must pay closer attention to the differences
between different types of belief. We must also pay careful
attention to the way in which conjunction and. corroboration
operate in this field. These will be topics to be pursued
in the ensuing chapters. The first of them is the question
of different classes of beliefs and the extent to which they
are and are not comparable.
In this chapter we have considered problems relating to
the concept of belief itself. At the outset we looked at
a group of problems related to belief being a category which
involves reference to mental states or events, Though there
are difficulties about propositional attitudes, and although
some reference to dispositions is needed, we also require a
concept of belief which uses the language of conscious mental
states. We then turned from analysis of the character of
belief to considering the relation between belief and evidence.
There I argued that the notion of evidential support is central
and needs further exploration in the chapters which follow.
But I also defended the view that there are factors which
should dissuade us from subscribing to strict evidentialism.
Evidential support is a central issue in our enquiry but not
the entire story. Finally I argued that we cannot adequately
discuss the question of rational belief by limiting our
consideration to beliefs expressed in single sentences. Beliefs
are interrelated and the evidential probability of a conjunction
of beliefs has special properties which we need to consider.
This last factor should encourage us to take seriously the
issue of the rationality of large complexes of beliefs such as
historical and metaphysical beliefs which will be considered
in the chapters which follow.
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Chapter 3. On the Rationality of Historical and Metaphysical Beliefs.
In the first chapter we were concerned with the relation between
belief and knowledge. Then in the second chapter we moved on to the
question of what belief is, and what makes-it rational. That latter
issue was initiated there but will continue to be discussed through the
rest of this work. The work as a whole is concerned with rational
belief, that is its theme. But in order to examine that topic certain
more specific areas will be selected for closer attention. One of
these is the area of beliefs about the historical past. Another is
metaphysical belief.
I have chosen these two areas for special attention for a number
of reasons. One is that much attention is currently paid to the
rationality of beliefs about matters studied by the natural sciences.
But these beliefs form only a section of our total set of beliefs.
If we are concerned with rational belief we need, as I argued earlier,
to take account of complexes of beliefs, and not just those beliefs
which can be expressed in single sentences. Much attention is paid
by specialists in the philosophy of science to the question of what
makes beliefs in those areas rational. But the area of belief about
the historical past is also an important field in which we wish our
beliefs to be rational. Some writers claim with great vigour that
rationality in this area functions differently and makes use of
different principles and criteria. So to some of those points of
difference we must direct our attention.
But metaphysical beliefs also form a distinct set. Here too
there are claims and counter claims about rational procedures. Some
even claim that historical and metaphysical beliefs are comparable in
that the assessment of their rationality involves special principles.
I wish to examine each of these items in its own right and also
the claim that there is an analogy between them.
Up to this point the discussion has largely been concerned
with the rationality of beliefs expressed in single sentences.
It has also chiefly been concerned with those sentences that
form statements about matters chiefly determined by empirical
observation. But there are also larger complexes of statements
to which people claim to give rational assent. If we were to
discuss the issue of rational belief exclusively in terms of
single sentences, a large area of the problem of rational belief
would never come into focus. This might be just tolerable if
one held a strongly foundationalist view of the matter. Some
people might be convinced, for example, that one only believes
rationally when one is disposed to assent sincerely to a statement
which either is incorrigible or which can be reliably inferred
from one or more such incorrigible statements. But such a strongly
foundationalist view is hotly contested. One need only point to
the very different views of Chisholm and Lehrer to see that some
place greater emphasis on propositions which are self justified,
or justified by their relation to what is directly evident, while
others emphasize the justification of propositions by the relations
they bear to each other. Foundationalists face the difficulty
that there are very few incorrigible propositions, and that
directly evident propositions are a limited class. It is also
very difficult to provide a satisfactory account of how one can
rationally defend many statements that we do in practice accept,
by reliable inference from so limited a base. The issue is usually
discussed in terms of knowledge, and whether knowledge can be
justified, only "by a chain of inferences leading back to what is
evident or 'given'. It is worth reiterating a point made earlier that
the requirements for rational belief are fewer and less stringent
than the requirements for knowledge. But this does not resolve
the question of whether rational belief ultimately requires an appeal
to basic beliefs, or whether all that can be done is to test part
of our framework of beliefs against the rest. For the moment,
however, I propose to proceed on the assumption that we must at
least do the latter. We must at least test various subsets of
our belief system against other of our beliefs to see if there
are inconsistencies. A minimal requirement of rational belief would
be that subsets of our beliefs should be free of internal inconsistency.
They should also be free of inconsistency with other subsets of our
framework of belief.
The question of larger complexes of beliefs is central to this
enquiry. This is not simply because I wish to examine such complexes,
and the question of the nature of belief in simpler sentences is a
necessary preliminary. It is also because the supposedly simpler
sentences are only simpler in certain respects. They are grammatically
brief and convenient, they use fewer words and concepts, and can
be formalized with fewer variables. But if it is indeed the case
that there are very few basic propositions, and that it is not at
all easy to show how non-basic propositions are inferred from
basic propositions, then we must recognize not just the desirability,
but the necessity of considering the rationality of larger complexes
of beliefs.
I propose therefore to take examples from two areas which
raise very considerable difficulties of the character indicated
abhve. One of these is the rationality of beliefs about matters
of history, the other is the question of the rationality of meta¬
physical beliefs. The term metaphysical has various uses but I
propose to include within the scope of this argument those beliefs
of a metaphysical character which are of maximal scope. But
though I wish to widen the scope of the investigation in this way
it will be necessary to control it in another. In order to do
this I propose to take the arguments used by Basil Mitchell in
his book The Justification of Religious Belief and those used
by R.G.Swinburne in his book The Existence of God as recent
examples of the defence of classical religious metaphysics. The
argument put forward by Mitchell is especially interesting because
of his claim that there is a comparison to be made between historical
reasoning and what he calls 'the claims that are made for the
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rationality of large-scale metaphysical systems'. The term
'large-scale metaphysical systems' is perhaps not the most elegant
or precise of expressions, but I will use it as a convenient way
of referring to what Mitchell wishes to justify and in order to
subject his argument to further analysis and critical scrutiny.
The choice of Swinburne's work also deserves a brief comment.
This work is of special interest not only because it examines
metaphysical beliefs/ but because it does so with the apparatus
of a neo-Bayesian theory of rational belief. In considering
his arguments it is possible both to examine closely his way cfarguing
that theistic belief is rational, and to scrutinize his assumption
that a neo-Bayesian method is the appropriate way to assess
rational belief.
I propose to discuss Mitchell's argument first and that of
Swinburne later. Mitchell's work is of special interest because
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it discusses metaphysical beliefs in the context of a general
theory about the justification of other kinds of beliefs. He
considers the sort of supporting arguments which are used to
defend the rationality of beliefs of a historical character,
and also draws on work in the philosophy of science concerning
the rationality of scientific hypotheses. Indeed his discussion
contains many valuable points of reference to the work of philosophers
of science such as Kuhn and Lakatos. This means that Mitchell's
book provides a useful test case for theories of rational belief.
It is of course specifically addressed to the question of the
justification of religious belief. But it also incorporates many
arguments concerned with the nature of the rationality of beliefs
of many classes. Those whose main interest in the study of rational
belief is the search for a rationally articulated view of religious
belief will not require much further reason for regarding Mitchell's
book as a suitable choice for scrutiny and investigation. I would
only add as additional ground for this choice that Mitchell attempts
throughout his book to treat the discussion of religious belief as
the investigation of a cumulative case. He recognizes that it
cannot be a matter of demonstrable proof (or disproof), but he
also opposes the irrationality of accepting or rejecting such
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belief without rational argument. But it is just Mitchell's
contention that the justification of religious belief can be seen
as the construction of a cumulative case which should be of interest
also to those whose approach to the philosophy of rational belief
is not necessarily concerned with the viability of religious
belief. Mitchell again provides a good subject for scrutiny
because it is central to his argument that there is a basic
similarity in the construction of a cumulative rational argument
in several different disciplines. His claim is that the cumulative
case which the theist puts forward is comparable to the cumulative
case made for their conclusions by historians, or literary critics
or the upholders of scientific hypotheses. Thus his position
ought to be of interest both to those specifically interested
in the rationality of theistic belief, and also to those interested
in whether or not there are common elements in the rational defence
of theories in disciplines of such widely differing character as
history, literary criticism, and the natural sciences. One
might accept some of Mitchell's case where it relates to disciplines
other than theology, or one might assent to all of his case, or
one might argue that he has underestimated the differences between
a rational case in historical study and a rational case in physics
and that a fortiori the differences between these disciplines and
the arguments of theistic metaphysics is even greater. But at
this point it is too early to offer even a hint as to which of
these options is to be preferred. It is enough to claim that if
we wish to examine in some detail an argument that the rational
defence of complex systems of beliefs is comparable in different
disciplines then Basil Mitchell's book provides an excellent
example on which to work.
For the reasons just given a consideration of Mitchell's
argument should be of interest both to those concerned generally
with the philosophy of rational belief, and to those more specifically
concerned with the question as to whether there can be rational
theistic belief. The crucial contention which he makes is contained
in the following passage:
1 I shall endeavour to show that in fields other than theology
we commonly, and justifiably, make use of arguments other
than those of proof or strict probability; and that, typically,
theological arguments are of this kind. '
He goes on to say that what has been taken to be a series of
failures when treated as attempts at 'purely deductive or inductive
argument' could well be better understood as contributions to a
cumulative case. He argues that on this view theists claim that
their view makes better sense' of all the evidence available
than any of the rival theories.
Mow in this initial statement by Mitchell it is worth noting
carefully his use of terminology. In some instances he is using
words in a sense different from that which I shall myself be using
and so some analysis of these differences is imperative at the
outset. By proof he seems to mean the use of a deductively valid
argument and his statement concedes' that in his view both in
theology and in other fields there are cumulative arguments of a
different character from this. But Mitchell also asserts that
these are not arguments involving 'strict probability' and that
they are 'not inductive'. This terminology is more problematical.
If he means that such arguments do not present precisely quantifiable
probabilities, or that they are not the kind of argument leading
to mathematical probabilities based on reliably computed frequencies,
then I agree with him. But I would not wish to exclude the term
probability altogether. Indeed I suspect that Mitchell would
agree with this point as he merely contends that the arguments
in question do not involve 'strict probablity'. I shall later
argue that epistemic probablity is not necessarily to be identified
with the mathematical probability of games of chance or of calculations
of frequencies. I would claim that there are arguments of a
cumulative character which raise the epistemic probablity of a
conclusion, or which increase the evidential support for a theory.
Yet I would also claim that this increase (or decrease) of support
is not necessarily to he calculated in terms of mathematical
probability either neo—Bayesian or classical. But this raises
complex issues which will reappear much later in the discussion.
4
There is one further area of disagreement over terminology
before it is possible to proceed. This is that Mitchell disavows
the term inductive for the kind of cumulative case which he has
in mind. Once again if he means by inductive the kind of enumerative
induction which sometimes figures prominently in discussions of
induction then I agree with him. But the terms inductive and
induction can be used more widely. There is also eliminative
induction, and the term induction is used more loosely still in
some contexts to include any argument which raises the epistemic
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probability of a theory or a conclusion. I therefore agree
with Mitchell that the arguments under consideration are not
arguments exclusively involving deductive inference or mathematical
probability or enumerative induction, but I would add that they
may involve epistemic probability or inductive considerations
of a more general kind.
Several issues are raised by the claim that in history and
in literary criticism and in theology and in other disciplines
there is argumentation of a cumulative kind. The first of these
to deserve attention is the more detailed exploration of just
how such arguments proceed in disciplines other than those involving
metaphysical theology. In order to do this I propose to focus
on the case of historical argumentation, though being ready to
draw on supporting instances from law and from literary interpretation
The relevant part of Mitchell's larger case is that there is an
analogy between historical and. metaphysical interpretation. I
shall, for convenience, refer to this central section of his
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argument as 'Mitchell's analogy'. In fact he argues for a
series of analogies. He supplements his comparison of rational
argument in history and. in metaphysics with further analogies
from literary interpretation and. from natural science as viewed,
by Kuhn. It is however his argument from historical study that
I wish to look at next,
Mitchell offers two examples. The first concerns explorers
who presumably have some archaeological skills. They discover
a large hole in the ground and a series of smaller holes nearby.
This leads one of the explorers to infer the need for an explanation
other than that they are natural depressions. Next in a neighbouring
cave they find a papyrus containing fragments of the plan of a
building. The first explorer now proposes a theory that the
large hole took the centre post of a wooden building and that
the smaller holes took the other posts. In this example involving
archaeology and papyrology there is indeed an argument involving
a simple form of a cumulative case. The evidence from the site
raises questions as to whether the holes are due to natural
causes or to human activity. Different theories will explain
the evidence. A regularity about the holes in the ground seems
to one explorer to raise the probability that the holes formed
part of some human construction. (I am here amplifying Mitchell's
argument). But widely differing interpretations of the data are
still possible. The further discovery of the papyrus with a
building plan in it adds to the now cumulative case for the
place having been the site of a human habitation. Further confirmation
is derived from matching the details of the plan with the distribution
of holes in the ground. But there is some discrepancy which
provides a measure of disconfirmation, especially in the view
of the second explorer. At this point the first explorer provides
an additional explanation for the features mentioned in the plan
which cannot he traced on the site.
Mitchell's basic point is that the argument is cumulative
and that several features of the case cooperate in favour of the
conclusion. I have already made some additional comments and will
now add further ones. The final move by the first explorer is
an example of an ad hoc supporting hypothesis. It does not
depend on new evidence. It is a fresh piece of supposition or
hypothesis in order to account for difficulties in a case which
has elements favouring a suggested conclusion. This is certainly
a common feature of such arguments but it is important to draw
a clear distinction between such an ad hoc additional hypothesis
and the inferences which had already been made on the basis of
the evidence then available. The gratuitous character of the
supplementary ad hoc hypothesis renders the whole case vulnerable.
It is gratuitous in that this particular part of the case lacks
evidential support. However the case as a whole is plausible
and this additional element is needed to provide an adequate
overall theory. However it is a weak point in the case. At
least two defences can be made at this point. One can either
counter attack by claiming that rival theories contain at least
as large an element of ad hoc argumentation. This is an adequate
though not an ideal defence. A better defence is to treat the
supplementary hypothesis as a prediction requiring a further
search for evidence. Let us suppose that the papyrus fragments
envisaged a building with more posts than can be traced on the
site. Rather than just speculate that the extra posts would
have been in a part of the building likely to disappear first
and leave fewer traces, it would be better to bring in more
refined techniques to examine the area where minute traces of
the extra posts might be found. For example it might be possible
with very careful chemical analysis to find traces of iron nails
in the soil at just those points where the wood of the missing
posts had completely vanished and the holes had gradually become
filled in and overgrown. The ad hoc hypothesis would then be
equivalent to a prediction which had been confirmed by the discovery
of further evidence.
One could make some further observations on the character
of the cumulative case. The existence of one or two holes in
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the ground is in itself patient of other very convincing explanations.
But if the holes are themselves square, and if the distribution
of holes is regular then each of these factors raises the probability
that we are dealing with a human construction. This inference is
warranted by the following considerations. On the one hand
though holes in the ground can be due to natural causes or to
the burrowing of animals these are rarely either square in themselves
or arranged in geometrical patterns. Human constructions do
regularly have such features, and it is otherwise observable
that such features have elsewhere turned out to be associated
with other evidence for human habitation and construction. There
is therefore an informal appeal to frequency or regularity which
underlies the claim that the data increase the evidential
support for the theory. I hasten to add that neither I nor
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Mitchell are here envisaging an analogy between the procedure of
the archeologists and the argument for design. (indeed the
feature of frequency or regularity, to which I have drawn attention,
is in Hume's discussion used against such an argument). In
Mitchell's scheme he uses the illustration from historical archaeology
as a parable (or allegory) in which the large hole represents the
'intellectual demand for ultimate explanation to which natural
theology appeals' and the smaller holes represent private religious
experiences of sin, grace etc. But I wish for the moment to remain
with the contention that historical arguments often consist of a
cumulative case which relies not on deductive inference nor on
enumerative induction but on separate pieces of evidence which
when taken together raise the evidential support for a theory. In
any case I think that Mitchell's use Of the parable to defend
theistic metaphysics is open to criticism. He says that the
fragmentary plan represents the concepts of Christian revelation.
But here the analogy is not so close. In the case of the archaeologists
the plan is additional supporting evidence because it provides
independent testimony to the existence of a human habitation on
the site. But in the case of metaphysics the concepts of the
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biblical texts are not so much independent evidence freshly
acquired, as existing texts already available, containing theories
based on the same experiences of sin, grace etc. as are now being
cited in favour of what are essentially similar theories.
Indeed Mitchell's designation of the religious belief he is
wishing to justify as 'traditional' Christian theism makes that
point abundantly clear. But, in fairness, one must recognize that
all parables have their limitations and Mitchell's case is in
general sound as examined so far, even if I would resist some
details in it. I grant his general point that in each case a
cumulative case is involved. But can Mitchell's analogy cope
with further analysis?
Mitchell's second more specifically historical example is
taken from the debate amongst historians over the events leading
up to Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon in 49 B.C. He cites
an article by P.J.Cuff (in Historia 1958) as an example of how
a historian may make a fresh interpretation of a limited amount
of documentary evidence. The issue was not so much the legality
of Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon, or rather its illegality.
The crucial dispute is over the duration of Caesar's command
in Gaul. Caesar was in difficulties, because, if his command of
his provinces and his legions expired before he could be elected
consul, he was liable to face prosecution. Cuff argued that it
is impossible to harmonize all the evidence as to the duration
of Caesar's command. He then inferred that it is an error to
try to make all the pieces of the jig-saw puzzle fit together.
His solution is different. He maintains that the exact duration
of Caesar's command was ambiguous at the time, and that this
ambiguity over the terminal date gradually became apparent and
led to two rival views one held by Caesar's party and the other by
Pompey's.
In this instance there is an element of assessing the
likelihood of different interpretations of the different pieces
of evidence. But the more significant factor here is that we
see a new solution being propounded which (in Mitchell's terms)
'puts the whole problem in a new perspective'. A new theory is
proposed whose persuasive force consists in the capacity to
reintegrate all the existing pieces of evidence into a more
convincing pattern. How again I grant Mitchell's basic point.
In historical study this is a common and appropriate way to
proceed. It is indeed the case that historians come up with
theories which commend themselves by providing a more satisfactory
account of the existing data even though in such cases fresh
data may neither be provided nor indeed available.
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Mitchell cautiously, and in my view wisely, refrains from
making an immediate move to justify metaphysical beliefs by a
direct appeal to this feature of historical method, but
one can see the drift of his argument. For the moment I wish to
remain with the proposed criterion for assessing the rationality
of the historical conclusion. Here we are dealing with a complex
set of beliefs. These include beliefs about the date, the text
and the significance of Roman legislation and about the words
and actions of people such as Cicero, Pompe'y and Caesar. The
conclusion is that the Lex Vatinia was ambiguous but that its
ambiguity only became apparent as the end of Caesar's command
came nearer. This belief, or inference or conclusion then
rests on a complex set of premises comprising other beliefs,
and is arrived at by a series of inferential steps of a non-
deductive kind. Of these the most interesting is the suggestion
that the confusion over the terminal date of Caesar's command
was inherent in the original situation and that this then explains
why 'the jig-saw pieces did not fit'.
I now wish to make some more critical comments on Mitchell's
use of the example from Cuff. I will for the sake of convenience
accept that Mitchell's account of Cuff's article is adequate for
our purposes. One factor which commends a conclusion such as
is here offered is that the new theory accounts for and explains the
alleged 'lack of fit', and that it does so more economically than is
the case with rival theories. Let us for the moment assume that
this is the case. The other more critical factor is this. Our
willingness to accept the theory is at least in part dependent
on our experience or awareness of other similar events. We know
from our own experience that a subsequent dispute may often he
due to the presence of a latent ambiguity in a text. It happens
for instance in legislation over overseas students. A series of
governments raises the fees it charges to overseas students by
an amount substantially in excess of the amount it charges home
students. Only afterwards is it realized that until now it has
counted as home students those who have been taking school courses
in the country for three years prior to their application to go
to University. Only later does the ambiguity become apparent
and fresh legislation is introduced to stop what is now castigated
as a 'loophole' . We are not concerned here with the ethics of
government, but with the tendency for a latent ambiguity to be
tolerated until it gives rise to subsequent controversy. Because
we are aware of this tendency it operates as an additional factor
commending the application of such an explanation to events in
the more distant past. There is in such a procedure an implicit
appeal to regularity or to frequency. What is believed to
have happened in the case of Julius Caesar is in part supported
by an implicit appeal to what is experienced in other situations,
notably in one's own time. But if this analysis is correct then
it renders Mitchell's analogy vulnerable to an objection similar
to one long since deployed against other defences of the rationality
of metaphysical systems. Insofar as the latter are of universal
scope and are offered as explanations of everything, they cannot
he supported by an implicit (or indeed any) appeal to their being
an instance of the kind of thing which happens regularly. They
can only be defended in this manner by an argument which claims
that what is true of parts of the whole may be true of the
totality. It is at this point that Mitchell shifts his ground
and moves from an analogy with historical argumentation to an
analogy between metaphysics and other wide ranging theories.
But here we must for the moment leave Mitchell's subsequent
moves in order to give further consideration to the case of
beliefs about history.
One interesting observation on the analogy between metaphysical
and historical beliefs is the following. It can justifiably
be claimed that there is some such analogy at least in part, if
only for the reason that Mitchell's ' traditional Christian theism'
is in fact a system which includes many historical statements.
It can also be argued that many of the more grandiose historical
systems either border upon, or actually are metaphysical systems.
Let us consider each of these rather different points in turn.
The first is that contained within traditional Christian
theistic metaphysics are a number of beliefs which would readily
be classed as historical rather than metaphysical. If we are
here arguing for a distinction between historical statements
which are included in a'metaphysical system, and those parts of
that system which are clearly metaphysical some care is needed.
I think that the distinction is best demonstrated by attempting
to show that there are at least two different classes of belief
and that the two different sets of statements offered below are
then approximately classified as 'historical' and 'metaphysical'.
To begin with let us simply distinguish between beliefs of type
A and beliefs of type C. Let us call them 'A' statements and
'C' statements.
With this simple, and as yet unexplored distinction in mind
let us try classifying some statements which presumably form
part of Mitchell's traditional Christian theism. I would suggest
that we begin by classifying the following as 'A' statements.
Al. Four of the disciples of Jesus were Galilean fishermen.
A2. Jesus at one time lived in a town called Nazareth.
Now both of these statements Al and A2 are comparable to other
straight historical statements such as that some of Socrates'
followers were Athenian citizens or that Plato at one time
visited Sicily. Only if we were to take the name Jesus as
including connotations of more than human status would there
be ground for objecting to such a classification. I propose,
however, for the purpose of argument to rule that the simple name
Jesus be treated as the designation of the historical human
figure and to insist that where statements are to be taken as
alluding to those suprahuman characteristics which orthodox
Christianity ascribes to its founder we will use one of the
titles such as Christ or Lord to make this clear. If th-is
point is accepted then Al and A2 are as acceptable as historical
statements as the comparable statements about Socrates and Plato.
Their classification as statements of a historical character is
without prejudice to their being held to be true or false historical
statements though I happen to believe both that they are true
I (TO
historical statements and that they can rationally he held to he
such.
he could now proceed to compile a further list of such
historical statements.
A3 Jesus taught in parables.
A4 Jesus taught non-retaliation.
A5 Jesus was executed hy crucifixion on the orders of Pontius
Pilate.
In each of these instances one of the component elements in
Mitchell's traditional theistic system is not just like a historical
statement, or capable of being supported by arguments analogous to those
used in historical debate. It is a historical statement, and
it can be provided with evidential support by exactly the same
sort of arguments involving literary sources and archaeological
data as is the case with other historical statements. The rationality
of belief about such matters is therefore to be argued in the same
way as is the rationality of the belief that Caesar's command in
Gaul was due to end in 50B.C. or 49B.C. or that he crossed the
Rubicon in 49 B.C.. But with other statements this is not so
obviously the case and indeed it may not be the case.
The clearest examples of sentences which belong to a different
category are those expressing beliefs of type C. I propose
initially to mark out this category by providing examples which
come from the tradition to which Mitchell belongs.
CI God is the creator of the universe.
C2 God effected the redemption of humanity through the cross.
C3 God will judge every human being at the last judgement.
These are statements of traditional theistic metaphysical belief
which are different in character from the set of statements of
type A listed a"bove. Whereas the first set of statements make
assertions ahout past historical events these C statements are
concerned primarily with matters which are of larger scope.
They may contain historical allusions "but they are of greater
scope than sentences of the first type. Thus C2 refers to the
past historical event of the crucifixion of Jesus but it does
so in a way which exceeds the bounds of the first category.
This sentence speaks of God. Wow I grant that there may be
revisionist interpreters of Christian theism who might attempt
to argue that sentences about God are not after all sentences
which aim at reference to a supernatural being. But Mitchell
at any rate is no such theistic revisionist. For him, if I
understand him correctly, such sentences are indeed intended
to refer to the activity of a supernatural being who is all
powerful, beneficent and omniscient and who in other respects
matches the descriptions of traditional theistic metaphysics.
Wow if Mitchell's analogy is to hold it is essential that
one show not just that statements of type A can be defended
by arguments similar to those used in historical study, but
that this is also the case with statements of type C. The reason
for this insistence should be obvious. It is, I maintain, the
case that sentences of type A are not only comparable to historical
statements but in fact are such statements. In other words I
am arguing, and I think it would be widely accepted (at least
by those whose theism is traditional) that theistic metaphysics
is a complex system which includes different types of belief.
Some of these are beliefs of a historical character. Others are
beliefs involving specifically metaphysical motifs, I am of
course using the term 'metaphysical' here in a special but I
lol
think widely used sense. At the very least I would argue that
I am using the term as Mitchell does when he is describing what
he calls metaphysical systems of maximal scope. I grant that the
term 'metaphysical' may have other uses but these are not in
play at this point where I need to make use of Mitchell's
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terminology if I am to discuss his argument.
Once it is conceded that A statements and C statements
can be distinguished, the next step in my argument can be taken.
This is that only if there is an analogy between the rational
defence of C statements and the rational defence of historical
judgements is Mitchell's case of any real help to the theistic
metaphysician. It is of course the case that A statements can
be defended rationally by the normal processes of historical
investigation. I grant this precisely because A statements are
indeed historical statements. But the distinctive and controversial
feature of belief systems such as traditional theistic metaphysics
is that they contain statements whose character exceeds the
limits of normal historical investigation. Mow, of course, the
A statements must be defended if the C statements are to be defended.
But the A statements do not entail the C statements. Nor do they
offer more than limited inferential support to the C statements.
Why is this? I do not think anyone will seriously maintain that
metaphysical conclusions can be obtained deductively from A
statements. But can they be given evidential support from the
A statements? This is a much more interesting question and one
which is entirely in keeping, if I do him justice, with Mitchell's
case. I would argue that the A statements may provide limited
support of this kind.
As an example of the limited support which I think may
justifiably be claimed let us take the case of certain of the
A statements and their relation to the claim of the following
C statement. - -
C4 Divine deliverance is effected through the cross
of Christ.
Now such a C statement requires the truth of at least the
following A statements.
A6 There was a historical person called Jesus.
A7 His character was such as to have impressed many of
his contemporaries favourably.
A8 He was executed on a Roman cross on the orders of
Pontius Pilate,
Unless A6 - 8 are true our C statement is difficult to sustain.
The C statement entails certain historical statements, and
unless those are shown to be true or at least shown to be
historically probable, then the C statement suffers disconfirmation
But A6 - 8 can be satisfactorily defended. Readers of a mainly
philosophical bent will have to accept on trust my statement
that this is a view which would be held by almost all of the
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serious historical investigators of the subject. But it is
also not difficult to maintain that such statements only give
limited evidential support to the much larger claim of C4
that divine deliverance is effected through the cross of Christ.
But the matter cannot be disposed of quite so swiftly.
One could add to A6, 7 and 8 further statements which
would also belong to category A. These might be more difficult
to defend historically but I do not think them unduly controversial
One could suggest the folio-wing:
A9 Many of the disciples of Jesus displayed considerable
growth of moral character as a result of their
acquaintance with him.
A10 After his death similar change of character was noticed
amongst people who were told about him but had not
met him.
All Such changes also took place in people several centuries
later in similar circumstances.
Mow again I do not claim that A9 — 11 prove the truth of
C4 or even make it more probable than improbable. I do grant
however that C4 can be supported by beliefs such as A9 - 11
and that C4 is more likely if A9 - 11 are true than if no such
supporting evidence were available. In other words I do maintain
that the relationship between the historical and the metaphysical
elements in traditional theism is more complex than either some
of its defenders or some of its opponents seem to think. This
point is in agreement with Mitchell's claim that a cumulative
case is involved here. It is also in harmony with his view
that the case is like the kind of cumulative case involved in
historical study. But the likeness extends only a certain
distance, A9 - 11 are comparable to the kind of arguments
one might use to defend the statement that Socrates continued
to have a morally beneficial influence on people long after
his death. But C4 is making a claim of much greater scope
than the statement about Socrates. The problem is that the
cumulative case we have outlined supports C4 only in so far
as it is comparable to the statement about Socrates. In other
words it only supports those elements in 04 which are of a A type,
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and. does not contribute to the support of just those elements
in C4 which are of a C type.
This last judgement may perhaps "be deemed as not wholly
warranted. It should perhaps he reformulated. Only if one can
show that the factors supporting C4 are of greater scope than
those supporting the statement about Socrates, is the greater
metaphysical content of C4 provided with evidential support.
On that issue I suspect that it would be difficult to proceed
further than we have done at this point. But before leaving
this particular example it is important to note that Mitchell
does not confine his defence to examples from history, he also
claims that the defence of large-scale metaphysical systems
is in other respects comparable to the debate over the merits
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of rival scientific paradigms. But for the moment we must
stay with the arguments about history.
Because our task is not simply to engage in debate with
Mitchell, but rather to explore the character of rational
belief in a series of different contexts, another related
issue must now be considered. This is the question of a class
of B statements which are neither as purely historical as
the A set nor as unambiguously metaphysical as the C set.
Again these are best illustrated by example.
B1 Paul believed that Jesus reconciled humanity to God.
B2 Paul's letters speak of Jesus as Son of God.
B3 Luther maintained that one is justified by faith alone.
B4 The Council of Trent upheld judgement by works.
These form a kind of hybrid group. One may recognize that
B statements include allusions to metaphysical concepts. But
the truth or falsity of B1 - 4 does not at first sight seem
to depend on the truth or falsity of the metaphysical concepts.
The B statements express "beliefs about beliefs. They are
historical beliefs about the metaphysical opinions of certain
historical personages. They are sometimes a source of great
confusion to unwary students who will occasionally discuss
whether or not Paul or Luther held a particular metaphysical
view with all the fervour that one might expect from one
discussing the merits of the substantive belief rather than
the belief about the belief.
The category of B statements needs to be mentioned, but
it should not deflect us. I would argue that the truth or
falsity of B statements is determined by exactly the same
kind of investigation that one devotes to A statements, and
that B statements should not be confused with C statements.
The nature and character of Paul's beliefs about metaphysical
matters is decided by the same procedure as the nature and
character of Paul's opinions about how many times he had
visited Jerusalem or Galatia. The decision depends on the
normal historical procedure for evaluating which texts were
indeed written by Paul, and what view such texts do in fact
contain. The procedure is entirely similar to the procedure
one would adopt when asking whether Caesar believed that
his command in Gaul expired in 50 B.C. or in 49 B.C..
But the B statements are not simply assimilable to the
A statements. They do need to be differentiated. The difference
is not so much one relating to the historical arguments one
would adduce in their defence. The difference consists in the
fact that they are historical statements about the metaphysical
beliefs of particular people. They therefore include metaphysical
lol
concepts. Is it possible to identify further what differentiates
them? I think it is. Let us take B2. In one sense all that
is required in order to confirm B2 is to find the appropriate
form of words in a letter which can be held to be one of the
genuine Pauline epistles. This can be done as the relevant
phrase occurs in each of the four major undisputed letters.
If B2 is construed as saying that Paul's letters used the form
of words in question, then the procedure for confirming B2
is strongly analogous to the procedure for confirming the
statement that Caesar believed that his command in Gaul extended
to 49 B.C.. But the matter is not quite so simple. This
becomes apparent if we ask a further question. Let us suppose
that Basil Mitchell and, say, D.Z.Phillips differ over the
meaning of the belief that Jesus is the Son of God. If we.
were now to ask whether Paul believed that Jesus was the Son
of God in the sense upheld by Mitchell or whether he believed
it in the sense upheld by D.Z.Phillips we would be driven
towards the conclusion that B2 is more complex than our initial
proposal suggested.
There is therefore a secondary complexity about beliefs
about beliefs. In one sense my belief that A believes that p
is simply to be confirmed or disconfirmed by arguments as to
whether A is (or in the example was) sincerely disposed to
assert that p. In another sense the different interpretations
of what it means for someone to believe that p are relevant
to the discussion of whether it is (or was) the case that A
believes that p.
Although I think that this analysis of the class of B
statements doqs point to further complexity, I do not think
that the discovery of this further complexity necessarily
vitiates Mitchell's case. He argues for an analogy between
metaphysical beliefs and historical beliefs, but also extends
the analogy to include literary interpretation. The latter
may well involve just the class of B statements to which I
have drawn attention. If we are discussing the meaning of
stanza from the metaphysical poetry of Donne, or if we are
discussing the anti-metaphysical polemic of Philo in Hume's
Dialogues then similar issues arise. However I do think that
the issue is more complex than Mitchell acknowledges. The
resolution of certain controversies in the interpretation of
literature may turn on the precise metaphysical connotation
of a sentence, or a line, or a stanza of a poem. In that
case the analogy between the defence of a metaphysical system,
and the defence of a belief about the opinions of a historical
or literary figure may be weakened. In at least some cases the
point at issue in the discussion of a historical or literary
matter may itself not just be like a metaphysical question
it may be_ a metaphysical question. He must therefore be careful
to note that while the interpretation of literature does indeed
involve just the kind of cumulative argument which Mitchell
claims, there are sometimes hidden complexities in the interpretation
of lines such as the ones he cites
' Tis madness to resist or blame
The force of angry Heaven's flame.
But I do not wish to exaggerate this point. The more important
distinction is between groups A and C.
The analysis of B statements poses the difficulty that
there are statements which we might sometimes regard as if
they were A statements, hut which when we ask a certain type
of question ahout them turn out to have some of the characteristics
of C statements. In considering an analogy which is attempting
to justify metaphysical systems by arguments accepted as normal
in historical study we must be careful to make sure that we
are comparing C statements with A statements, and avoid the
potential confusion which B statements might contribute. This
is not to say that B statements are in themselves unduly
problematical. It is merely the case that they are liable to
introduce unnecessary confusion into the consideration of
Mitchell's analogy.
But even when we limit ourselves to considering the claim
that one can justify G statements by the sort of cumulative
argument one uses to justify A statements we still find that the
issues are complex. The problem I now wish to consider is this.
I proposed the distinction when it became apparent that some of
the statements contained in a metaphysical system either are
or contain historical statements. Thus within the set of meta¬
physical beliefs which Mitchell is defending we find historical
sentences about Jesus and Paul as well as metaphysical statements
about salvation and the divinity of Christ. It is possible to
extract pure A statements. Thus one can identify some of the
historical elements in the set of theistic metaphysical
beliefs. But it is very difficult, perhaps impossible to
produce a complete set of pure C statements. Many of the C
statements will continue to contain explicitly or implicitly
some A element. Thus sentences which describe Christ as
redeemer will almost always contain an explicit or implicit
element which alludes to the historical fact of the crucifixion
of Jesus. We can formulate this element in terms of an A
statement of purely historical character, hut it is very
difficult, perhaps impossible, to quote a C statement in which
the Christian belief about salvation is expressed in purely
metaphysical terms.
Indeed the very quest for pure C statements may do violence
to the character of the system of beliefs which we are investigatin
There may be some pure C statements but many statements which
are classed in group C also contain historical elements.
•God is immortal and invisible' is presumably a statement
which comes as near to being a pure C statement as any. But
'Christ died for the sins of the world' cannot readily, or
perhaps in any way, be reformulated to yield a sentence which
lacks a historical as well as a metaphysical element. Indeed
it would do violence to the character of the belief we are
investigating to make such an attempt.
This means that there is a further complexity to Mitchell's
analogy. I am still disposed to persevere with it as a potentially
illuminating approach, but I think that it needs to be further
qualified. If his claim is to remain a significant claim
then it must be saying that the justification of the C elements
in the C statements of belief depends on the kind of cumulative
argument used in the justification of purely historical A
statements. ¥e can then ask if this claim is to be accepted.
There is however another line of argument on the whole
question which needs to be considered, Mitchell's analogy
claims that systems of metaphysical belief can be justified
by the kind of cumulative argument used in historical study,
bow in order to set up such a comparison it is very important
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that the examples do in fact conform to this model. This is
certainly the case where the duration of Caesar"s command in
Gaul is taken as a model for the defence of a conclusion by
cumulative argument. Indeed it also illustrates the further
point that sometimes, in such discussions of past historical
states of affairs, a new theory can "be propounded which views
the existing evidence in a different way. But we need to "be
careful in the choice of examples. This is because some sets
of beliefs about history may themselves be ' large scale
metaphysical systems' (to quote Mitchell's phrase). There
have been in the past, and may well still be, those who put
forward all embracing schemata for the interpretation of
'history'. Very often such grand schemes receive rather abrupt
treatment from those whose view of the academic study of history
persuades them that they should focus on specific events within
the more limited period of a century, a generation, or even
the span of a few days in the life of one of history's more
notorious villains. But there are works of much larger scope.
Ve must therefore be careful lest the analogy between metaphysics
and history be expressed in terms that are vague or slippery.
Examples of beliefs about history which are themselves
metaphysical in character would be Marxist views of history,
or idealist or physicalist theories of history. In these
cases there would certainly be sets of more purely historical
sentences, but also sentences involving a good deal of high
level theory, or concepts of maximal scope. It is not the
presence of theory as such which marks off such metaphysical
systems, it is rather the great generality of the schemes that
they exemplify. Theories which contain concepts of maximal
scope certainly fall into this category. The view that all
events can "be described in terms which are reduced to the
language of physics would be a prime example. But also any
theory that the whole of history has an ultimate goal would
be another. How there may be a case for saying that theistic
metaphysics can be defended by arguments comparable to those
used to defend systems of this type. One might even claim
that it is no more difficult to defend theistic metaphysics
than systems of this type. And Mitchell does indeed seem to
put forward a case somewhat along the first of these lines.
But it is importaxit to distinguish carefully between this claim
and the analogy with the debate over Caesar's command in Gaul.
In the one example theistic beliefs are said to be defended
by a cumulative argument such as that used by historians dealing
with the details of a particular era. In the other case theistic
beliefs are being defended as comparable in character to other
metaphysical systems of belief. Mitchell's case for the rational
of theistic belief uses both of these approaches. He first
sketches the analogy with history, then admits that the analogy
has limitations, and supplements it with the further line of
defence. It is however the first of these that I wish to
explore further at present.
It is a merit of the work we are considering that it does
see that the question of rational belief cannot just be confined
to the rationality of believing simple sentences. Our beliefs
come in sets and we test the probable truth or falsity of a
belief or set of beliefs by exploring its relationship to
other beliefs. This process of testing beliefs and sets of
beliefs is of crucial importance in distinguishing between
those beliefs which we hold to be rational and those which
we-class as irrational. The case of beliefs about past events
is sufficiently complex to raise a whole series of issues
which are of immediate concern to anyone interested in the
rationality of belief, and this is the case both for those
chiefly concerned with metaphysical belief and for those concerned
with beliefs of a less general character. Tiithout necessarily
invoking a purely foundationalist theory of justification,
I would however argue that we could propose that at least from
one point of view we could construct a scale of increasing
complexity. At the lower end of the scale is a belief about
a matter of direct observation. I believe that there is a
sheet of paper in front of me. More complex than this is the
belief that Caesar's command in Gaul extended to 50 or 49 B.C..
This is more complex because it includes beliefs about matters
of direct observation and more besides. It includes the belief
that there are coins of Julius Caesar now observable. It also
includes the belief that I once observed the text of a book
which is claimed to be a copy of a copy of a copy (etc) of
one written by Caesar. Then there is a further level of
complexity. This is that I know people who believe that
Christ died for the redemption of the world. Such a belief
includes beliefs comparable to those about the existence of
a figure of the past such as Caesar, but much more besides.
For the sake of our present analysis we can speak of tho&e
tiers of belief each of which includes elements to be found
in the previous level.
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I must of course make certain qualifications at this
point. I am well aware that the three tiers of belief which
I have here identified are only three amongst many widely
differing classes of beliefs. I not only do not dispute that,
I positively assent to and accept that. But these three tiers
do represent an increasing order of complexity when viewed from
the perspective I have presented. Each tier includes the
problems of the previous one and also additional problems
besides. I also accept that there are many types of belief
in addition to those selected here, as well as there being
many tiers of complexity. I am very far from presupposing
that all types of belief are to be assessed by the same criteria.
There may be certain common criteria, but that must be argued
for and not presupposed. For the time being we must note
that as well as there being beliefs about matters of direct
observation, and historical beliefs and metaphysical beliefs
there are also others. There are beliefs about the classification
of animals and birds, of protons and electrons, of civil and
criminal law, of ethical values and of astronomical and cosmological
theory. Such widely differing classes of beliefs may have some
features in common, but are so evidently different in subject
matter that it would be wise to expect them each to raise
special difficulties of their own when it comes to evaluating
the grounds on which they are held and the degree of confidence
with which we should hold them.
For the present however I wish to confine the discussion
to the more limited but still sufficiently broad question of
the comparison of historical and metaphysical beliefs. Another
objection which might be made is that not all metaphysical
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beliefs necessarily include a historical element. There
may be C beliefs which lack an A element. Thus 'God is an
immortal and invisible being* does not obviously or straight¬
forwardly contain any reference to history. This belief there¬
fore cannot be shown, on the grounds given above, to be more
complex than a belief about Caesar. Whether it is so or not
is a nice point. What is sufficient here I hope is to argue
that this example of a C belief belongs to a class of C beliefs
(held by Mitchell and many others) which we are investigating,
and which taken as a whole do contain A elements. Indeed more
than this can be argued. It is inherent in the character of
the set of theistic metaphysical beliefs under discussion that
the God about whom they speak is not only a being about whom
metaphysical statements are made, but who is also held to have
acted in certain ways in history. Whether one agrees with his
beliefs or not it ought to be recognized that this is what
Mitchell and many other traditional theists believe, and such
beliefs cannot properly be discussed if one only looks at those
sentences which speak of an omnipotent and benevolent deity,
and not at the associated beliefs of a historical character.
To abstract certain elements and look at these alone is an
artificial procedure and undoubtedly contributes to the sense
of unreality which can sometimes be detected in purely philosophical
debates about theism. Even in the case of Jewish and Islamic
theistic belief I would hold the same point to be valid. One
cannot properly evaluate Judaism without recognizing that
its beliefs about God are beliefs about a deity who is held
to have acted in a certain way in the history of his people.
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In the case of Islam also one cannot completely separate
abstract belief about God from the belief that he has revealed
himself through the teaching of the prophet. Thus even if we
could identify single sentences within such systems of belief
of a purely C type we would have to admit that these are in
practice held in conjunction with other C beliefs which include
A elements. This shows, I believe, that the issue is more
complex than Mitchell's published argument admits. I do,
however, think that Swinburne's defence of C type statements
exemplifies one way of conducting such a defence and I propose
at a later point to offer some criticisms of his presentation
also.
The preceding paragraphs do, I think, show that the analogy
which Mitchell put forward is a very interesting one. Points
can be made for and against it, and it is especially important
to note that the issue is much more complex than appears at
first sight. Having, I hope, given sufficient preliminary
indication of its complexity I now wish to take a somewhat
longer route to examining its validity or invalidity. I propose
to consider at some length the character of beliefs about
historical matters. This will serve two purposes. It will
advance our general study of the rationality of belief by
considering that issue in relation to a specific class of
utterances of belief namely those about past events. Secondly
it will advance our consideration of Mitchell's analogy. Hhen
we return from the more extended discussion of historical
beliefs I propose then to consider some arguments of Richard
Swinburne as well as those of Mitchell. This is because I
think that Swinburne has taken up the question of cumulative
argumentation and the confirmation of belief in a way which
extends and amplifies the debate. If at that later point
we are to consider-whether a metaphysical system can successfully
be defended by an argument which relies on a cumulative assessment
of probabilities then a critical appraisal of Swinburne's
approach is particularly appropriate. Indeed not only has
Swinburne developed his view in a series of three volumes,
but his approach has given rise to contrary arguments from
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other philosophers such as J.L.Mackie. The issue is therefore
one giving rise to lively debate in philosophical circles at
present. But our next step must be to look more closely at
the kind of argumentation used in assessing beliefs about
historical events.
II*
Chapter 4. Historical Study and the Criteria of Rational Belief.
We began our study with a question about the character of rational
belief. In order to examine this topic I first focussed on the relation
between belief and knowledge to see where the concept of rational belief
stood in relation to the more frequently discussed and often more highly
prized category of knowledge. Then the argument turned to the nature
of belief and to the factors which urge us to consider some beliefs
rational. In the third chapter I pointed out that we also need to
consider complexes of beliefs and sets of beliefs as well as beliefs
expressed in single sentences. I there selected historical and
metaphysical beliefs as special areas for further attention.
I chose historical and metaphysical beliefs because each of
these areas has aroused controversy in relation to criteria of
rationality. Each deserves attention in its own right. But the
question of an analogy between them has also been raised and will be
kept in mind. In this chapter the focus will be on factors
affecting the rational appraisal of beliefs about the historical past.
In any study of rational belief this deserves attention in its own
right. It also has connections with problems of rational belief
elsewhere. If current philosophy of science makes use of the history
of science in order to assess the rationality of science, then it
ought to be interested in the rationality of historical study. But
in any case historical beliefs form an important subset of our
total set of beliefs. So the question of their rationality is a
central not just a preliminary matter. Then as further chapters
follow I also propose to return to the question of an analogy
betwen historical and metaphysical beliefs. So this chapter is more
directly concerned with issues involved in assessing the rationality
of historical "beliefs themselves in their own right . But a later
chapter will also draw on this one for comparative purposes.
The rationality of beliefs about past events is an interesting
test case for a theory of rational belief. This is so because
beliefs about historical events form a distinct and problematical
class. I wish to claim that there are certain similarities
and affinities between different classes of belief. But I
also wish to maintain that the different classes are different,
and that they cannot be wholly assimilated to one another.
The extent to which different classes of belief are evaluated
by similar procedures is a vexed question. The issue is particularly
acute in the case of metaphysical beliefs. Some philosophers
might well argue that such beliefs cannot be treated as if they
were comparable to beliefs about chairs and tables or even the
events of the only partly accessible past. But to adopt this
view in a full blooded manner leads to the consequence that
there are very few or perhaps no common principles for assessing
the rationality of different classes of belief. This would
leave one with one of two choices. Either each class of beliefs
has its own canons of rationality, or certain classes of belief
are beyond rational evaluation. I personally do not find either
of these extreme positions acceptable, although I admit that if
one does not claim that all beliefs are assessed by the same
criteria of rationality one must give at least partial assent
to one or other of these views, (preferably the former). The
relation between historical beliefs and beliefs about matters
of more immediate perception provides an interesting test case
for examining the extent to which common criteria of rationality
can or cannot be held to apply to different categories of belief
The most evident difference between historical beliefs and
beliefs about matters of present observation is the inaccessibil
of the past. Past events are not directly accessible. But
to what extent does this factor really distinguish history from
other disciplines or historical beliefs from beliefs about the
physics or chemistry of everyday objects? In the case of
historical events we are dependent on the indirect evidence
of present data from which we infer what took place thirty or
three hundred or three thousand years ago. He possess artefacts
or original documents or copies of documents from which we
make our inferences. Statues and coins and inscriptions and
papyri provide us with objects of direct perception about whose
character and significance we construct theories and hypotheses.
Such data can be very differently described. For example I
am very familiar with photographs of a particular coin which
can be described in the following ways:
D1 This is a round piece of metal.
D2 This coin bears the name Vespasian.
D3 This coin bears the legend Judaea carta.
D4 This is a coin from the time of the Roman Emperor
Vespasian.
Each of these descriptive statements contains an element of
observation and an element of theory. The interrelations
between theory and observation are complex and I propose at
this point only to draw attention to a few of them. D1 describe
a currently observable object in terms of geometrical shape
and chemical composition. 1)2 is different. It describes
lettering found on the object, it describes the object as part
of a familiar monetary system, and it describes the combination
of letters on the object as comprising a name. B3 is similar
to D2 except that the inscription on the part of the coin
mentioned in D3 is a slogan containing not only a name but
also (part of) a verb. D4 not only identifies the object as
a coin but also gives it a place in the chronological framework
of Roman Imperial history. From many convergent pieces of
evidence such as the existence of this coin, the arch of Titus,
the writings of ancient historians, and recent archaedogical
evidence of buildings captured by Roman soldiers and burnt,
we conclude that this coin relates to the crushing by the
soldiers of Vespasian of a revolt in Judaea which had begun
in A.D. 66.
Historical statements about the military successes of
Vespasian and Titus, or the duration of Caesar's Gallic command,
are statements about events which are only indirectly accessible.
But that does not in itself mark off historical beliefs from
the beliefs of other scientific disciplines. Many other
statements are about matters which are only indirectly accessibl
For instance some states of affairs are only observable by
instruments because of their comparative inaccessibility.
Very minute particles and very distant objects fall into this
category. There is here however an important distinction.
Such objects can be reinspected on successive occasions (and
perhaps with different instruments), How while one might
maintain that the past events of the fall of Jerusalem and the
fall of Masada can be reinspected, the process of reinspection
is not precisely comparable. In the one case the object is
present but very minute or very distant, in the other it is
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the evidence which is present and reinspected, the past state
of affairs is "arrived at" only by theorizing about the evidence,
(indeed it might be argued by some theorists that the past
state of affairs only exists in the historian's theoretical
reconstruction, though I would not wish to use such a way of
describing it).
There are however whole sections of natural science which
are much closer in character to historical study than is suggested
by the usual examples taken from such disciplines. For instance
one could cite beliefs about the origin of the species and
beliefs about the early cosmological events which resulted in
the rapid acceleration of galaxies in different directions.
(i am of course here using ' cosmological' in an astronomical
rather than a metaphysical sense.) Here we have examples
from biology and cosmology which do have distinct affinities
with examples from historical study in so far as they are all
concerned with states of affairs which are held to have obtained
in the distant past. For this purpose the phrase 'less recent past'
must serve as a less than wholly precise way of referring to
that period which antedates the memories of those now alive.
The very recent past raises issues of a slightly different
character again in so far as it is accessible via our own
memory. Indeed a case may be made for using the recent past
as a model for the understanding of the less recent past.
But be that as it may we are obliged to note that certain
assertions about cosmology and biology have distinct similarities
to assertions about historical events of the more distant past.
The issue with which we are here concerned cuts across the
common distinction between the natural and the human sciences.
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In certain respects at least, some parts of "biology and cosmology
share with historical study the methodological problem of
drawing inferences about past states of affairs from present
evidence. In.other respects of course the common distinction
remains. The study of the early history of the galaxies and
of the origin of the species are very different disciplines
from the study of human history. "Fnat especially marks off
human history is the complex nature of human personhood and
human motivation. (This last point stands whether or not
one adopts a physicalist or a personalist view of human behaviour).
One of the tasks of the historian is to propound theories
and hypotheses about past events. The theories are the present
constructs of the community of historians, the evidence is
present in the form of objects and reports, we might even say
that the ' facts' about the past are present conclusions about
past states of affairs when those conclusions are indeed true.
But it is no novel conclusion to insist that the past states
of affairs may be the subject of our theories or hypotheses
but cannot themselves be recovered. This point has surfaced
in recent philosophical controversy over the work of Leon
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Goldstein. I wish to maintain however that in at least some
sense of the term the events of the past are independent of
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our theories about them. The events of the past have left
surviving traces and when we come across traces of these
events we can correct our theories. This process of judging
whether in the light of new evidence our previous theories are
true or false is an essential part of historical study. But
it is not the only factor which leads us to infer the reality
n-u
of past events.
It is right to distinguish the recent past from the more
distant -past. But the very distinction itself tells us something
about the character of history. The chief ground for differentiation
is that many events in the recent past can be attested from the
memories of those still alive today. Thus the argument from
memory provides an important step in the discussion about the
past even if it is only the events of the recent past which
are remembered at first hand. This is not to say that memory
is always correct. Indeed it is all too evident to us that
our memories cannot always be relied upon as they provide us
at times with conflicting evidence. But the unreliability of
specific memories does not undermine the argument from memory
altogether. On this Walsh writes
'Part of the evidence for the judgement that memory is
liable to mislead consists of memories of occasions on
which we have ourselves been misled by it, and unless
these memories are treated as authentic the wider judgement
4*5
could never be made.'
Memory is of course not to be equated with immediate perception.
But the relation between them is a subtle one. The sense
perception of objects can be repeated. This is not the same
as recalling a memory once again. In the case of sense perception
the object is freshly sensed on each occasion. In the case of
the successive recounting of one's memories we would be wiser
not to speak of fresh access to the past event but to the
reawakening of the memory of the past event. But even successive
sense perception of objects is significant only if a memory of
the previous sensing is accepted. Thus there is a role for
memory even in the observational procedures of the natural
sciences, even if that role is not identical with the role of
memory in recalling recent historical events. Further if
memory is not always reliable, neither is sense perception
always so.
In the case of remembered events (or remembered states
of affairs) we are dealing with something which is at least
partially comparable to sense-perception. But the events of
the more distant past are not directly accessible to our
memories. All that we can claim is the following. Memory
provides us with ground for believing that there were events
in the recent past. But the acknowledgement that there were
events in the recent past, along with objects which lead usA
to make inferences about the more remote past, provides us
with ground for believing that there were events in the distant
past, This argument does not attempt to refute total scepticism.
All it can do is to claim that if on the basis of sense-perception
we accept the reality of present objects then there are comparable
but not identical reasons for accepting that there were past
events and past states of affairs.
Insofar as history and natural history are concerned with
past events and past states of affairs there is as I argued
earlier a partial analogy between them. But there are also
significant differences. We cannot simply assimilate history
to natural history. In both disciplines we find an assumption
on the basis of present evidence that certain things took
place or were in a certain state at an earlier period. Thus
natural sciences also incorporate theories which postulate
past happenings. But history is essentially though not exclusively
concerned with events involving human activity and with institutions
and forces in which human behaviour plays a role. Thus history
does not simply consist in events decided by single great individual
but,even when concerned with the movement of prices in the later
Roman Empire, it is dealing with past happenings in which human
behaviour is a significant factor. I would therefore appeal
to the analogy between history and natural history in arguing
for the reality of past happenings, but wish to qualify it
when considering the distinctive, character of historical events.
Reasons for wishing to qualify the analogy between history
and natural history would not only derive from the argument
that history typically involves reference to the thoughts and
intentions of human agents. That is so, and it does mean that
history is for that reason to be distinguished from natural
history. Even if someone were to argue that human thought is
merely to be seen as the behaviour of a complex physical
organism, one could still argue that human thought operates
in ways which are markedly distinct from the behaviour of
molecules, or sub-atomic particles, or algae or zebras. But
it is not only the role of human thought which is a factor
in marking off history from natural history. Many philosophers
of history would maintain that the laws and generalizations
used by historians differ at least in certain respects from the
laws of natural science. The chief reason often given is that
explanation in history rests on generalizations of a different
kind from those used in natural science. The generalizations
are more often limited in character to the traits of human
behaviour in particular periods or amongst particular groups
of people. This is not to say that there are not also universal
laws which are also exemplified, in historical events. Human
behaviour is of course subject to the constraints of nature.
But many patterns of human behaviour themselves only seem to
be-capable of being described by laws of limited generality.
Thus certain patterns of behaviour are more common amongst
some groups and in some periods. The marriage customs implied
in the play Romeo and Juliet, and those in Shakespeare's
England, are not necessarily those of other peoples in other
ages. Even when one is offered what looks like a real generalization
it differs from scientific laws. Take for example
HI Discontent amongst the peasantry always leads to
revolution.
This is imprecise in its details, specifying neither the degree
of discontent needed nor the time which might lapse before
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revolution comes. Few historians would be willing to attempt
to tighten such a generalization as they would not consider
it possible to amass sufficient data to complete the task.
But this argument does not exclude the possibility of social
scientists attempting to assess, in the present, more precise
details of such a correlation. Historical study lacks such
precision. He cannot readily decide whether it is unobtainable
in principle or not, but it is unobtainable in practice in many
cases.
In considering the rationality of beliefs about historical
events a series of issues can be specified for further debate.
Some of these have already been introduced in a preliminary
way but in each case some further discussion will be needed.
There is the character of historical explanation insofar as
the statements of historians purport not only to tell us what
happened, "but why it happened as it did. Then there is the
question of historical objectivity. If historians describe
a series of past events from different and apparently
incompatible viewpoints, to what extent can we claim that the
statements made by any one of them are rationally believed?
A further major issue is the relation between historical study
and other disciplines. Many philosophers write as if the
natural sciences exemplify rationality. Indeed debates about
rationality and epistemic justification are most commonly
conducted with reference to the rationality of conclusions
arrived at in the natural sciences. If in the study of history
decisions are made in a somewhat different manner, what are
the implications of that for the rationality of historical
beliefs? And if other beliefs are defended because of their
comparability to historical beliefs what are the consequences
for those beliefs of our conclusions about historical beliefs?
Finally and perhaps most interestingly what is the relationaship
between statements of belief that certain historical events
occurred and the events themselves. Can we speak meaningfully
of the reality of past events and should we reject those, like
Goldstein, who speak of historians actually constructing historical
events? In a work of this kind it is not possible to give
full treatment to all of these issues and I propose to focus
especially on the fourth and last of them as this aspect of the
status of historical beliefs is undergoing the most vigorous
recent discussion. But in order to approach this question I
propose to look briefly at those which lead up to it.
Both when attempting to discover what it was that happened,
and also when offering explanations as to why it happened,
historians engage in the construction of theories. In this
respect history proceeds much as other sciences do. There is
present evidence, and on the basis of the evidence rival theories
may be offered as to what occurred and what led up to the
occurrence. Of course there are differences in that, as we
have noted above, the past itself is not available for our
inspection, we can only inspect the present evidence. But in
that historians deal with theories about evidence there is a
comparison to be had with the rational pursuit of other disciplines.
But the borderline between theory and observation is a notoriously
problematical one. It is helpful to distinguish between different
levels of theoreticity. The example of the Roman coin given
above already indicates some of the issues. But I propose to
pursue the point with a different example, that of the Coptic
gnostic papyri from Egypt.
In the case of these papyri there are different levels
of theory involved in the description of the evidence. Botanical
theory is involved in identifying the material as papyrus,
theory about ancient books in declaring that they were bound
as codices, theory about language in identifying the script in
them as Coptic, theory about the history of ideas in declaring
the contents to be gnostic in character. Even at the simplest
level in declaring the discovery to be an 'object' we are involved
in some kind of very basic theory. But the texts in question
serve as evidence for higher level historical theories also.
Let us suppose that there is now widespread agreement amongst
the relevant scholars that these texts are papyrus codices
written in Coptic and coming from Egypt between AD200 and
AD ')00. These conclusions now form an evidential base for
higher-level theories ahout the origins of Gnosticism. They do so
even though it is admitted that theory is involved in the basic
description of the evidence that we have given. Indeed the basic
description may well not only contain theory ...but also imply that
a change occurred or that something happened in the past. In
this case the basic description implies that the texts were
written in Coptic language in Egypt in the time of the Roman
Empire. Our task is easier in this case as there is indeed
general agreement amongst the relevant experts on what I have
classed as the basic description of the evidence. Even if there
were not I would still maintain that what we are investigating
follows a more complex form of a basic pattern. The pattern
is this. Observation + theory^ provides evidence for theory,-,.
Perhaps closer to this example is the variant: observation +
theories 1, 2, 3 provides evidence for theory^.
Let us take this pattern as an outline of the situation
described. ITow theory^ in this case represents what I have called
a higher-level historical theory about the origins of Gnosticism.
Tie have a contemporary object on whose description we have good
measure of agreement, which it is claimed forms the basis for a
historical theory or a set of rival theories about gnostic origins.
Let one of these theories be that Gnosticism was independent and
not a byproduct of Christianity. He will call this the thesis of
an independent Gnosticism. (its dependence on other Hellenistic
and oriental beliefs is generally accepted). To what extent is
there a difference between the rationality of believing that
Gnosticism arose in an independent manner and the rationality
of believing that this object is a papyrus codex or that that
object is a wooden table? It is at this point that it becomes
apparent that the rational defence of theories is not entirely
uniform in different fields for reasons additional to those already
given. To some extent one can supply the usual answers. One
theory is preferable to another on grounds of internal consistency,
its consistency with other accepted beliefs, its simplicity,
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explanatory power, fruitfulness and the like. This answer
is certainly what one is given in many discussions of scientific
method. Thus we are told that Newton' s theory of gravity is
preferable to its predecessors because of its greater simplicity
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and its greater explanatory scope, or that Einstein's theories
are acceptable because of their explanation of anomalous data
and their offering predictions which were subsequently confirmed.
The criteria are however by no means without problems. Estimates
of simplicity may vary, and one criterion may have to be traded
off against another. But the use of these criteria is a
commonplace of the philosophy of science. The recourse to
these criteria is certainly most evident in the case of high
level scientific theories, and especially in those cases where
rival theories eventually gave way to one dominant theory.
But the criteria are not all equally applicable to all of these
examples.
In the case of historical beliefs the choice between theories
49does also in practice rest on criteria such as those listed.
But here too the criteria are not all equally used in all cases.
Eruitfulness in making predictions is a very important criterion,
but one much more rarely available in historical study. Also
it is not so easy to obtain theories of wide scope and greater
explanatory power in a discipline which relies heavily on
limited generalizations and is often concerned with the events
which occurred in particular places and particular periods.
Yet both of these criteria do have a place and an important
one in certain instances. Very often however it is the internal
-consistency of a theory, its consistency with other beliefs
and its simplicity which commends it. In the case of the
Hag Hammadi Gnostic texts it was observed that two of the
texts were notably independent in the manner defined above.
This observation was held to confirm one of two previously
rival theories about Gnosticism, namely the independence
theory. However confirmation is usually a matter of degree
and it is so in this case. The new discovery in a sense acted
like the verification of a previous prediction. One could
cast it in the following form:
H2 If Gnosticism did arise independently we would expect
one day to find Gnostic texts of an independent
character.
But the acceptance of the independence theory also relies
on other criteria notably that of simplicity. Its supporters
have to maintain that it is also simpler (and therefore more
rational) to hold that some of the recently discovered gnostic
texts are independent and arose amongst Gnostics who had no
close acquaintance with Christianity^ rather than that such
texts emerged amongst Gnostics who had been originally influenced
by Christians and who then ensured that their texts left no
trace of such influence.
In this example we see the operation of two criteria.
A previous theory gains confirmation when an implicit prediction
is fulfilled. But the evaluation of the fulfilment of this
particular prediction itself depends on the judgement that one
view of the new texts is preferable to its rival or rivals on
the ground, of simplicity. Clearly much more analysis of these
criteria is needed than has so far been provided by this
example. But what is here being maintained is that, given
that certain criteria are used to evaluate the rationality
of scientific theories, we can examine the practice of historical
science to see if similar criteria are used. If they are,
then it would be possible to pursue the argument by maintaining
that the criteria of historical study are at least as rational
as those of the natural sciences. But the issue cannot be so
easily resolved. Tie have already noted certain differences and
distinctions between the two areas of investigation. hhere
historical methods and criteria differ from those of the natural
sciences we have a test case for the argument that at least to
some extent this academic discipline exhibits variations from
the criteria and standards of rationality used in the natural
sciences. This is therefore a crucial issue in the entire
argument of this work. If someone is inclined to assume that
the criteria of rationality in the natural sciences are a
paradigm case of what it is to believe something rationally,
then our evaluation of historical methodology may provide a
test case of whether in fact other disciplines ought to be
assimilated to the model of rationality which is held to
obtain in the natural sciences. Two factors must be examined.
The first is whether there are indeed differences in the criteria
for rational belief in history and in the natural sciences.
I have already argued that in at least some respects there are
such differences, but the issue deserves further exploration.
The second factor is whether if we do concede the existence
of such differences that lowers our estimate of the rational
status of historical judgements or obliges us to admit at
least some variation in the application of criteria of rationality.
A further point could well be noted at this juncture,
bhen estimating the rationality of believing that all the marbles
in a bag are red when a certain proportion are drawn at random
and found to be red, we can use a mathematical formula which
computes the probability involved. Intuitively we recognize
that the more marbles that have been drawn and found to be
red the more likely it is that all are red. Of course it is
more complex, as one green marble instantly destroys the
likelihood of all the marbles being red, though it may only
marginally reduce the likelihood that most of the marbles are
red. But in such cases one can argue that a conclusion is
rationally acceptable or rationally believed if there is more
evidence for it than against it (provided especially that there
is no conclusive evidence which tells against it). This is
largely the position adumbrated towards the end of chapter
two. One must, however, remember an important distinction.
The case of the coloured marbles differs in at least one
significant respect from that of many inductive inferences.
In the case of a bag containing a specified number of marbles
we reason that the probability of the marbles in the sample
matching the given population increases with the size of the
sample. But in the case of many inductive inferences the
population is not fixed. If we do not know the total
population of ravens we are unable to calculate the proportion
of observed black ravens to unobserved ravens. The inferred
generalization that all ravens are "black has to rest on our
observation of large numbers of black ravens in as many different
places and circumstances as ?re can manage, and the absence of
any observations of ravens of a different colour. This differs
from the example of the marbles, and it also differs from the
case where we have conflicting evidence i.e. strong circumstantial
evidence of theft on the part of an employee who had previously
been regarded as of unimpeachable honesty. In such a case we
would, as argued earlier, be inclined to say that circumstantial
evidence of guilt may well be insufficient to outweigh reliable
evidence of previous good character. The examples show that
non-deductive inference takes very varied forms. Even in the
case of the ravens, however, we might allow that there was
greater evidential support for the generalization that all
ravens are black in the following circumstances. The supporting
evidence is substantial and varied as assumed above, no firm
counter instances are recorded, and any reports of multicoloured
ravens come from untrained and untested observers. In such a
case we would say that there is greater evidential support
for the generalization than against it.
But we must now take account of a very different factor.
This is that in evaluating higher level theories in science
and in history a variety of criteria are involved. These
cannot readily be reduced to the formula that more evidence
favours theory A than theory B. he may need to amend our
view of rational belief once again in order to make clear
what in these circumstances might be a better description
of the matter. bhile we might continue to tolerate statements
to the effect that the balance of evidence is in favour of theory
A we might prefer to express the issue in terms of criteria.
To some extent this issue had already been anticipated
at an earlier point by using the expression ' evidential support'.
But we could now note a further factor. It is RB2 which is in
question here and which needs to be reconsidered and supplemented:
P232 S rationally believes that p if S believes that p and
S has greater evidential support for p than for -p.
This was supplemented with RB3 which covered those cases where
the evidential support is equal. But now a further point can
be added
RB4 S rationally believes that p if p is a theory which
satisfies the criteria of rationality better than -p.
Our procedure is to work towards an analysis of the problem of
rational belief by gradually revising or expanding the formulations
of what is involved in rationally believing that p. RB4 introduces
into the formulae specific reference to the criteria. But it
still leaves unresolved what it is for a theory to satisfy these
criteria better than its negation does. This is an especially
problematical area. Judgements of comparative simplicity can
be attacked as subjective, and even if they were agreed, there
might still be ground for disagreement elsewhere. One theory
might be simpler and another display greater explanatory scope.
How then do we decide between them? Or one theory might make
spectacularly successful predictions, but be regarded with
deep suspicion as it seems paradoxical in certain respects.
t
The controversies over the logical status of quantum mechanics
are held by some physicists to exemplify just that difficulty.
But for the present we must return to the question of the
rationality of belief about matters of history. All the same
we must continue to look at the criteria used, and the way
historical judgements are held to satisfy them.
I have argued that historical statements are based upon
present evidence such as texts, inscriptions, the remains of
buildings. These pieces of evidence are described and the
description of them incorporates lower level theory. The
evidence as described is then set by historians into higher
level theory about past events and past states of affairs.
Where these theories are in conflict with one another, choices
have to be made. Those choices are not arbitrary but guided
by criteria such as consistency, simplicity, explanatory power,
fruitfulness and the like. In this respect there is a broad
similarity between the structure and evaluation of theories
about the historical past and the structure and evaluation
of scientific theories, certain differences being conceded.
These differences can be detected especially in the relative
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inaccessibility of past events and in the rarity of opportunity
for actually testing predictions.
The next topic for discussion is the question of historical
explanation and the extent to which the vigorous controversy
over historical explanation throws light on the question of
rational belief. One class of historical statements has
attracted particular attention from philosophers and this is
the class of explanatory statements. Some approaches to this
question begin from a priori principles about the nature of
explanation. From this standpoint it is argued that one can
only explain why an event occurred if one can specify both a
general law and. a set of initial conditions. Given the general
law, and the satisfaction of the initial conditions specified
in that law one can then obtain deductively the conclusion
that the event occurred. This outlines very briefly an approach
which attempts to make historical explanation conform to a
certain model. The model is that which sees explanation in
terms of a deductive inference from a covering law and a set
of initial conditions. The more precise description for this
line of approach is 'deductive-nomological'. But this ugly
hybrid of Greek and Latin terminology is clumsy and inelegant,
and in practice an alternative but looser description has been
used. This approach has therefore often been described as
'the covering law' approach. It should, however, be noted
that the covering law approach only provides a complete explanation
where the covering law in question is strictly universal. The
crucial point can be simply made. There is a law that the
rolling of four dice will almost always result in a total of
more than four spots being uppermost. The statistical probability
is 1295/1296 = 0.9992. But if we ask why in such a case more
than four was scored, the law in question does not provide a
complete explanation even if it tells us that such a result
was extremely likely.
The controversy over the covering law approach to historical
explanation is especially instructive. It provides an example
of an attempt to assimilate one discipline to the standards,
methods and criteria of another. The model of explanation
by deduction from a universal law and a set of stated initial
conditions is one which is much more common in the natural
sciences. Even there, however, it is not the only model for
explanation, as the use of statistical generalizations shows.
But it is with the different character of historical explanation
that I am chiefly concerned and the diversity even within the
natural sciences must he left to those more acquainted with
those fields. In the case of historical explanation a notorious
dilemma arises. On the one hand explanation "by deduction
from a universal law offers an impressive model of how on
a -priori reasoning complete explanation ought to operate. One
could well argue that unless the event was certain, given the
universal law and the stated initial conditions, one had not
actually offered a convincing account of why the event did in
fact occur rather than fail to occur. Thus the practice of the
natural sciences and our strong intuitions about the nature of
explanation point firmly in one direction. But the actual
practice of historical study and a great many theorists about
historical methodology point in a different direction. In
practice historians are reluctant to provide, or to allow
others to provide universal generalizations. There is wide
agreement that most explanations offered by historians fall
short of the covering-law model advocated by Hempel. There is
also a claim by some philosophers that historical practice
should not be forced into a theoretical mould provided by
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other disciplines. The controversy which arises here does
so as a result of the formulation of an issue in one discipline
being proposed for use in regulating the methodology of
another discipline. Tie must therefore examine the problem
a little more closely.
One of the factors in the controversy is that terms like
'explanation' and 'complete explanation' are inadequately
defined. Just as with statements about causes some further
clarification is often needed. In ordinary language we
say that a fire in a cinema was caused by an unextinguished
cigarette. But someone who insisted on pedantic precision
would demand that we name other necessary and sufficient
conditions. So in the case of explanation what is often
offered in ordinary language is an account of those features
which lessen our puzzlement about why an event occurred.
We are puzzled that Louis XIV reduced pressure on the Wetherlands
and thus allowed William of Orange to land in England. Trevelyan
offers the explanation that Louis calculated that William would
become involved in a civil war and long troubles in Britain
and so allow Prance more scope in continental Europe, The fact
that in that case Louis blundered badly is beside the point,
the calculation would have seemed reasonable enough at the time.
But the explanation offered would need to be amplified in order
to satisfy those who uphold the covering—law model. The one
view sees explanatory statements as statements which reduce
puzzlement. The other view insists that explanations must
give an adequate account of why things happened as they did
and did not turn out differently. In order to do that the
explanation needs to be recast so as to imply (or confer high
inductive probability on) the event. Here view 'al and view ' b_'
are operating with looser and tighter definitions of explanation.
On the tighter view one requires a generalization in order to
provide a full or complete explane-tion. (The terms full or
complete do not here imply an ever receding series of further
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explanations of facts cited in the original explanation).
But one can also see that many of the required generalizations
are at present either not available, or if available only
cast in a form which incorporates a series of not very precise
restrictions. Thus one could produce a generalization to the
effect that rulers normally refrain from pressing their enemies
if they think that the latter have embarked on a course of
action which will keep them hors de combat. But a generalization
cast in such a form does not allow one to infer with deductive
certainty events such as the failure of Louis to keep up
pressure on 'William of Orange'. For is the support for such a
generalization easy to produce.
Indeed some might argue that there is a paradox here if
the generalization is needed to support the specific instance, and
if the specific instances are the grounds on which the generalization
is accepted. It is true that historical generalizations are
rarely made explicit, and are often suspected of unreliability
if they are set out in detail. So it is paradoxical to insist
on a shaky generalization to add rigour to a specific explanation.
But the paradox may be lessened if one argues as follows. The
historian notices that R is often followed by S and infers
inductively that R is a significant contributory cause of S.
This general inference is strengthened if it can be shown that
R is never followed by -S or that if R is followed by -S some
further factor is implicated. (Here an auxiliary hypothesis
is needed). The general inference even if only given qualified
assent could then serve to support the specific explanation in
a modified Hempelian manner. This suggestion does not resolve all
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the difficulties affecting the theory of explanation. It does,
however, provide a way of showing how individual explanations
can he hacked with limited generalizations which themselves
derive support from the observation of specific sequences of
events. The links are however non-deductive ones. Even the
move from the generalization to the specific explanation is
not deductive. The generalization is a hypothesis tested in
certain ways, and propped up by auxiliary hypotheses. The
hypothetical generalization only renders the individual explanation
more likely, it is not so tight as to allow the explanation to he
inferred with deductive certainty.
The above account helps to diminish our unease over the
problems of historical explanation, but does not resolve all
the difficulties. It invokes the kind of defence of hypothetical
generalizations and their need of auxiliary hypotheses which
is not unknown in other disciplines. The key point is however
that the generalization may only confer probability on the
explanation. A specialist in probability theory might wish
to add further refinements in terms of the probability of the
explanandum in a specified reference class being higher than
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its prior probability. But the mathematical complexities
cannot be further pursued here.
In the argument above and especially in the example concerning
the policy of Louis XIV it is accepted that one of the differences
between history and the physical sciences is that history is
at least some of the time concerned with human agents and their
thoughts. In explaining why a general acted as he did we may
well suppose that it was because he thought that the disposition
of enemy forces was different from what it later turned out to
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have been. There may even he some record of a despatch, or a
memoir claiming that to have been the case. Or it could he
that only such an error of judgement on his part would satisfactorily
explain that general's disastrous plan of.advance, and so such an
error is inferred by a historian. Now I grant it is a very
important part of historical explanation to consider the thoughts
as well as the actions of people of previous generations, as well
also as the character of their institutions and social customs.
But this does not mean that one has to assent to some of the more
extravagant idealist views of history. There is no necessity for
the acknowledgement that past thoughts play a role in history to
lead us to the view that history is primarily or exclusively
concerned with the thoughts of past agents, or that the historian
has the same thoughts as past agents. One very direct objection to
the second of these views is that the past thought led to a certain
action whereas the historian's present consideration of that past
thought does not lead to the same action. A historian may indeed
imaginatively place himself in the situation of Caesar or Napoleon,
and ask what he himself or what some modern commander might do in a
similar situation, but that is all that we need to admit,
without going so far as to sa.y that the past thoughts are
re-enacted. If what is required is an argument against the
view that we cannot reliably infer what was then thought, we
still do not need to fall back on the disputed formulations.
We do not need to speak of re-enacting past thoughts. It is
sufficient to argue along one of the following lines.We assume that people
generally give us a truthful account of their mental calculations
unless we have one of a number of reasons for suspecting it to
be in their interest to lie. If we have an account of what
someone's calculations were then we test whether it is reasonable
to believe that account in ways similar to the tests we would
apply to a witness in a court. Hot all of those tests are
available, but we can ask about whether it was in someone's
interest to lie, whether on previous occasions his evidence
was trustworthy, whether his account is self consistent and
so on. Or if we have evidence only for someone's actions,
we might infer what his calculation was, even in the absence
of direct evidence, by asking what calculation is usually
made by people who act in that way. In other words we may
admit that the consideration of what past agents were thinking
may indeed be a part of what is involved in a historian constructing
an account of what he has reason to believe happened. But this
does not require us to admit the more extravagant claims of
idealist theories of history.
Before leaving the question of historical explanation a
number of remaining issues need to be noted. First there is
the relevance of theories about historical explanation to
other claims about rational belief. Arguments about causes and
about explanation figure in Swinburne's discussion of the defence
of metaphysical beliefs by inductive arguments. It is therefore
relevant to consider not only how the problems of explanation
affect the question of rational belief in historical contexts,
but also how this has a bearing on the analogy between historical
and metaphysical beliefs. Hhile it is true that a fair measure of
what might be called inductive argumentation is involved in
historical explanation caution will be needed in assessing Swinburne'
extension of this to metaphysical arguments. There are as we have
seen real difficulties about the rational acceptance of historical
generalizations. ¥e may find that these difficulties are
even greater in the case of metaphysical explanation, and that
the analogy with rational "belief in a historical context is
one that needs to "be treated with considerable caution.
Certainly historians do offer explanations, and these
implicitly involve generalizations, even if the latter are
often limited in character and only partially provided with
rational support. Such generalizations rest on the evidence
of the regular conjunction of particular occurrences, and on
the merits of rival hypotheses about such regularities. But
these hypothetical generalizations are often limited to the
way people behave in particular periods, or to the way particular
classes of people behave. But such generalizations if implied
rather than stated are less likely to be tested, and historians
are notoriously reluctant to expand their explanatory remarks
about particular incidents into testable generalizations.
Further even if stated in a way that in principle might allow
testing, restricted generalizations about past periods are
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inevitably difficult to confirm or disconfirm. Even in the
contemporary social sciences this is problematical due to the
many factors involved. In the case of historical generalizations
this difficulty is compounded by the paucity of the data. But
the difficulties are not insuperable. Tito examples must serve,
one from the nineteenth century, one from a much earlier
period.
i) 'The conditions were favourable to a revolution. The
government had no military forces at hand. The working
class was passing through an acute stage of unemployment..
Here one can see an implied argument that revolutions are
more likely to succeed when governments are caught without
troops at the ready, and also that the populace is more likely
to rebel when unemployment is high than when it is not. Each
of these generalizations probabilifies the explanation, and
each could be supported by instances of positive correlations.
But the cases where such factors failed to lead to successful
revolution would also need to be considered and further auxiliary
hypotheses offered to account for these. The rational acceptance
of the explanation thus depends on the preferability of the
theory incorporating the hypotheses in question over rival
theories and rival hypotheses. For example one would need to
provide an explanation for successful revolution in Iran when
the government had very powerful military forces and had been
encouraging rising economic expectations in the population.
The credibility of explanations and their related generalizations
rests on the evaluation of the relative merits of rival hypotheses.
It is not a case of simple enumerative induction,
* r
ii) The Ghassanid prince and 12,000 Christian Arabs
went over to the enemy. They were Honophysites and
hated Ileraclius; and their pay was many months
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overdue.
On this Cohen notes that while each factor alone would hardly
explain the desertion, the two together form a plausible explanation
as each blocks a hole in the other. Yet he adds that it would
be rash to accept an unqualified generalization that leaders
are deserted by troops when arrears of pay compound religious
differences. One needs to exclude factors which might counteract
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a tendency to desert. These night include, fear of a common
enemy, desire for loot, military tradition, or admiration for
a leader. The presence of the former factors and the relative
absence of the latter, would increase the likelihood of desejrtion.
But further factors again might be irrelevant to the question.
So the adequacy of an explanation might be increased by specifying
further factors provided that they are relevant. That would
imply further linked generalizations raising the probability of
the explanandum. But the relevance of additional factors would
have to be subject to a test. Such a test could be carried
out even in a discipline like history where it is often the
case that all the data are already there. The data may be
available already, but the hypothesis that desertion is more
likely in certain combinations of circumstances than in others
could be tested up to a point. The problem is that such tests
tend to be carried out more by looking for counter instances
than by adding measurable instances. The combined factors are
so many that it would be very difficult to determine the extent of
the increase in the probability of desertion when troops have
been left unpaid for 9 months as against 6 moiiths. It is,
however, plausible that the risk increases with the delay.
Tde would infer that from our own feelings on the issue, and
from observation of normal human behaviour.
So the rational credibility of historical explanations
does to some extent turn on the comparative credibility of a
set of relevant generalizations. These in turn are supported
by arguments which render them more or less likely. So even
if deductive inferences are not available and even if we cannot
readily quantify the increase in probability which arises,
such, matters do involve the assessment of probabilities. But
the probability in question here may well function differently
from the mathematical probabilities involved in coin spinning
and dice throwing. Cohen is making a valid point when he
argues that in legal and historical examples we often work
by accepting that what normally happens is probable, unless there
is evidence for one of those events which upset our normal
expectation. The relevant procedure is a series of tests. . One
of Cohen1s examples illustrates this. One normally assumes
that a witness on oath tells the truth. But a witness may
tell the truth about strangers, but not where he is an interested
party. Or a witness may have good vision in daytime, but poor
vision at night. If either factor is thought to operate
then we lower our estimate of the probability. IJhen a witness
speaks without evasion and without self contradiction, and in
agreement with other independent witnesses we raise our estimate
of the probability of the truth of his evidence. That there
is a series of tests we would readily agree, and also that these
raise or lower the probability involved. But rival calculi of
probability have been proposed as methods of estimating the
likelihood. Upholders of these rival systems could not from
the points made above find conclusive reason for claiming that
one view must be correct and the other mistaken. Yet there is
a difficulty for those who use a mathematical calculus to
estimate epistemic probability. In the case of the dice and the
coins mathematical values are available. In the case of theory
choice in history or in science, except in those cases where
statistical factors operate, such values are arbitrarily
invented. This should make us cautious about mathematical
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treatments of the prohahle truth or probable verisimilitude
of theories.
At an earlier point in the argument of this chapter a
certain selectivity was proposed, and one of the topics selected
for attention was the relation between what it is reasonable
to believe about past events and the events themselves. It
is to this issue that I now wish to return. I have already
accepted that historical conclusions about past events are
inferred from present evidence. I accept that what historians
are doing can be described as constructing an account of past
events and past states of affairs from present evidence. But
it is one thing to agree with constructionist methodology and
quite another to advocate philosophical constructionism. The
latter view is suggested when philosophers of history like
Goldstein talk of historians constructing facts or constructing
events. Thus Goldstein writes about A.J.P.Taylor:
1 Taylor's conception of the origins of the Second horld
Par involves historical facts which have no existence
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at all in the conception of his opponents.'
This is either loose wording by Goldstein or the endorsement
of a position with considerable difficulties. If we distinguish
facts from states of affairs, then facts are what true propositions
assert about a state of affairs. But that means that the
word fact is incorrectly used in the quotation. he should not
say that Taylor's account involves facts which don't exist for
his opponents. he should say one of the following. 'Taylor's
account establishes facts which his opponents do not accept
as facts' or 'Taylor's account claims to have established
facts but his opponents do not recognize them as such'.
It is certainly normal in popular usage to say that historians
reconstruct the course of past events. I suppose, to he more
precise, we should say that historian A constructs an account
of what he judges to have taken place . But some writers go
further and speak of the construction of events. Goldstein
does this when he says that ' Hexter then constructs a course
of events which is supposed to make sense of what he has and
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knows1 (about the 17th century Presbyterian Independents).
Goldstein contrasts this with the view that historians discover
what happened by reading descriptions in old documents. The
italics are Goldstein's. Now there could be an acceptable
reading of what Goldstein says. I would agree that historians
do not discover, or do not always discover, accounts of past
events; they have to construct such accounts from the evidence
available to them. (I would prefer to allow that such construction
might indeed be discovery of what actually happened, but let
that pass). But reconstructing what happened by constructing
an account of what happened is not the same as constructing
events. It is because Goldstein uses the latter phrase combined
with a running criticism of realism about the historical past
that his views have drawn critical fire. He does not deny a
real past, only that it can provide a check on historical
conclusions. He writes for instance
'He have no access to historical events apart from their
constitution in historical research and no way of investigatin
reconstructed past events until they have been reconstructed. '
Now there is a sense in which what he says is undeniable. Our
only access to past states of affairs is indeed by historical
method. • He have no independent access to past reality.
But Goldstein seems to contrast this situation with that of
observation of present objects. How I grant that there is a
difference in that, as I argued above, present objects can be
reinspected. But one could argue against Goldstein that we
only know present objects insofar as we observe them, and
we have no independent access to present reality except as
it comes to us through observation. But Goldstein does not
seem to admit this, if I understand him correctly. He comes
near to it at times in his reply to Howe11-Smith. ^ Yet at
crucial points he shies away. Thus he says that we can glance
at a vase that is present, but take no such glance at the
historical past, and he sees this as a key difference. I
would argue that insofar as he is right in talking of the
primacy of knowing, we know the vase and past events only
insofar as they are given to us through perception in the one
case and through historical method in the other. But this
does not lead to anti-realism, or to a denial of any effective
role for the real object or the real past. In each case further
observation, or the fresh application of historical method
may oblige us to change view of the matter, and this is how
reality exerts pressure on our picture of it. Of course in
each case there is no access to that reality (present or past)
except through perception in the one case, or historical method
in the other. But that point does not render the concept of
reality vacuous and without effect on otir claims.
In order to unravel this tangle it is perhaps best to
stand back from what Goldstein said, and attempt to clarify
the substantive issue. It is true to say that insofar as we
know, we only know by means of the methods available to us.
Ue do not have independent access to reality in that sense.
But that does not mean that there is no check on our use of the
methods. The way we use the methods in test t^ can be further
checked by our using test t^ on additional evidence as and
when that becomes available. If on evidence e^ we claim to
know that Roman Imperial finances were scrutinized by civil
servants, then evidence e^ raay in the future confirm or dis-
confirm this view. (Confirmation is of course here used in
the usual sense of providing further support for a view).
Row this means that our views are constrained by reality.
In the case of disconfirmation fresh evidence causes us to
accept a fresh belief which is inconsistent with our previous
set of beliefs, he may not always be able to tell which
of our theories must be altered when alteration is demanded
by an inconsistency in our set of beliefs, but some alteration
is demanded in the case of disconfirmation, and it is reality
which tugs at the web of our beliefs.
But we can only truthfully speak of knowledge when our
beliefs are indeed true ones. This makes our claims to
know precarious. But we cannot somehow evade that precariousness
of our claims to knowledge by tactical retreat. It won't do
to say at least we do have knowledge when the object of our
knowledge is our own construction. That is the case whether we
are attempting to construct an account of past events or to
give an account of what we now see. Of course statements about
what we seem to see now, or what we hold to have happened in
the past are less vulnerable than statements about present
objects or past events. But it won't do to reduce historical
study to knowledge of constructs, or knowledge ox 'facts'
if "by that all we mean is the facts as we construct them.
There are two reasons to resist such tactical retreat.
In the first place it does mot secure complete invulnerability.
(l-Jhen I say 'I know that I am thinking* my statement is incorrigible.
But my claim to know that I believe that p is not incorrigible.
I may make an error and believe that I believe that Caesar
died in 43B.C. and then quickly correct myself. In such an
instance I did not know that I believed that p,because in
fact I really believed q and not p.) Secondly and more importantly,
our conduct of historical investigations would be futile if it
were aimed at producing constructs regardless of whether they
were true accounts of past events and past states of affairs.
It is the attempt to provide an account which is a trie description
of the real past which gives history its point. How I do not
think that Goldstein would assent to some of the views which I
am attacking here. But I state them, and reject them, in order
to show why I reject views which tend in this direction. He
asserts p, and p seems to me to imply q, As I reject q, and
believe q' to be implied by p, I must reject p also. Perhaps
Goldstein's views do not imply what I am rejecting. But in
that case he would need to show a greater willingness to assent
to the realist view that is being advocated here than he seems
to display in his arguments so far.
In fact Goldstein seems to waver over the case of observation.
At times he implies that what he says of the inaccessibility
of historical reality is also true of physical reality, at
times he seems to deny this. He certainly speaks of his
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position with regard to history as 'anti-realistic'.
But he argues that in the case of science ' in the world, of the
natural, present nature seems to impose itself brutaly upon
our awareness of if. The problem is that he claims that this
does not obtain in history. I would argue that in each case
reality does impinge on our beliefs though I grant that it
does so through the medium of scientific or historical method.
The crucial factor in the case of historical beliefs is the
situation which arises when fresh evidence overturns accepted
beliefs. This happens more rarely in history than it does in
physics, but when it happens it has a comparably devastating
effect. (Pompa also criticizes Goldstein's anti-realism.)
Archaeological excavation or the availability of previously
inaccessible documents are normal means whereby fresh data become
available and confirm or discredit existing theories. Thus the
strong suspicion of collusion between Israel, Prance and Britain
in 1956 was eventually confirmed by the publication of memoirs
by Anthony hutting. ^ Had the alleged Hitler diaries been
genuine these might well have confirmed or discredited many
interim conclusions about the policy of Hazi Germany under
Hitler. In the latter case however, even if the diaries had
not been exposed as forgeries, historians would have needed
to test the new data against the likelihood that even genuine
diaries might well contain false and misleading statements.
But such a situation is not unknown in the natural sciences
where new experimental data which upset existing theories may
themselves be suspect till further tested.
A better instance of the need to check and recheck fresh
data which overturn existing theories is the highly controversial
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case of the excavations at the K phar Nahum synagogue. Uhen
this fine white limestone synagogue was first discovered it
was assumed "by some to confirm the mention of such a first
century building in the text of Hark. The text mentions
such a building, and the discovery seemed to confirm the
evidence of the texts. Unfortunately however it gradually
became apparent that on stylistic and other grounds this
building could not be as early as the first century. This
0
left the upholders of the theory that K phar Uahum had a
synagogue in the first century with a problem. Either such
a building was under the present one, or there was such a
building elsewhere perhaps on a site now under the lake, or
no such building existed. Let us call these theories T, T'
and T' ' . At first T was the preferred theory. Further excavation
was eventually conducted in 1953-4 below the steps at the
southeast corner of the building. Below the white limestone
foundations of the later building could be seen the black
basalt blocks of an earlier construction. This new datum
was taken as confirming theory T. But further confirmation
was considered desirable. Fortunately the site had not been
cleared by total excavation as sometimes happens in other
contexts. After 1968 trenches were taken through the floor
of the present building. Underneath it was not a first century
synagogue such as that recently found at Gamla. Rather there
was an insula of houses. Theory T could now only be sustained
if supported by an ad hoc auxiliary hypothesis that one of
these houses was used as a synagogue. But such an ad hoc
revision would only be rationally credible if it lends itself
to further testing. For example if a new trench uncovered a
house with some traces of a menorah, or a niche for a torah
scroll, or some other trace of cultic use, then the rational
credibility of the revision of theory T would he confirmed.
But no such further tests have yet been successful. Instead
a fresh controversy has broken out over the claim that under
the limestone building late fourth century coins were found
which cause the latter fine and elaborate construction to be
dated by the Franciscan excavators to early Byzantine times.
Israeli scholars have cast doubt on this as they find it
improbable that so fine a Jewish construction in this style
could have taken place after the time when the Roman Empire
had passed under Christian rule. This last point further
illustrates the way in which fresh data are not themselves
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beyond question, but may be impugned in various ways.
How I have deliberately cast the account of the excavations in
the form of a rational reconstruction of the argument in a way
that illustrates the similarity between historical and scientific
argumentation. I do not think that I have done violence to the
history of the excavations in the process. There is here a
parallel to the kind of testing of theories, and amendment of
theories by supplementation with ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses
which happens in the natural sciences. The need to subject
theories so amended to further testing is a crucial point in
the methodology of scientific research programmes as adumbrated
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by Imre Lakatos. But the fact that this was what the historians
and archaeologists saw to be necessary, and eventually performed,
is precisely what supports my claim that in this instance the
methodology of historical research and the methodology of
scientific research programmes can be shown to have a similar
15*7
rational structure. ITor do I think that the process of reasoning
in the historical example is untypical of historical research.
Indeed the objectors fasten on alternative theories which would
explain the presence of fourth century coins,-and on general
truJc.
historical and stylistic considerations, do not reject the
essential outline of the process of reasoning which led to the
successive investigations.
Theories about past events and past states of affairs
are assessed as constructions designed to explain present
evidence. Theories differ in simplicity and explanatory power,
in internal consistency and in the extent of their consistency
with other theories. Rational belief is in these instances
a matter of rational theory choice. he are often faced with a
set of rival theories, and need to offer grounds for preferring
one over the others. he have already seen how judgements of
comparative simplicity counted in favour of one theory of the
Egyptian gnostic texts. Here in the case of the rival theories
about an ancient synagogue we see the role of auxiliary hypotheses
and the need to predict fresh data. A theory may be amended
by the addition of an ad hoc auxiliary hypothesis provided
that such an amendment offers a fresh opportunity for testing
in a crucial experiment. History may not always provide such
chances of acquiring fresh data but it is in principle possible, and
with the ever more sophisticated techniques somewhat more
practicable in the case of archaeology.
Even where fresh data are not immediately forthcoming one
could cast ones beliefs about past facts into the form of rationally
reconstructed beliefs containing predictions. Thus one could
15?
argue that Cuff's theory about the duration of Caesar's
Gallic command contains an implicit prediction. This would
be that if some long lost text of Cicero were to come to
light which commented-explicitly on the issue it would favour
Cuff's interpretation rather than its negation, or any of its
rivals. Even in natural science it is sometimes conceded
that the eventual testing of such predictions may take an
indefinite time.
I have alluded to the way in which historical argumentation
can be shown to conform to criteria which are deployed in the
philosophy of science. As an illustration of the latter I
propose to cite two passages from Lakatos. These represent
a refinement of the view of scientific rationality developed
by Popper.
'For the naive falsificationist any theory which can be
interpreted as experimentally falsifiable, is 'acceptable' or
'scientific'. For the sophisticated falsificationist
a theory is 'acceptable' or 'scientific' only if it has
corroborated excess empirical content over its predecessor
(or rival), that is, only if it leads to the discovery
of novel facts. This condition can be analysed into
two clauses: that the new theory has excess empirical
content ('acceptability^') and that some of this excess
content is verified ('acceptability^'). The first clause
can be checked instantly by a priori logical analysis;
the second can be checked only empirically and this
may take an indefinite time.'
This position is then slightly reformulated later by Lakatos
in the following manner:
'Let us take a series of theories, T^, T^, T^, ...
where each subsequent theory results from adding auxiliary
clauses to (or from semantical reinterpretations of) the
previous theory in order to accommodate some anomaly,
each theory having at least as much content as the
unrefuted content of its predecessor. Let us say that
such a series of theories is theoretically -progressive
(or 'constitutes a theoretically progressive problemshift' )
if each new theory has some excess empirical content
over its predecessor, that i$ if it predicts some novel,
hitherto unexpected fact. Let us say that a theoretically
progressive series of theories is also empirically
progressive (or 'constitutes an empirically progressive
problemshift') if some of this excess empirical content
is also corroborated, that is, if each new theory leads
us to the actual discovery of some new fact. Pinally,
let us call a problemshift progressive if it is both
theoretically and empirically progressive, and degenerating
if it is not. lie ' accept' problemshif ts as 'scientific'
only if they are at least theoretically progressive; if they
are not, we 'reject' them as 'pseudoscientific'. Progress
is measured by the degree to which problemshift is
progressive, by the degree to which the series of theories
leads us to the discovery of novel facts. lie regard
a theory in the series ' falsified' when it is superseded by a
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theory with higher corroborated content.'
This position is defended with a series of examples of actual
scientific problems which cannot be discussed here. Lor can
I engage at this point in minor disagreements over incidental
points in this account. I agree with the main theses of this
position,and wish to use it to claim that if this is an acceptable
account of the rationality of scientific theories, then it can
be argued that historical beliefs are at least as rational as
scientific beliefsywhen they satisfy the criteria outlined
above.
In practice of course one must admit that the prediction
of novel data is infrequently rewarded with success and one
often has to be content with the conclusion that a series of
theories or series of revisions of a theory, in historical
study is 'theoretically progressive' . In such cases it is
important to show either that rival series are not progressive
but degenerating, or that on the other criteria the preferred
series has clear advantage. There is no clear decision procedure
in such matters. Ho one has succeeded in ranking the criteria
and constructing a fully articulated method for deciding between
theories. But this does not mean that such decisions are
arbitrary. Criteria do exist, and have been listed above, and
theories can be preferred over their rivals in the light of
these criteria. The fact that some theories seem equally
balanced in that they can each claim the support of different
criteria does not exclude the fact that in other cases one
theory can be preferred to its rivals.
There is one interesting and important issue which arises
from the debate over Goldstein's work still to be discussed.
This is the question of the provisional nature of historical
judgements. Are we to say (with Valsh and others0^) that common
usage and historical conviction rightly lead us to say that some
historical judgements provide us with knowledge. Walsh argues
that it is odd to say that it is only a well supported belief
that George Washington was the first President of the United
States. But Goldstein argues that statements are never
irrevocably established. The problem is that each of these
points is correct. It is certainly odd (though not false)
to say only that it is a well supported belief that George
Washington was the first President of the USA, rather than
that we know this. Yet even if the statement is beyond serious
doubt, it is not beyond all doubt. Perhaps he had a double
who stood in for him, that he was killed before becoming
President and his double took over his identity and his (then)
future Presidency, and perhaps documents of overwhelming
plausibility lie in an attic awaiting discovery. In that case we
would have to withdraw our claim to knowledge. But we would
also have to withdraw the claim that we have a well supported
belief (even if we had had a well supported belief until its
support was undermined). Even if we had said 'I believe G.W.
to have been the first President of the USA' we would in this
case have to abandon the belief. And e.ven the mere assertion
'G.W. was the ....' would have to be negated. In other words
the problem of withdrawal may function slightly differently,
in different contexts, but it is pervasive. Claims to know,
to have well supported belief, or just to believe, and also
simple assertions are all subject to withdrawal in one form
or another, if fresh evidence upsets them. My tactic in
focussing on rational belief in this work is not intended to
bypass the fact that it is not only claims to know which
may need to be withdrawn.
■Walsh, is surprisingly willing to envisage a radical approach
to the problem. He writes:
'... once absolute facts go, the way is open to a radically
new conception of truth and .fact generally. I agree
that no such view has so far been worked out with any
seriousness. But I suggest that it might be, and that
£7
Goldstein's arguments point towards it ...'
Perhaps one should not make too much of what in context is a
more guarded concession, but this so sharply conflicts with
our normal usage of the terms ' truth' and 'fact' as to make
it implausible that such a revision could be coherently carried
through.
The most acute problem however to my mind is not this
but rather the undecidability of certain statements especially
in history. A realist will argue, as I do, that past states
of affairs were as they were, and if we reason truly about
them, we know the facts (assuming that our beliefs about them
are undefeated justified true beliefs). I can argue, as I
have, that past reality exerts pressure on present theory via
fresh evidence. But what of those cases where fresh evidence
is not there to become available? The realist is obliged to
argue that historical statements are all either true or false,
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but has to admit that many may actually be undecidable.
If we have rival theories about some poorly evidenced period
of pre-history it could be the case that no fresh evidence
ever will throw light on the merits of the rival hypotheses.
One could argue in such a case that it is rational either to
believe whichever of the theories better satisfies our other
criteria, or to suspend judgement if we deem them equally
plausible on such grounds. Can we in such cases eliminate
the recourse to prediction? Be could do so if we knew for
certain that further evidence was not to be had, but this is
not how things-are. Even where further evidence is not in
fact available it may not be certain that it is not available.
But if we have good reason to believe that further evidence
is not to be had, we might rationally decide between rival
views on the other criteria without invoking the criterion
of fruitfulness in making successful predictions. (This last
concession may have a bearing on issues of a more metaphysical
character to be discussed in the next chapter).
Summary and Conclusion
Be must now take stock of the argument in this chapter.
Certain crucial questions have been explored from different
angles. Of these the most important is the extent to which
the evaluation of the rationality of a belief varies in ways
that are determined by the character of the belief in question.
I have argued that in the case of beliefs about historical
events as in the case of choice between rival scientific
theories, certain criteria can be specified. Bhile a limited
class of beliefs about matters such as coin spinning and dice
throwing can be assessed in a simpler manner and by the use of
the classical calculus of probability, most other beliefs are
evaluated in a more complex way. Bith these it is a question
of assessing the relative merits of rival theories in terms
of criteria. These criteria include internal consistency,
consistency with other accepted beliefs, comparative simplicity
explanatory' power, and fruitfulness in making predictions.
One can point to a broad, similarity here between the use of these
criteria in the natural science, and their use in various aspects
of historical study. Historical explanation is one particular
example where evaluation by these criteria can be shown to be
relevant to assessing the rationality of historical beliefs.
Yet though one part of the argument of this chapter is to
draw attention to certain similarities in the evaluation of
the rationality of beliefs in history and in the natural
sciences, certain important differences have also been noted.
The inaccessibility of the past is a constant problem for
historical study, but an issue which impinges much less on the
natural sciences. The differences between memory and sense
perception are a further factor. The role of evidence in
relation to theories about past states of affairs differs in
certain ways from the way evidence is used in relation to
scientific theories about states of affairs that can be replicated,
or that can be predicted even though they have not yet been
observed. But though the role of prediction is much more
dominant in the assessment of scientific theories and much
rarer in historical study, the role of prediction is of great
importance. One could rationally reconstruct many historical
arguments so as to make it evident that they contain implicit
predictions.
How then does Mitchell's analogy stand? It is important
to note that Mitchell in his own way agrees that the difference
between the rational defence of historical theories and that
of scientific ones is not to be exaggerated. He himself
appeals to the work of Kuhn and of Lakatos in the philosophy
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of science. The philosophy of the natural sciences admits
of a good deal of sophistication about the relationship between
theory and the criteria by which theories are deemed rationally
acceptable, and I note that, though it is beyond the scope
of the argument of this chapter to pursue it further. In the
case of historical theories and the rational credibility of
statements about the past one can argue that many of the
criteria deployed in the natural sciences are indeed applicable,
once allowance is made for those differences that have been
specified above. The most crucial of these is of course the
infrequency of successful prediction and the fact that in
certain cases historians rationally and wisely deem such a
test not to be available. In the next chapter I propose to
consider the arguments put forward by Swinburne that the
criteria we have discussed can be used not only in assessing
arguments in science and in history but also in assessing the
rational credibility of metaphysical beliefs. That is a
highly controversial issue but one which is hardly irrelevant
to the study of rational belief. It is therefore important
to give careful and critical attention to his arguments.
(
Chapter 5 Criticism of Swinburne's Case for Rational Metaphysical
Belief.
The argument so far has considered several different aspects
of rational belief.--Our starting point was the relationship
between belief and knowledge, and then the question of what makes
some beliefs rational. In considering rational belief it was
noted that controversy exists over the status of historical
and metaphysical beliefs and their relationship to the criteria
of rationality employed in the natural sciences. In the case
of historical beliefs I have argued that they can be held to be
rational if they satisfy criteria comparable to, but only
slightly different from, those used in the philosophy of science.
This conclusion maintains two theses. The first is relatively
non controversial, namely that at least some historical beliefs
belong to the category of rational belief. The second is both
more debatable and more interesting. It is that in accepting
the rationality of historical beliefs we largely defended them
by attempting to show that they satisfy the criteria currently
accepted in the philosophy of science, but argued that some
modification of these criteria was appropriate in the special
circumstances pertaining to the assessment of historical beliefs.
The chief modification was that though historical beliefs
contain predictions, the possibility of testing these predictions
arises less often than in many of the natural sciences. Even
here, however, some comparability with certain areas of scientific
investigation was noted. The study of past states of the universe
and of past states of animal evolution provide examples.
The next step is to ask whether or not a further extension
of the sphere of rational belief should include metaphysical
beliefs. This issue has already been raised in a preliminary
way. At an earlier point it was noted that Mitchell argued
for an analogy between historical and metaphysical beliefs.
'Thile some criticism of that analogy has already been offered,
its real test was deferred to this chapter. In order to examine
the analogy further, I wish to examine the rationality of the
class of metaphysical beliefs which Mitchell had in mind,
namely theistic metaphysical beliefs, and more specifically
the type of arguments put forward by those upholders of Christian
theism who maintain that they can defend their views by rational
argument. In Mitchell's book on the justification of religious
belief, he does more to establish the general character of a
rational defence of theistic belief than to advance detailed
arguments on specific points. For this reason I propose to
take recent work of Richard Swinburne as a further example of
one who undertakes the rational defence of theistic belief.
I do not claim that Swinburne is at every point in agreement
with Mitchell, merely that he provides a more detailed example
of the type of programme which Mitchell proposed.
Swinburne maintains that theistic belief can be defended
by inductive argumentation. By this he means that it can be
defended by arguments which raise the probability of the
desired conclusion. Indeed he goes further. He maintains
that 'On our total evidence theism is more probable than
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not'. In other words, in his terminology, he claims that
his total argument is 'a good P-inductive argument'.
Tnile maintaining the reserve I expressed earlier about the
use of the term 'inductive', I am, for the purposes of debate,
willing to acquiesce in Swinburne's terminology that a P-inductive
argument is an argument which renders its conclusion more
probable than not. The question is whether Swinburne's arguments
can indeed perform this task for theistic belief. I have chosen
Swinburne's work for critical discussion because it represents
a significant attempt to argue for the rationality of theistic
metaphysics, and because it does so in an original manner by
using confirmation theory. Though I think Swinburne's arguments
may not in fact establish the conclusions that he desires, many
writers have hailed this work as a highly significant contribution
to natural theology. Thus Crombie says of it that it is 'an
excellent book which, in conjunction with its predecessor, has
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done a vast amount to forward discussion in their subject'.
Penelhum also praises Swinburne's earlier volume with the
judgement that no defence can compare with this in the quality
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of its arguments or the clarity of its thought. Though the
response to these volumes has by no means been uncritical,
it is clear that, if we wish to consider the merits of arguments
for the rationality of theistic metaphysics, Swinburne's trilogy
provides what many consider to be a most significant recent
contribution to the subject. The critical scrutiny of these types of
argument is therefore of central significance for the current
work, so they will provide the main (though not the only) focus
for debate.
The issue here at stake in the discussion which follows is this.
It is whether or not metaphysical beliefs can be rationally
appraised. To this I give a positive answer. I maintain
that the "beliefs under discussion are meaningful, and that
they are either true or false, and that it is appropriate
to evaluate whether it is rational to hold them. I also
maintain that criteria comparable to those used in the philosophy
of science and in the philosophical appraisal of historical
writings are appropriate in this field also. he can assess the
epistemic probability of such beliefs by comparing these beliefs
with rival theories. In evaluating the rational superiority of
one theory over its rivals we need to assess their accuracy,
internal consistency, explanatory scope, simplicity, and
fruitfulness. This is the main issue and I propose to argue
that these metaphysical beliefs are a proper subject for rational
debate.
But a second issue is beyond our scope. This is whether as
a result of such debate it is (epistemically) rational to hold
these beliefs. In order to give a positive answer here it would
be necessary to provide an argument which showed that theistic
metaphysical beliefs are more probable than rival views, or
more probable than the negation of such beliefs. Swinburne
claims that he has done this. His claim is therefore in
effect a claim to have restored natural theology as a successful
intellectual venture. This is a bold claim, but I am not sure that
it is successful. I think that Swinburne has shown how a
restoration of natural theology might be possible, but I do
not think that he has in fact provided arguments which effect
what he desires to effect. If a negative judgement on this
aspect of Swinburne's work is correct then several possibilities
remain and it will be relevant to outline them. One night
infer that if this defence fails then all attempts at natural
theology must fail. But again though such a view is frequently
ascribed to believers as well as to non believers it can be
argued that it is premature and inadequately grounded. A
further possibility is that a rational defence of theistic
metaphysics might in principle be possible, but has not in
practice been achieved. Our purpose however is rather different.
It is to explore the question of the rational criteria to be- used
in evaluating metaphysical theism. It is .with this issue of criteria
for rs.tional belief that we are concerned.
One immediate objection to the whole enterprise attempted
in this chapter is that it does violence to the character of
metaphysical beliefs to treat then as comparable to beliefs
about matters which aie empirically decidable, or at least in
principle empirically decidable. Some philosophers might wish
to object that there is need of a demarcation between empirical
and metaphysical assertions and that the former can be tested
by criteria for rational belief but that the latter cannot.
Also some believers and some philosophers of religion might
wish to object that theistic belief is not a matter of assessing
probabilities but involves a total commitment which cannot be
harmonized with the policy of assessing the probable truth of
one's beliefs. I propose to consider these two lines of
objection in sequence, though briefly.
The construction of a demarcation between scientific and
non-scientific statements has been a constant motif in contemporary
philosophy. Let us characterize one main aim of philosophy as
the attempt to correct our intuitions and our judgements. Our
intuitions and our judgements do not form a consistent set.
So some intuitions or judgements need to be revised or abandoned.
This happens even within logic as can be seen from attempts to
reduce or resolve logical paradoxes. (See for instance the
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attempts by Prof. IT. Tennant to avoid the Lewis paradox).'"
In the field with which we are concerned, one possible judgement
is that scientific statements are somehow more reliable than
historical ones. But in the philosophy of science appeal to
the history of science is itself necessary to the exploration
of scientific statements. A further possible judgement is that
the conclusions of progressive research programmes in the natural
and human sciences are acceptable, but that metaphysical
statements fall into a different and less acceptable category.
But in order to maintain such a view several arguments need to
be carried through successfully. First one would need to show
that conclusions reached in the natural and human sciences do
not depend on any metaphysical assumptions contained in the
theory base from which those conclusions are derived. If there
are metaphysical assumptions in that corpus of theory one
would need to exempt at least some metaphysical statements from
relegation beyond the pale of acceptability. If for example
we class a realist theory about the existence of past states
of affairs as necessary to our historical research, and so as
necessary to our view of the extent and character of past
scientific research then at least one metaphysical belief can
be identified within our class of assumptions from which the
conclusions of progressive research programmes are derived.
This argument may not avail against views like those of Goldstein,
but I have already offered criticisms of his position in the
Ill
previous chapter. Further even if one could show that the
natural and human sciences operated without being dependent
on any metaphysical assumptions one would still have to offer
some reason for accepting findings in these fields but rejecting
the entire class of metaphysical statements. Or if one admits
that there are metaphysical assumptions used in the sciences
one would have to say why these statements are acceptable and
others not. If it is replied that sentences used in the sciences
are acceptable because they or inferences from them satisfy
criteria of rationality such as those outlined above, then it
becomes necessary to show that other metaphysical statements
neither satisfy these criteria nor criteria largely equivalent
to them, In other words the objector has to engage in the
argument proposed in this chapter and not dismiss it in advance.
If there is a demarcation it is not between scientific and
metaphysical statements as such, but between those statements which
satisfy the criteria and those which do not.
The second line of objection comes from the opposite
direction. Some believers might insist that certain metaphysical
beliefs, such as theistic belief, involve a total commitment
to a way of life, or to a way of seeing the world, and that
one must either stand within it or outside it, and there is
no way in which one can stand aside and assess the alternatives
dispassionately. Another argument is that what is involved
in becoming a religioiis believer (or in choosing between God
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and Mammon) is not a matter of assessing epistemic probabilities.
A further way of expressing the objection from this quarter is
to insist on a distinction between belief in God and belief
that God exists. These three forms of the second line of
ni
objection are interrelated but not identical. I propose to
discuss them in the reverse order.
The distinction between belief in God, and belief that
God exists is undoubtedly important and must not be ignored
but equally it should not be exaggerated. Its importance
lies in the fact that most theistic believers would insist
that it is inadequate to describe their position as one of
holding the view that God exists, or that it is probable that
God exists. An associated line of argument would reject the
term hypothesis in this connection. Host believers would claim
that their belief is held with far greater conviction than a
mere hypothesis, that it entails not just recognising the
existence of God but a relationship of gratitude, faith, love,
and obedience to his moral demand. Anyone who offers an account
of theistic belief which would be rejected as a misleading
description by the majority of those holding that belief should
certainly be subjected to critical scrutiny. One essential
point here is a distinction between faith and belief. In other
contexts the two terms are often interchangeable. But in this
context faith more often has connotations for believers of
grateful acceptance of a redemption which no merely human
agent can achieve. Indeed in biblical contexts even the words
translated by 'believe' and'belief' often have such connotations.
But in Swinburne's writings belief in God almost always has its
more philosophical sense of holding the view that God exists.
This distinction is of great importance, but two further observations
must be made. It is not possible to maintain the wider sense of
the term faith without conceding that belief that God exists
forms an indispensable element in it. It is correct to say
that in religious discourse faith means the acceptance of
benefits from God. But those who believe that they receive
benefits from God can only do so if they believe that -God
exists and that he has the character they attribute to him.
Philosophical debate has focussed on these latter assertions,
as it is these which hold a certain epistemic precedence. But
that is not all that it is appropriate to say. Philosophical
discussion is chiefly interested in the support or lack of
support for these beliefs. It has therefore tended to focus,
as Swinburne's book does, on cosmology and on questions about
the existence of God. But if most Christian believers would
in fact insist that beliefs about redemption and beliefs about
the nature of Christ are more central to their position, then
any philosophical discussion which focusses exclusively on
other aspects fails to discuss with accuracy the beliefs that are
actually held. It is this which gives an air of unreality to
much philosophical discussion of theistic belief.
I grant wholeheartedly that if one is to discuss the beliefs
of a community one must do so in a way which accurately describes
the character of those beliefs. But I do not agree with attempts
to resist rational enquiry into the grounds on which suich beliefs
are held. The greater the conviction with which a belief is
held, the more important it is to test that belief against its
rivals. The more a belief determines a whole pattern of behaviour
the more important it is to ensure that that belief is a true
belief. This point is implicitly conceded by dedicated believers
who are usually amongst the first to criticise what they hold to
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"be false alternatives to their "beliefs. In his review of
Swinburne's conclusion to the trilogy D.Z.Phillips argues that
the gain or loss of religious belief is not accounted for by
"reasoning, and that those who choose between God and Mammon
do not do so 'according to common criteria in an assessment
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of probabilities'. He is correct to say that more is involved
in such decisions than pure calculation, but quite quite mistaken
if he is asserting either that people do not investigate the
probable truth of their beliefs, or that they should not do so.
The view that people do not, or do not need to attempt
to examine the probable truth of their beliefs would follow if
it were true that such an investigation is impossible. If it
really were the case that there are different and incommensurable
ways of viewing the world then no comparison between these
rival views would be possible. Let us call this view the
incommensurability thesis. It is similar to the argument over
whether rival scientific paradigms are incommensurable, an
issue which has been much debated in the wake of Thomas Kuhn's
remarks on the subject. In the case of Kuhn the thesis is that
rival scientific paradigms cannot be compared with one another
as they each describe the universe in terms which are theory-
laden. Mitchell has argued that there is indeed a similarity
between controversies over metaphysical beliefs and controversies
7Rbetween upholders of rival scientific paradigms. Mitchell is
however too cautious to infer radical incommensurability or
radical meaning variance from this. It is one thing to say
that the upholders of rival paradigms often misunderstand one
another, but quite a different thesis to say that these views
cannot be compared with each other. The latter is a false
inference from the view that observations are theory-laden.
I accept the view that observation or experience is theory-
laden, but not the more radical inference.
That theories are totally incommensurable is in any case
implausible if there are tests which, for instance, favour one
paradigm against another. That there are such tests accounts for
scientific preference for Einstein against Ifevton. But perhaps
what is meant is only that theories are incapable of complete
comparison owing to meaning variance. But even that is questionable.
It is argued that one set of astronomers observed stars in
different locations whereas another astronomer identified the
successive positions of a planet. But while we could express
this as one group of scientists experiencing stars where another
experiences a planet this is not the only way of expressing the
matter. he can and do modify the theory by which we describe
experiences and observations. hhile there is no observation
without some theory, observation is not only expressible in
terms of one particular theory. Thus in this example we
could say with greater accuracy that at t^ A observed a bright
object at 1^, and at t^ B observed a bright object at 1Q, and
at t^ C observed a bright object at 1^, and I) inferred that
there were stars at 1-^ and 1^ and 1^. he can then compare
this with the view that at t^ E calculated that observation
of a bright object at 1^ at t^ and at 1^ at t^ and at 1^ at
t^, would be better explained by the existence of a planet
in c
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whose orbit included 1^ and 1^ and 1^. he can compare these
rival views and they are not incommensurable.
But perhaps it could be argued that while incommensurability
has rightly been rejected in discussions of Kuhn's views on
science, there might he a legitimate case for it in metaphysics.
Thus D.Z.Phillips argues
'Religious language is not an interpretation of how things
are, hut determines how things are for the believer.
The saint and the atheist do not interpret the same
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world in different ways. They see different worlds.'
It is notoriously difficult to pin down exactly what it is that
Phillips is saying, especially as he combines language of
determined commitment with approval of the view that a sentence
yQ
such as 'God exists' is not a statement of fact. The most
straightforward way to understand this would be to say that the
faith of such a believer that God cares for him means that he
approaches everything in life with hope and confidence. It
is argued that such a view means more than the reduction of
belief about God to a determination to live in a loving (or
hopeful) way. But if there is more, it is difficult to give
content to this additional meaning without making statements
in the indicative mood. But this Phillips refuses to do. Also
such a position does not do justice to the conviction of the
great majority of believers past and present that their belief
in God does at least include some statements of fact.
How I admit that there is a sense in which someone's
attitude determines how things are. For instance the attitude
of a community of believers determines whether a disaster is
seen by them as an occasion for despair, or as an opportunity
for remedy and hope. But this, though an element in traditional
theistic faith, is only part of a larger whole and to treat
it as the whole is to engage in a content reducing stratagem.
A better description of the natter would be that faith sees
the world not as an arena for proving oneself but as a place
where persons receive their value and their inspiration to
goodness from a source outside and beyond themselves. But
this account of faith requires statements in the indicative
mood. I grant that much of the language of the mystics, and
that of the Sufi tales, and possibly (on some interpretations)
that of the parables of Jesus may be interpreted as differing
from statements of fact, though I happen to hold that indirect
statements of how things are do play a role in the latter
example. But the doctrinal utterances found in the Apostle
Paul and in the gospels, and in the classic creeds and confessions
do contain or entail assertions, and this is how the great
majority of believers, and their critics, see the matter.
Our concern is with the evaluation of rational belief,
hithin that class this chapter is concerned with two related
questions. Are metaphysical beliefs open to rational criticism,
and if so what are the rational criteria to be used ? The
first of these questions would receive a negative answer if
it could be shown that metaphysical beliefs are not amenable
to rational scrutiny. I shall argue later that theistic metaphysics
is open to rational scrutiny, but in order to do that a little
more attention must be given to those other than Phillips who
maintain that rational scrutiny is out of place in the case of
these beliefs.
It could be argued that theistic belief is such that if
true it requires total commitment whereas rational enquiry
ni
could, only result in a qualified assent which is inappropriate
to religious faith. There is a point of substance here and
it needs to he clarified and discussed. There is a place for
passionate loyalty and commitment hut to argue that such commitment
should he made to a creed regardless of any attempt to discover
the truth or falsity of that creed is gross irrationality and
liable to justify adherence to creeds which have brought about
great evils in the course of history. This objection might be
avoided if a shift is made from emphasizing the objective
character of what is believed, to stressing the element of
passionate conviction in the believing relationship. (Some
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interpretations of Kierkegaard take this line) how if this
view were amended to one which praised passionate commitment
to the pursuit of truth and goodness it would have more to
commend it. But there would then be no reason to condemn the
rational pursuit of truth in the area in which we are concerned.
Indeed the enquirer who commits himself utterly to the pursuit
of truth could more appropriately be portrayed as the exemplar of
subjective faith, rather than as a passionless researcher
doomed to a futile pursuit. But the fact that one can use
such emotive portrayal to justify opposing positions suggests
that this is no way to conduct an argument.
The grain of sense which can be found in the contention
we are considering is this. It might be the case that theism
demands total loyalty while being such that it can neither
be proven nor disproven, nor even shown to be probable or
improbable. But against this several points can be made.
'..lien rival claims to such loyalty are defended in a similar
I
manner the edge of this line of argument is blunted. There
are rival positions, a choice between them is needed, and so
some attempt to assess at least the probability of the rival
metaphysical views should be attempted. This point is strengthened
when one remembers the evils to which blind loyalty has led
people. It is further strengthened when one remembers that the
great majority of traditional theists have held their beliefs
to be rational, and at least probable if not more. Again
the greater the demand for commitment the more important it
is to seek out the truth of that to which commitment is demanded.
If these principles are granted it would follow that those
who urge loyalty to a deity who commands total commitment without
providing evidence or ground for the truth of that to which
one is to be loyal are urging loyalty to a being who falls
short of human standards of goodness.
These objections would carry less force if theism were
cast in the form of belief in an ideal of goodness. (Such a
view is not wholly distant from that defended in Iris Murdoch1 s
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Gifford Lectures of 1982). But that would entail a considerable
reshaping of traditional theism. That in itself is not an
insuperable objection. It could be the case that such a
revision proved more rationally acceptable and open to fewer
objections than its rivals and so be deemed closer to the
truth. For the present I merely note this possibility while
recording one line of objection to it. If such a view were
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cast in the form of a demand for moral striving it would be
inconsistent with one of the prime insights of the theistic
tradition stemming from Paul, Augustine and the Reformers
that faith is not so much a matter of moral striving as of
the recognition that one's value and one's inspiration come
from a source other than the self. All the same the issue is
one of considerable interest and importance. ih.ether a view
of this kind could he developed in a way which can overcome
objections from this quarter as well as from anti—Platonists
is an issue which cannot be pursued at this moment but which
may reappear later.
That there is a need for a commitment which exceeds the
rational support for theism is also maintained in a more guarded
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form by Hick. His argument is that God has created a world
in which his presence is not unambiguously revealed. The
reason for this is to enable human response to him to be free.
If God were known to exist, his being is. such that the knowledge
of his existence would make a total difference to us and we
would not be in a position of freedom to choose to respond
to him in faith. Hick cites Irenaeus (Haer. 4.37*5) i-n favour
of the traditional character of this view. Hick's argument
is quite different from that of Kierkegaard, and is used to
supplement rather than to denigrate rational enquiry. In this
respect it does not offer an objection to the kind of rational
enquiry undertaken by Swinburne and selected for criticism
here. But Hick's position requires the view that the balance
of probability is about even. In this he differs from Swinburne
for the latter holds theism to be on balance more probable than
not. Perhaps this difference is not too serious as for both
writers the deciding factor is religious experience which is
available only to the believer. Hick's argument therefore
demands rather than rejects the kind of rational enquiry
envisaged here. It does however maintain that more than
rational investigation is at stake, as well as requiring the
rational scrutiny of arguments which is to follow.
Hick's view is that the ambiguity of the evidence can none¬
theless permit belief in theism to be defensible, as a certain
O -J
'epistemic distance' between God and humanity is a necessary
condition of human choice in the matter being genuinely free.
But this appeal to a necessary epistemic distance is not
without its problems. One objection is that classical Christian
theism held that angelic beings knew God and yet rebelled.
So in terms of one biblical and patris tic story rebellion and
lack of epistemic distance are not inconsistent with one another.
(interestingly the writer of the Bpistle of James says 'the
devils believe' when describing this situation. Here is an
example of a case of what the writer presumably might equally
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have called knowledge being described in terms of belief. )
But this objection does not destroy Hick's case, as his version
n r-
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of theism abandons this particular mythical element. Hick
sees that his defence is inconsistent with part of the tradition
and disowns that element in the tradition.
More serious objections can be brought against Hick. If
he holds that the evidence is ambiguous,but that nevertheless
his version of theism is to be preferred to an alternative
reading of the evidence, why is the benefit of the doubt to be
given to the one view rather than to its alternative? Some
additional non epistemic argumentation is here needed. If it
is available then what is offered is a rational but non evidential
ground rather than a purely voluntary choice. If it is not
available then the voluntary element in faith is in danger
m
of being arbitrary rather than Just voluntary. This situation
is compounded if the ambiguity of the evidence is such that
there is not just a choice to be made between one view and its
alternative but between several rival views. If ambiguity
(or as Hick calls it 'epistemic distance') means that after
consideration of the evidence several metaphysical beliefs
all seem equally probable then the difficulty of defending a
choice of one of them against the others is intensified.
I have spent some time discussing the views of those who wish
either to resist or to qualify the contention that metaphysical beliefs
are open to rational scrutiny. My aim has been to give as large a place
as possible to rational enquiry. But we shall see later that the ranking
or weighting of rational criteria may be differently estimated. This
would of course help to explain how rival views may remain in conflict
even though those who hold them agree that they should assess their
beliefs by rational criteria. But we must now turn to consider Swinburne's
method of arguing for the rationality of theistic metaphysics.
Swinburne's Programme.
I will use the term Swinburne's programme to define the
series of arguments which he uses chiefly in the second volume
of his trilogy. This is the volume entitled The Existence of
God. In it he proposes to use what he calls inductive arguments
for the existence of God. By this he means a series of arguments
of a non deductive kind. Within this series he distinguishes
between those arguments which are confirmatory (and which
raise the probability of his conclusion), and the cumulative
effect of his arguments which he claims renders theism more
probable than not. This distinction is expressed in his
terminology as the use of C—inductive and P-inductive arguments.
A C-inductive argument merely makes a conclusion more probable
than it was previously, whereas a P-inductive argument renders
it more probable than not. I shall accept this terminology
for the purpose of discussion.
Iluch more debatable is the fact that Swinburne uses a
form of Bayesian confirmation theory to assess the weight of
his arguments. He wisely refrains from attempting to give
precise numerical values to his equations, and limits himself
in the main to considering whether a particular probability
is high or low or very low, or greater than the probability
of another item. But the use of Bayes's theorem is itself
controversial, and this is one of the main elements in his
argument which cannot simply he taken for granted, even for
the sake of discussion. I therefore propose to consider
Swinburne's programme in two distinct ways. One is to draw
attention to doubts about the proper applicability of Bayes's
theorem. This is a complex matter and I am well aware that
Swinburne has presented his reasons for taking his view of
the matter at length in his hook An Introduction to Confirmation
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Theory. But the reasons for dissent in this area are sufficient
for this issue not to be ignored. I therefore propose to
indicate briefly why I think that the version of Bayesianism
proposed does not do justice to the problem of theory choice
and hypothesis evaluation in this area. I then propose to
continue the argument by maintaining that even on Swinburne's
Bayesian view the arguments are not as compelling as he claims.
This strategy is I believe strongly defensible. The
major arguments need to be assessed whether one is using
Bayes's theorem or not. If it is possible to maintain that
Swinburne's case cannot be carried either when evaluated within
his formal system or when evaluated more informally then we
have a significant conclusion. I believe this to be the case
and will present arguments to that effect.
But first I must outline in a provisional way my reservations
about the use of Bayes's theorem in this context. The theorem
states:
P(h/e.k) = ?fe/h.k) x P(h/k)
P(e/k)
This is to be read as follows: the probability of h (the
hypothesis) on e (the new evidence) and on k (the background
knowledge) is equal to the probability of the evidence given
h and k, divided by the probability of the evidence on k alone,
and multiplied by the probability of the hypothesis on k alone.
P(h/k) is also called the prior probability of h. The theorem
itself is deducible from the axioms of the probability of chance.
Naturally I do not reject the calculus of the mathematical
probability of chance events when it is in its proper domain. For
do I deny that Bayes's theorem is deducible from it. But it is
far from agreed that the evidential probabilities of confirmation
theory are to be treated as the mathematical probabilities of
chance. In the case of games of dice and cards and marbles
the two types of probability may well coincide. But even there
there are problems. Even in the simple case of spinning
coins, horrendously complex arguments divide the statisticians
into rival schools. If the bias of a coin is given we can,
by the calculus, estimate the probability of the next spin
producing heads. Let us call the bias 0. Given Q the direct
inference can be calculated. But the inverse inference is
problematical and. notoriously so. If 6 is unknown and we
have the results of n spins/ can we use the calculus to estimate
the value of 6 ? If the theorem in question is used we are
involved in assessing the prior probability that the bias of
the coin has a certain value. Frequentists object that this
admits an unwarranted element into the calculation. It is also
argued that using the principle of indifference leads to incoherent
O •~r
results. If there are problems even with examples so close
to those where the mathematical calculus works well, then
a fortiori we should expect worse problems in domains more
remote. (Also in domains with infinite quantities the Dutch
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Book defence^ is of no avail).
Swinburne defends the applicability of the theorem by
arguing that it satisfactorily explains the rational choice
between scientific theories. He also gives a brief example
involving the inference of guilt of committing a crime from
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evidence and prior probabilities. This latter example is
particularly unfortunate. Swinburne does not mention that
this issue is hotly contested. Swinburne's example runs as
follows. The hypothesis h is that Jones robbed Sarclays Bank,
e is the evidence that he was near the bank at the time of the
crime, and k the background knowledge that Jones robbed another
bank, Lloyds bank, on another occasion. Swinburne maintains
that the probability that Jones robbed Barclays Bank is the
prior probability that he did it, multiplied by the extent to
which the hypothesis makes e more expected than it was on the
background knowledge. This example is open to two serious
objections. It incorporates an estimate of the prior probability
of the guilt of the accused, and it incorporates as background
evidence knowledge (based on a previous conviction?) that
Jones robbed another bank. Both of these elenents are utterly
inadmissible in a court of law. The rules of assessment of
legal evidence in Keele as in Jew York absolutely forbid the
kind of procedure being recommended here by Swinburne. There
are further difficulties in the details. How for instance
would one calculate the prior probability of guilt even if the
court allowed such a consideration? Paradoxes arise from the
use of the axioms of mathematical probability at this point
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as Cohen has shown. This is more serious.
Swinburne's appeal to decision between scientific theories
is better presented but still controversial. He cites examples
from Hewton and Kepler and Einstein. From these he infers that
the prior probability of a theory is determined by its simplicity
its fit with theories in a neighbouring field and its narrowness
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of scope. He then says 'For large-scale theories the crucial
92
determinant of prior probability is simplicity'. How many do
agree that simplicity, scope and fit are values for theory
appraisal, and that the history of science exemplifies these
(and other) values. But it does not follow from this that
these values are used to assess the prior -probability of a
theory. That we should be asking about the prior probability
in this way is simply assumed and not shown by Swinburne.
That simplicity is the crucial determinant of the prior probabili
of large scale theories assumes both that we should be assessing
pjxor
theories on probability and that simplicity is the way to do
A
it. How I grant as I have argued above that one of the criteria
for rationa.1 theory choice is simplicity. Therefore it is
worth arguing against Swinburne later that his theory- is not
as simple as he claims it to he and this will he a main element
in the argument which will follow later. But Swinburne too
readily reduces the criteria to those that fit his Bayesian
scheme. He is on better ground when he argues that the broad
scope of ITewton's theory is offset by its great explanatory
power.
Swinburne's use of Bayes certainly brings the criterion
of explanatory power into prominence. In his terms this is the
capacity of a theory to entail or make probable ' the occurrence
of many diverse phenomena which are all observed to occur, and
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the occurrence of which is not otherwise to be expected1 .
For a Bayesian this means that explanatory power is a function
of (i.e. is determined by) the p(e/h k) f p(e/k). But
the formula itself does not tell us how the formula is to be
used. Swinburne in practice starts with k as background
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information of a tautological character. This is one standard
procedure. For this method, k consists of the truths of logic
and mathematics. Then e represents empirical evidence additional
to the background knowledge (k). That means however that in
the first stage one is assessing the prior probability of h,
and of e, on k alone, where k is tautological. Swinburne does
just this at the outset. But the calculation of such prior
probabilities where k is tautological means that one is involved
in assessing the intrinsic probability of h, or likelihood of
e on no empirical evidence, and that we have already argued
to be a source of great difficulties, and in at least some
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cases inconsistencies.
The subsequent stages of Swinburne's argument gradually
feed in additional evidence as the new e, and incorporate the
e from the earlier stages into the new k. Readers of Swinburne
unfamiliar with Bayesian conditionalization may initially find
this confusing, but it is standard procedure in some quarters.
The merit of this procedure is that it tries to capture our
judgement that cumulative evidence builds up a case. he start
with k as minimal tautological knowledge and assess h on e-^ and
k^. Then we add e^, and our new k^ is e^ & k^ and so on.
Though this is standard for Bayesians, there are however those
like Cohen who argue that the corroboration of inductive
probabilities generates paradoxes if the calculus of mathematical
9 6
probability is used. I grant that cumulation or corroboration
occurs, even if the mechanism by which it is calculated is
contested. I also grant that in assessing theories we need
to know if the empirical evidence is more likely given the
theory (or hypothesis) in question than on its rivals. I also
grant that Swinburne is correct in saying that if several
theories explain the evidence equally well, then we have to
use some other criterion or criteria to decide between them.
But here we strike a major point of conflict.
Swinburne insists that given equal explanatory power it
is simplicity which decides between hypotheses. He therefore
gives enormous weight to simplicity as a decisive factor and
goes on to defend the probability of theism to a large extent
on the grounds of its simplicity. On this issue it will be
sufficient if I can later show that he is overestimating the
simplicity of theism, but I also hold that he overestimates
the role of simplicity as a criterion. He argues that there
is an infinite number of theories which would make the evidence
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equally likely. It is therefore necessary to choose between
then on grounds other than explanatory power, and Swinburne
argues, it is simplicity which does this. how I agree that
simplicity is one of the criteria used, and that it nay rule out —-
many possible theories which are never even seriously considered.
But when there are serious rival theories with equal explanatory
power the decision between them is decided by comparative
simplicity only when all else fails. The normal procedure
for deciding between serious rivals would be to devise a
'crucial experiment'. Bow I grant many qualifications need to
be added about decisions between theories modified in the light
of crucial experiments. It is of course almost always possible
to modify the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses in order
to defend a theory which is at a disadvantage as a result
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of test by crucial experiment. But Swinburne places enormous
emphasis on simplicity and says extremely little about fruitfulness
in making predictions, or about crucial experiments, or about
the problems of the ad hoc adjustment of theories. Even when
he does reject ad hoc addition of a hypothesis to a theory
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he does so in terms of loss of simplicity. But the whole
point of much discussion of scientific method is the regulation
of ad hoc adjustment by requiring fresh testable predictions.
This is also the point, if I understand it correctly, of
Bayesian conditionalization. The device of amplifying e is
intended to capture the importance of finding fresh evidence.
But Swinburne plays down this element in Bayesian conditionalisation.
Uhen Swinburne sets up his hypothesis h all the evidence is
already to hand. He feeds in the evidence bit by bit but none
of it is novel evidence. This point is explicitly admitted
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(on page 67) out its implications are not discussed in any
detail.
It may "be that in the case of large-scale metaphysical
systems like traditional theism there is-no prospect of fresh evidence.
It could be that the idea of devising a crucial experiment, or
looking for new evidence is out of place here. But that has to
be argued, and would require defence. It would mean that there
is a major difference between the criteria used to assess theism
and those used in scientific method. ITor would the analogy
from history provide a refuge from the problems at this point.
I argued above that even though the discovery of fresh evidence
is less frequent in historical research than in the natural
sciences it still plays a crucial role when available. But in
any case one could well argue that fresh evidence has impinged on
metaphysical theories at least in an indirect manner as I shall
now argue.
For several reasons I prefer the term theory to hypothesis
for the categorization of the central core of a view under
assessment. Let us call the metaphysical core of theism the
theory and let us call its related hypotheses about historical
and scientific matters auxiliary hypotheses. These hypotheses
have been upset by the discovery of fresh evidence. For
instance the geostatic hypothesis had to be abandoned under
the pressure of fresh evidence. Also the hypothesis of the
historical accuracy of the biblical texts has been constantly
upset by archaeological and other findings. It can be argued
that fresh evidence of this kind only affects the protective
belt of auxiliary hypotheses and not the central core of
metaphysical theistic theory. But the loss of auxiliary
Ml
hypotheses "by ad hoc removal is as criticizable as the addition
of ad hoc supplementary hypotheses without fresh warrant. It
is a content-reducing strategem. This issue arises from a
consideration of" "the criteria for assessing non-deductive
inferences. It should not he confused with the older debate
over falsification as a criterion of meaningfulness. The two
issues are very different. The one arose from the discussion
of what it is for a statement to be meaningful. The current
issue arises from consideration of what makes a research
programme degenerative or progressive.
It counts against Swinburne, though in this instance
not against Bayesianism, that he drops this criterion. It is
ironic that, just where Bayesian conditionalisation does accord
with a central desideratum of the methodology of scientific
research programmes, Swinburne fails to use it. The failure
to stress the role of fresh evidence and the resort to content
decreasing strategems are condemned by neo-Bayesians and
followers of Lakatos alike. Failure at this point is a serious
matter even if it initially affects auxiliary hypotheses rather
than the central core of theism.
Swinburne's lack of emphasis on the role of fresh evidence
is but one factor which leads him to overemphasize the use of
simplicity as a criterion for theory choice. His particular
way of using Bayen's theorem throws a great deal of weight on prior
probabilities, and Swinburne's assessment of prior probabilities turns
largely on simplicity. I have already objected that this does
not do justice to the emphasis (recognized by Eayesian conditionalizers
and by others) which should be placed on fresh evidence. I have
also objected that some aspects of the Bayesian reliance on
prior probabilities create problems which have not as yet been
solved. I do however grant that simplicity is one criterion
of theory choice even if I maintain that Swinburne overrates
it at the expense of other criteria. I also suspect that
discussions of simplicity in recent literature suggest that
there are more problems in providing a satisfactory account of
what simplicity is and why it should be a criterion than
Swinburne seems to allow.
One of the reasons for being very cautious about Swinburne's
use of Bayes's theorem is that different Bayesians vary considerably
in the way they use the calculus. This strongly suggests that
there is no very direct link between the theorem and the way
the theorem is used to justify rational belief in scientific
(or other) theories. bhat is at issue there; is whether a
particular way of using the calculus does justice to the criteria
for deciding between theories, and especially whether it provides
a satisfactory account of examples drawn from the history of
science. That issue cannot be further pursued here, but it
is relevant and necessary to show how Bayesians do differ
significantly. Swinburne relies very heavily on the assessment
of prior probabilities and contends that simplicity is the main
determinant of such prior judgements. But faced with problems
in the evaluation of such judgements other Bayesians argue
that the dubious prior probability judgements are eventually
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'swamped' by the steady accumulation of evidence. But
Swinburne relies heavily on his assessment of intrinsic probabilities.
In his concluding chapter this is admitted when he says
'The crucial factor with which we shall need to compare
P(h/ic) will be P(e/k) . .. ' 103
At this point I must emphasize what it is that I do not
claim as a result of the criticisms of Bayesian arguments I
have put forward. I do not claim that these arguments show
a Bayesian or a mathematical calculus to he impossible in this
context. But I do hold that Swinburne's assumption of the
correctness of his Bayesian approach is questionable. There
are serious objections and difficulties in the way of such an
approach. But I am neither attempting to resolve the mathematical
problems of confirmation theory nor to construct a perfect
method for the evaluation of scientific hypotheses. I am
merely stating my reasons for my reserve about Swinburne's
general views on confirmation before proceeding to criticize
his specific criteria for the probability of theistic metaphysics
I propose to criticize the latter even on his assumptions about
confirmation. My arguments against his views on confirmation
are merely provided to make it clear that I have reservations
about even those parts of his position which I shall tolerate
for the purposes of discussion. I do not wish to be dubbed a
Bayesian just because I argue that even if Swinburne's Bayesianism
were correct his attempt to justify theistic metaphysics by it
is open to severe criticism. But my reservations about Swinburne'
use of Bayes's theorem do not necessarily mean that I am committed
to the view that no revision of Bayesianism can escape the
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criticisms that have been offered. My present stance is
simply that Swinburne's use of Bayes's theorem coincides with
some elements in the use of criteria for rational theory
choice, but runs into difficulties at certain specified points,
and neglects certain other important criteria for rational
theory choice or rational belief.
So far I have given reasons for accepting one of Swinburne'
main contentions that metaphysical "beliefs can "be the subject
of rational enquiry. I have criticized those who deprecate
the role of rational discussion in this area. But I do not"
thereby commit myself either to Swinburne's Bayesianism or to
his optimism about providing inductive arguments to justify
theistic metaphysics. His particular use of Bayes's theorem
I have criticized, while not necessarily rejecting all versions
of Bayesianism in this area. But it is now time to move on
and to consider the more specific criteria which Swinburne
t
uses to justify theistic metaphysical belief.
[<u
Chapter 6. Criteria for Rational Metaphysical Belief?
It is widely held that there is a great proliferation
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of potential theories. One major aspect of the problem
of rational belief can therefore be described as the problem
of rational theory choice. This in turn can be considered as
the problem of deciding that one theory is preferable on
rational criteria to its actual (or potential) rivals. Even
if we restrict such an operation to the consideration of
serious rival theories such a procedure still seems somewhat
generous when judged by the more parsimonious approach of an
earlier generation, but we must let that pass. The issue with
which we are concerned is that of criteria for rational meta¬
physical belief. The question of criteria is a central feature
of our whole enquiry. For a metaphysical belief to be a
candidate for being a rational belief it must at least look as
though it is going to satisfy criteria for rational belief, and
it is those criteria with which we are especially concerned.
Naturally we would like to find some philosopher's stone which
enabled us to tell instantly (or at least speedily) which
metaphysical theories are or are not rational. But I hope that
it will be clear from this study that such a procedure is
certainly not instant. The present work aims to show how a task
of that nature might be undertaken, and with that more modest
aim we must for the present be satisfied.
¥e could defend the rationality of a set of metaphysical
beliefs if we could show that the criteria used to assess it
are comparable to (though not necessarily identical with) the
criteria used in assessing other beliefs. This is the point of
the earlier chapters on the character of beliefs about the
historical past. My contention is that in that area we are
dealing with beliefs which are subject to revision. We
assess those beliefs by criteria, and if they satisfy those
criteria better than other theories or beliefs then we deem them
to be rational beliefs. (Perhaps they might also be things that
we know but that is a yet more complex issue). I accepted the
rational character of beliefs about matters of the historical
past on the grounds that they satisfy certain criteria, in much
the same way as theories or beliefs about the natural world
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satisfy criteria. Indeed I went further and argued that many
of the criteria used in the one field are comparable to the
criteria used in the other. One of the chief differences lay
in the frequency with which the criterion of fruitfulness
in making predictions could be used, but I drew attention to the
possibility of using even that criterion in historical study,
and indeed its importance when it was possible to use it, and
its potential importance at other times.
So the question this final chapter must address is this.
Are the criteria used to defend metaphysical beliefs at least
comparable to those used in assessing beliefs in other domains?
If they are then this warrants the procedure of assessing
the probability or rationality of such beliefs and the attempt
to declare that they have evidential support. This does not
of course mean that one could write a blank cheque to be used
to the credit of any metaphysical belief whatsoever. What it
does mean is that we are saying that one can assess .the
probability and not just the logical possibility of such beliefs.
I do not propose to discuss the issue in a purely abstract
manner. I propose to select some examples of the methods and
criteria used by Richard Swinburne in his important book The
Existence of God. This is not because I agree with his conclusions,
or even necessarily with all of his methods. It is because I
maintain that this book raises very important issues about the
methods and criteria we use to assess the rationality of
metaphysical beliefs. By selecting certain specific arguments
from Swinburne as examples and discussing them, I hope to explore
the question of methods and criteria in this area. Because my
aim is to focus on criteria and methods I must leave certain
elements in Swinburne's arguments untouched. This does not mean
that I always agree with them. Though I find his arguments
clearly and forcefully presented, and a major contribution to
methodology, I also find some of his points strangely presented
and curiously argued. But I cannot deviate from the main task
in order to register dissent on other matters. I may make use
of occasional devices such as warning quotation marks or the
word sic in parenthesis to remind the reader that like any
author I may quote or summarize arguments which I will not
always criticize at every conceivable point. The one focus of
attention is on the contention that metaphysical beliefs can be
appraised by methods comparable to those used in assessing
theories or beliefs about history and about other matters. In
each case we do or we ought to revise our beliefs when rational
considerations oblige us to do so. In each case we should
prefer those beliefs which best satisfy rational criteria, other
things being equal.
There was a tendency a generation ago to link the
distinction between rational and irrational beliefs with the
distinction between scientific and metaphysical beliefs. Traces
of this tendency sometimes still survive. But with changes in
the philosophy of science came the end of attempts at a strong
linkage of this kind. Two factors especially contributed to this.
One was the recognition of the relevance of the history of science
to the methodology of science and the accompanying awareness that
the views of natural scientists did not simply develop by the
accumulation of knowledge, but also by the overthrow and
replacement of paradigms and theories. The other was the
recognition that the tenets of science are theory—laden. These
changes narrowed the gulf between scientific, historical and even
metaphysical beliefs,
We seem to require at least two distinctions. One is a
distinction between the beliefs which are assigned to different
academic disciplines (historical, metaphysical, scientific).
The other is the distinction between those beliefs in each
discipline which are rational and those that are not. It is this
latter distinction with which we are especially concerned. Without
it any theory is as tenable as any other theory. In the case of
metaphysical beliefs we must consider whether there are criteria
of rationality which enable us to maintain the distinction in
question. We need to ask whether the criteria here are comparable
to those discussed earlier in relation to beliefs about the
historical past. In earlier chapters we listed criteria such as
consistency, accuracy, explanatory power, fruitfulness and
simplicity. Wow we must consider these, or criteria like them,
in relation to the rationality of metaphysical beliefs.
Criteria (la) Coherence (or internal self consistency).
The first criterion is the one to -which I shall give least
attention as it is less controversial than the others. We are
concerned here not so much with truth, or with mere possibility,
as with (epistemic) probability. It is a necessary condition
for the probability of a theory or set of beliefs that it be
possible. If it contains incoherence or self contradiction then
it is not logically possible. If it is not a logically possible
theory or set of beliefs then it cannot be a probable one. In
the case of theistic metaphysical beliefs much attention has been
directed to the question of their logical possibility, and the
extent to which such a system of belief is or is not free from
incoherence. Indeed Swinburne himself devoted the whole of a
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previous volume to just this question. In it he made certain
modifications to traditional theism and then argues indirectly
that the resulting 'modified traditional theism' is free of
incoherence. This is one of those points I have no inclination
to contest. My interest is in the means of determining the
probability of such systems of belief. For that purpose it is
of course necessary to note that freedom from self contradiction
is a sine qua non.
I am aware that some writers claim that in science the
requirement of coherence can be overridden. It is argued that
if a theory rests on inconsistent foundations but is startlingly
successful in making predictions then it is rational to prefer
that theory to its more consistent but less fruitful rivals.
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This claim is however highly controversial and in any case
hardly applicable to the evaluation of metaphysical beliefs
where the paucity of prediction is notoriously problematical.
For our purpose we may treat coherence as a necessary condition.
Of course matters are somewhat more complex. If we find
that a theory is incoherent it is not automatically discredited
as impossible, and therefore worse than improbable. An inconsistency
may be marginal rather than central. It might be possible
to remove one or two peripheral hypotheses from a theory (one or
two beliefs from a set of beliefs) and restore the coherence of
of
the whole, or rather^most of it. One description of such a
process is the selection of the preferred maximally consistent
subset of an inconsistent set. Indeed Swinburne himself aims
to do just that when he makes modifications to his version of
traditional theism. At this point however we may begin to see
something of the complexity of the criteria we are investigating.
We tend to be somewhat suspicious of a person who continues to
maintain a theory while making one concession after another
as parts of the theory have to be abandoned or modified. Of
course in many theories it is the case that there are peripheral
hypotheses. It is often not the case that every element entails
every other. But constant reduction or constant modification
rouses suspicion. This issue is that of the 'content-reducing-
stratagem' .One main suggested remedy is to look for an
increase in testability to offset the loss of confidence engendered
by ad hoc modifications of theories. But this is an issue which
belongs more to the discussion of the criterion of fruitfulness
in making predictions which must be discussed later.
The last issue has been discussed in rather an abstract
way. Perhaps an analogy may help some readers and illustrate the
point at issue. Sets of beliefs are sometimes compared to
laundry bags full of unconnected items. But suppose it is
claimed that the bag contains clean laundry. It contains 50
items and we are able to inspect five. Two are found to be dirty.
Someone might argue that these two items are not connected with
the rest, and that all the essential items in the bag are clean
laundry. But those of us with suspicious natures would tend
to ask for some means of specifying which further items are to
be classed as essential and which not. Only if a satisfactory
answer is forthcoming would we then withdraw our suspicion.
Modification of a theory may be the result of finding an
internal incoherence, or due to the failure to satisfy some
other criterion. So we shall have to keep an eye open for this
factor. It may recur. In the meantime I intend to rest content
with the observation that self consistency is a necessary but
insufficient condition for the probability of a set of beliefs.
(in this chapter I am chiefly concerned with criteria
for rationally evaluating theistic metaphysical beliefs. I am
well aware that many philosophers have focussed far more on
questions like the nature of religious language and the
coherence of theism. I am also well aware that these issues
are relevant to evaluating the rationality or probability of
such beliefs. My chief point is that these factors are most
relevant to the question of the possibility of such beliefs
and that what I am especially concerned with are those further
criteria which are particularly relevant to the probability
of such beliefs. On the question of religious language I
simply propose to state very briefly and without any extended
discussion the type of approach presupposed here. I am
interested in exploring the criteria for testing those versions
of theistic belief which hold that some of the terms used to
describe God are to some extent analogical. In other words I
am considering criteria used in relation to beliefs interpreted
as saying that divine wisdom and divine love and divine
personhood are comparable to but not in every respect comparable
to human wisdom and human love and human personhood. In accepting
for the purpose of the argument that the version of theism
under discussion is this one I am declining to discuss criteria
for evaluating interpretations of theism such as those which
take theistic language purely or mainly in an attitudinal sense.
An example of the latter would be D.Z.Phillips interpretation
of the phrase 'the love of God' to refer not to a divine being
who acts in a loving way but solely to the importance of the
believer so acting.^).
(lb) Consistency with other beliefs.
The theories or sets of beliefs whioh we hold are part
of our total system of beliefs. Much of the giddiness which
philosophy is blamed for inducing is in fact caused by the
confusion which results from incoherences in our total system
of beliefs. The problem is that it can be very difficult to
identify the offending propositions, and even more difficult
to determine which to discard or change. In the case of
theistic metaphysics a bold adherent might argue that his
theistic belief is an entire system which comprehends statements
of every kind so that there are no 'other beliefs' with which
his theistic "belief needs to "be compatible. In such a case one
could argue that all that has happened here is that a different
classification has "been adopted. The class of beliefs
comprising this believer's set of metaphysical beliefs is
expanded to include all his other beliefs. What on my model
arises as an issue of coherence with other beliefs is, on this
person's model, turned into an issue of internal consistency
such as we have just discussed. The difference is one of
terminology and classification rather than one of substance.
In either case the test is whether there are beliefs which
contradict the specific narrower set of beliefs we are examining
Let us use the terminology of my model. If within someone'
total set of beliefs their theistic beliefs are in contradiction
to other beliefs, then something has to be abandoned or modified
somewhere. So much is relatively straightforward. But faced
with such a contradiction where is the adjustment to be made?
This is the question which focusses attention on the issue with
which I am most concerned. Some criterion (or some criteria)
other than that of consistency is' needed to provide a ground
for restoring the consistency of a set of beliefs in one way
rather than another. Faced with a failure of consistency it
is usually the case that there are several or even a great
number of rival remedies. A few very brief examples may
illustrate the point.
Let us class belief in the omnipotence omniscience and
benevolence of a personal deity as a set of theistic
metaphysical beliefs T^. Let us class the set of beliefs
that the Khmer Rouge murdered millions of their fellow citizens
and. that today scores of children will die of cancer or other
diseases as a set of other beliefs T^. The consistency of the
total set of beliefs which includes and T^ is under
discussion. I cite the example solely to point up the
methodological issue at stake. Some theists might well argue
that any alleged inconsistency between and is more
apparent than real and that the divine omnipotence and
benevolence are not compromised by the admitted evidence of
Tg. Others might contend that some adjustment needs to be
made in T^. Some people might argue that consistency can be
restored if the nature of divine benevolence is clarified and
qualified. True benevolence in this context is concerned with
of
the true good character formation and 'soul making' and
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to that end the real possibility of evil choices and real
suffering is inescapable. In other words a modification is
introduced into what benevolence might otherwise be taken to
mean. Others might focus on omnipotence and proceed in
various ways to aim at restoring the coherence of and T^
by qualifying omnipotence. (The earlier term meant supremely
powerful rather than capable of doing anything} it is
incoherent to imagine that omnipotence includes the capacity
to perform what is logically contradictory; God is a being
of immensely great but not absolutely unlimited power).
Various moves are here possible. Others again might aim to
restore the consistency of their total set of beliefs by
maintaining and by abandoning rather than modifying or
defending T^. Finally a purely fanciful option will illustrate
the far reaching implications of Quine's law that any sentence
whatever may be held true provided we make sufficiently drastic
changes elsewhere in the system. An enthusiastic Christian
Marxist might argue that premature death due to disease is
the result of imperfections in the distributions of resources
in society and that the alleged atrocities of the Khmer Rouge
are fabrications of the CIA and the Vietnamese. (just in case
any of the readers of this book is attempting to attribute
all the views I cite to myself I should add that I regard the
last view as quite indefensible. I cite it only to illustrate
the point that beliefs about empirical matters are beliefs
and can be contested and are contested, sometimes unreasonably
(as here) and sometimes with reason). I can now say why there
is a point at issue which concerns criteria and method. I am
not intending to add to the innumerable discussions of the
problem of evil; I am seriously raising the question of what
criteria are relevant to the rational choice of theories or
beliefs. The question at issue is this. Faced with rival
proposals for defending or restoring the consistency of a
set of beliefs why do we, or why should we, choose one of
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them rather than the others?
Even if we were not faced with an alleged loss of
consistency we might still arrive at a similar problem.
Suppose we accept the view that the number of potential theories
or sets of beliefs is very large. Suppose we also assume that
there is a large class of consistent sets of such beliefs.
Let us call our set of beliefs about chiefly empirical matters
Sg and select three sets of chiefly metaphysical beliefs
as rivals to each other. These are S-^, S2, and Sy Let us
further suppose that S^, Sg, and are each internally
coherent. And let us also assume that each of S^, Sg and Sg
either is coherent with Sg or can he made coherent with Sg
without disproportionate effort. This situation is contrived,
hut not wholly implausible. Faced with a choice of S^ + Sg
or + Sg or S + Sg which of the three rival options do we
choose and why? In such a case criteria other than coherence
need to he invoked.
(2) Simplicity
One of the criteria to he considered in this connection
is that of simplicity. This is in fact a much more difficult
and controversial matter than is sometimes thought. In some
ways I would prefer to discuss it after considering most of
the other criteria. I recognize the wide use of appeals
to simplicity, as well as harbouring reservations about the
problematical character of this criterion. If it were the
last criterion to he invoked one could reduce its role
somewhat by arguing that one exercized a preference for a
simpler theory only when one had to choose between rivals after
one had sifted out all the other rival theories on other
criteria such as explanatory power, fruitfulness and accuracy.
But there are at least two reasons for considering simplicity
at an earlier point in this chapter. One is that simplicity
is correctly invoked at an early as well as a late point in
the rational scrutiny of beliefs. A wildly complex theory
may be extremely difficult to test. If one values criticizibility
then one wants criticizable theories to be presented for
scrutiny. Popper argues that the appropriate ooncept of
simplicity is to "be equated with decree of falsifiahility
(his italics).^ I would prefer to speak of criticizability,
hut I think that Popper has drawn attention to an important
element in the process of evaluation. Paced with rival theories
we look for testable theories. The very simplest are quickly
rejected. We then look for a theory which has not already
been rejected (Popper would say falsified) and which is readily
testable. In this sense simplicity is a criterion which we
introduce at an early point (though we cannot wholly equate
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simplicity with criticizability. ). Though there may be
some connection between simplicity and vulnerability to
criticism the two notions cannot be equated. The following
objection has been put. If all observed X s are Z s, then
the theory that all X s and Y s are Z s is more ('falsifiable' )
vulnerable to criticism than the theory that all X s are Z s.
Yet we would hardly hesitate to designate the latter as simpler
(and the theory which we should test first).
My other reason for agreeing to discuss simplicity at
this stage is more mechanical. I propose to consider the
role of simplicity as a criterion in examples drawn from
Swinburne's book. He introduces it as one of his first
criteria. It is therefore convenient for me to consider it now.
Swinburne is of course using a form of Bayesian confirmation
theory. In his opinion simplicity is the main factor in
determining prior probability so he invokes this at a very
early point in his second volume when he moves on from the
coherence of theism to the consideration of its probability.
Though I have already indicated that I do not share Swinburne's
2Q<\
confidence about Bayesian confirmation theory, I do agree that
simplicity is a relevant criterion so debate is possible on at
least part of Swinburne's argument. Before starting on a
specific example from his book, however, I wish to consider
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some specific problems with regard to the appeal to simplicity.
It is somewhat surprising that wide assent is given to
the view that simplicity is a virtue in a theory yet we lack
an adequate account of what simplicity is and why we should
prefer it. There is evident excitement amongst physicists at
the thought that developments in small particle research may
explain the proliferation of sub-atomic particles in terms of a
limited and ordered set of yet smaller particles. The hoped for
theory is neater and simpler. But can we specify what makes a
theory simpler than its rivals? Some distinctions are needed.
Value is placed on different types of economy. We can for
instance distinguish economy of mathematical form, economy of
theoretical premises, and ontological economy of postulated
entities. But it is problematical that the logical form we
use can affect apparent simplicity. Logical equivalents can
look simpler or more complex than each other, as can mathematical
formulae which are equivalent. Apparent simplicity can also
depend on linguistic usage. 'Emeralds are grue' expresses
simply in the language of grulers what looks less simple and
so less plausible when expressed in the language of colours.
(That emeralds are green before the year 2000 and blue
thereafter). If we argue that colours are natural kinds,
whereas grulers are not, we are told that the identification
of natural kinds depends on scientific theories and the latter
on the use of simplicity in theory choice. Our line of
argument appeals to simplicity hut does not do much to clarify
the notion. It shows that our notion of simplicity may he
more deeply embedded in our conceptual system than we sometimes
realize. It is a more primitive notion in other words. It
underlies many of the other judgements that we make. It is
therefore hard to try to define simplicity* and unwise to try
to define it in terms of less primitive notions. Yet it is
not viciously circular to appeal to simplicity in this case.
If Green can argue convincingly that Grue's defences always
produces a new loss of simplicity Green's case is strengthened.
The simplest theory is certainly not always preferred and
apparent simplicity may not he real simplicity. That planets
travel in circles is a simple hypothesis. But it fails to meet
the criterion of accuracy and so it falls. That every physical
body exerts a gravitational pull on every other is a more
satisfactory theory. This shows that some balance is needed
between accuracy, explanatory power and simplicity. We cannot
prefer the intuitively simpler theory at the expense of all
other criteria. We can perhaps reformulate our rule to prefer
the simplest of rival theories of equivalent accuracy,
explanatory power and fruitfulness. (Which would still leave
us with a problem of evaluating different performances on
these criteria). The examples cited above help to illustrate
some aspects of the appeal to simplicity but do not tell us
how to define the criterion.
Sober attempted to define simplicity in terms of degree
of informativeness in answering a question. But this leads
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to unsatisfactory results noted below. We seem to be left
with the somewhat embarrassing position that we do prefer some
theories to others on grounds of simplicity but we do not
X2.3
have a wholly adequate account of what simplicity is. This
means that we should treat appeals to simplicity with a certain
amount of caution. It also means that for the time being the
best way to proceed will be by means of the discussion of
particular appeals to simplicity in the domain with which we
are concerned. This in fact is how the matter is discussed in
other domains so it should not distress us unduly. The problem
is not that we are unable to provide examples of preferences
for one theory over another on grounds of simplicity. It is
that we lack a clear account of how these preferences help us
to achieve an adequate definition of the criterion (or criteria)
of simplicity. Our current task is however to argue that it
is possible to make judgements about metaphysical theories on
grounds of simplicity. In order to do that I propose to discuss
some examples of judgements of simplicity made by Swinburne.
If I sometimes argue in passing that considerations of simplicity
require conclusions other than those which Swinburne favours,
this does not conflict with my contention that simplicity is an
appropriate criterion. On that point I agree with Swinburne
even if I disagree at times with his use of the criterion.
By examining some examples of the appeal to simplicity in
this one recent major work on theistic metaphysics we can explore
aspects of the role of the criterion of simplicity in this area.
In order to discuss Swinburne's appeal to simplicity I will
have to give some indication of what he says. Some of what
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he says is, in my view, very strangely expressed and strangely
argued. I am therefore anxious that my readers should not
attribute the views I am criticizing to myself. In order to
avoid this hazard I propose to start by letting Swinburne speak
for himself in a few selected quotations in which he makes an
appeal to simplicity.
'In these respects the theist proposes a significant
simplification of our world view. There are three
tenable views as to the relation between scientific and
personal explanation. One untenable view is the occasionalist
view.... Two other untenable views are the view that
scientific explanation is analysable in terms of personal
explanation and the opposite view that personal explanation
is analysable in terms of scientific explanation...
Given that all these views are false, there really operate
both scientific causality and personal causality and
neither is analysable in terms of the other. There remain
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three tenable views of their relation to each other.'
Swinburne entitles these theism, materialism and dualism and
then argues that theism is simpler and more preferable. He
argue s:
'How clearly both the theist's view and the materialist's
view result in a significantly simpler world-view
than the dualist world-view... The materialist programme
has a certain initial plausibility... There are however...
very considerable scientific and philosophical difficulties
... I have pointed out here that equal simplicity
may be gained in a different way by supposing that in
the stated respect scientific explanation is reducible
to personal explanation.'
Just in case it seems at first sight that Swinburne has crudely
contradicted himself it should be noted that in the last clause
he presumably means that in his view scientific explanation
can be included within theistic personal explanation. He
continues:
• So then theism has very considerable simplicity. Simplicity
is the major determinant of intrinsic probability...
The intrinsic probability of theism is, relative to other
hypotheses about what there is, very high, because of the
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great simplicity of the hypothesis of theism.'
In the above quotations I have italicized those areas which
appeal to considerations of simplicity. The passages cited
above form the conclusion to a line of argument stretching
over a hundred pages in which Swinburne discusses what he means
by inductive argument, explanation, scientific explanation
and personal explanation. In the course of that longer argument
for the simplicity of theism Swinburne makes another appeal to
simplicity. He maintains that the deity in which theists believe
is the simplest kind of person there could be. This is an
issue related to but not to be confused with his general
argument for the simplicity of theism. The general argument
is the major one, the other appeal to simplicity is an argument
within an argument. I propose to discuss the major argument
first and the subsidiary argument later on. The two types
of appeal to simplicity are to ray mind not the same and should
not be confused with one another. (i am not saying that
Swinburne makes such a confusion, but that we need, to pay
close attention to what he says).
Swinburne's main argument falls into two parts. He argues
that theism and 'materialism' are simpler than and so preferable
to 'dualism'. This is the first step. The second is his
argument that 'materialism' as the surviving main rival to
theism
'...seems doomed to failure. For a detailed materialist
theory could not be a simple enough theory for us to have
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reasonable confidence in its truth.
From these two steps follow, or so he claims, Swinburne's
conclusion already cited above that theism has very considerable
simplicity and so, relative to its rivals, very high intrinsic
probability.
We have here then a very explicit set of appeals to
simplicity to attempt to resolve a metaphysical debate. Swinburne
does not regard simplicity as the only criterion by any means.
But he does make it the major determinant of the prior
probability of a theory, in this case of a metaphysical theoiy.
I have already indicated my reservations about this Bayesian
element in Swinburne's argument. I did that in Ch. 5 when I was
considering approaches to the question of criteria and methods
which differed radically in various ways from my own. I do
not propose to repeat that discussion here. It is sufficient
to note that here we are concerned with the narrower issue of
the place of appeals to simplicity in relation to metaphysical
beliefs. The point at issue here is whether the argument adds
to, or detracts from, the contention that a metaphysical belief
is more rational than its rivals if (amongst other things) it
is simpler than its rivals.
At this point we must consider the question of rivalry,
which is a crucial element in the rational evaluation of
competing "beliefs. Current discussion is remarkably tolerant
about the number of potential theories with which any given
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theory could be compared. But tolerance has its limits and
the limitation of potential rivals is usually effected by
specifying certain serious rivals. Which rivals are to be
regarded as serious depends on their success in meeting criteria
such as simplicity, explanatory power and the like. Attentive
thinkers will see that this is not a circular argument. Theories
are sifted. Those which blatantly fail one or more of the tests
are relegated to the list of less serious rivals. Those that
promise to satisfy the tests rather more adequately are then
more carefully scrutinized as serious rivals.
There is however a more taxing problem in comparing
competing theories. This is that some theories are so different
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in character that it is hard to see how they can be compared.
There is however a device for coping with this which Hesse
describes. She points out that
'Two theories h and h' can always be made to have
notionally the same content by conjoining with h that
part of the relevant content of h' with which it does
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not conflict, and similarly for h'.'
Swinburne does not explicitly state that this tactic is being
adopted, but to note this factor will avoid potential
confusion. Swinburne contrasts theistic personal explanation
"with what he variously describes as ' scientific explanation' ,
'the materialist programme' and the like. At first sight
this may seem confusing, but I do not think that a close
reading of Swinburne supports the view that he is confused.
He is not envisaging some facile comparison of science and
religion of a generation ago whereby science was deemed to
offer explanation within the universe and religion explanation
of the universe, or some such uneasy truce was proclaimed.
He is working with more recent theories of theory. True he
sometimes uses the term 'scientific explanation' in a broader
sometimes a norrower sense. But this is usually clear enough
in context. Let us attempt a 'reconstruction' of this element
in his argument, focussing on his appeal to simplicity.
Swinburne claims that theism (P) is simpler than its
rivals. The main rivals he considers are dualism (D) and
(scientific) materialism (S). These are large scale theories
aimed at explaining at least two sets of data. These sets
of data are (s) events explained by reference to scientific
theories (or laws) about physical objects and the like
(scientific explanation in the narrower sense: hence the
lower case s), and (p) events which require a reference to the
intentions of persons in order to explain them (personal
explanation). The choice of lettering is mine and the reasoning
for it will I hope become plain.
Where Swinburne is confusing is that he describes both
P (theism) and p (explanations of human actions) as 'personal
explanation' . But the context almost always makes it dear
whether he means P (the theory that everything i3 ultimately
due to the intentions of a personal deity) or p (the theory
that certain events are caused by the intentions of human
persons). In set theoretical terms the hypotheses comprising
p are a subset of the hypotheses comprising P.
Similarly the term 'scientific explanation1 is used in
two ways. It is used of the large scale theory S that
everything is to be explained by a programme of materialist
reduction so that p is explained in terms of s. But the term
1 scientific explanation* is also used in the narrower sense
to refer to s alone. Again in set theoretical terras the
hypotheses comprising s are a subset of the hypotheses
comprising S. (Or, if you prefer it, the theories comprising s
are a subset of the theories comprising the research programme S).
We can now examine the character of the appeal to simplicity
which Swinburne makes in the passages cited above. He is saying
in effect that there are three main rivals for comparison: P, S,
and D. D comprises s and p and asserts that s is not reducible
to p, and p is not reducible to s. S comprises s and p and
asserts that p will eventually turn out to be reducible to s.
P comprises s and p and asserts that both s and p are reducible
to (theistic) personal explanation. There is a notational
difficulty here but if I understand Swinburne correctly we
cannot say that he is claiming s is reducible to p nor that
s is reducible to P. We will need a further subset of P namely
P* to which it is claimed s and p are reducible. P then asserts,
amongst other things that s. and p are reducible to P'. The
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need to distinguish P and P* is I suspect purely notational
and I do not propose to argue that P loses simplicity on that
score. This I believe exemplifies the point made earlier
that simplicity or complexity of description may not
necessarily signify that a theory is really simpler or more
complex. In fact I hold that the apparent complexity of
distinguishing P from P' masks a real loss of simplicity.
But the issue on which we are to focus is this. Can we
explicate and defend the appeal to simplicity in cases such as
these?
One objection needs to be considered right away. This is
that P, S, and D are not proper competitors. It could be
argued that theism, materialism and (explanatory) dualism are
not real rivals as explanations. There is force to this
objection but I think that it is misplaced and premature.
Swinburne proposes that we consider the prior probability of
these theories by estimating their relative simplicity. He
then considers the relative explanatory power of theism at the
next stage. To object at this stage that the three theories
are not equal in explanatory power is to miss the point. I
am proposing to argue later that a loss of simplicity may be
compensated for by a gain in explanatory power. I am also
proposing to argue that while one may make an initial
provisional estimate of the simplicity of rival theories one
can only finally invoke simplicity at a much later stage when
the theories have been compared for explanatory power, accuracy
and fruitfulness as well. In other words I agree with the
aim of the objection, but am pointing out that it is premature
to raise it at this point as it does not bear on what Swinburne
actually says.
Swinburne's method, is to invoke simplicity at a very early
point in the argument and to use it as the main determinant of
prior probability. Against this a series of points need to
be made in the proper order. The major point is that we should
not evaluate simplicity independently of other criteria. I
am indeed going on to argue that a loss of simplicity may be
offset by a gain in explanatory power (or a gain on some other
criterion). That to my mind is the correct form of the
objection. (I think in fact that Swinburne probably could
accommodate the point within his Bayesian calculations though,
if I have read him correctly, he does not do so). He does
not do so because he argues that theism is the simplest theory
tout court when compared with D (dualism) and S (materialism).
My objection against this is that this argument rests too much
weight on the criterion of simplicity. It invokes the
criterion too much at too early a point, and it would be better
to consider the evaluation of theories in terms of their
simplicity relative to their explantory power. But in order
to illustrate the force of this methodological objection I
need to argue in stages first that Swinburne's excessive early
reliance on simplicity is misplaced, and then that a loss of
absolute simplicity could be offset by a gain in explanatory
power.
In order to reach my conclusion about criteria and
methods I need to spend some time showing that Swinburne's
argument does indeed involve an overestimate of simplicity.
Let us return to Swinburne* s contest between P, S, and D.
His terminology is sometimes slightly different from mine
"but I think that no serious injury will result. Let us
identify P as Swinburne's modified traditional personal theism
S is what he entitles materialism or the like. I propose to
treat S as a group of related theories in a research programme
The version of S which I shall sometimes consider is S' . This
variant of S is less crudely materialistic than Swinburne's S.
S' is the view that the behaviour of human persons is not
crudely reducible to talk of electrons and neurons but will
ultimately be included within an enlarged programme of unified
science comprising the natural and the human sciences. To
my mind S' is preferable to Swinburne's S, but as I shall be
arguing mainly about the role of simplicity in relation to
the contract between P, D and either S or S' I think my
distinction between S as crude materialism and S' as a more
subtle theory does not do any injustice to Swinburne. Let
us entitle S' as the theory of a unified science as opposed
to S which is materialist reductionism. D remains as before
the dualistic theory described earlier. It is the theory
that p (the explanation of the behaviour of persons) and s
(the explanation of other events according to modified
Hempelian scientific laws) are independent of one another.
(Swinburne argues as we noted above that on this view neither
of these elements is reducible to the other).
The crucial question is this. Swinburne claims that
127P and S are simpler than D and that P is simpler than S.
Does this example help to clarify our question about the role
of simplicity as a criterion? I think it does.
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Let us consider first the claim that P and S are each
simpler than D. Swinburne argues:
•Now clearly both the theist's view and the materialist's
view result in a significantly simpler world-view than
the dualist world-view.'
He continues:
•A world-view in which all personal explanations have a
complete explanation in scientific terms, or all scientific
explanations have a complete explanation in personal terms
would be a simpler world-view than others, and as such
more likely to be true.'
and further:
'dualism gives a very messy, unsimple, picture of the
.128world...'
This is all very brief. The appeal to simplicity here is
almost assumed as self evident. Can we try to specify what
kind of simplicity is involved? Swinburne correctly notes
that part of what he says reflects the appeal made by
'materialists' (we might add 'and upholders of a unified science')
to simplicity. In this case it is the type of simplicity
achieved by identifying one set of entities with another or
by showing one set of entities to be an extension of another
class of entities. He have already noted a difference between
this kind of simplicity and simplicity achieved by elimination
129of entities. But dualists usually object that the identification
in question, or the thesis of compatibilism in question, cannot
be carried through. In other words simplicity alone is held
not to decide the matter. He shall return to this point shortly.
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But when Swinburne comes to contrasting theism and
materialism, his equivalent of our contrast between P and S
or S', he makes a different move. Here he puts up two
arguments. The first claims that theism offers 1 equal
simplicity' to the rival more scientific view."*""^ The second
then draws attention to difficulties in the materialist
account. From those he concludes as we noted above
'a detailed materialist theory could not be a simple
enough theory for us to have reasonable confidence in
its truth.'
So in effect Swinburne is claiming that P and S promise
equal simplicity but that S fails to deliver it. His
objection to the rival view S is that it fails to carry
through a programme of reducing personal explanation to laws
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of a Hempelian kind. We cannot pursue here the question
of the persuasiveness of Swinburne's objection. If he were
right in arguing that S fail3 at this point then this would
be either an instance of a failure of accuracy or an instance
of a rival theory needing to be made more complex in order
to deal with such a failure. Swinburne seems to imply that
S suffers the latter fate.
Even if it were true that S is more complex in some
such manner that does not resolve our interest in the
applicability of the criterion of simplicity. The complexity
in S (or S') would be exemplified by the need for a large
number of imprecise and untested hypotheses about the
correlation between brain states and mental events. This
complexity then, it is argued detracts from the simplicity
of S. But we need to distinguish between a complexity of
this kind and a more fundamental type of simplicity. Let us
examine the claim by Swinburne that:
•Theism is simple in postulating that in this way
explanation is all of one kind' .
This is a much more fundamental issue as the argument here
is that two whole systems of hypotheses (s and p) can be
coordinated in one unifying theory P. Both S and P aim at
this more basic type of simplicity. So let us try to set up
the character of the appeal to simplicity and then test it.
It is claimed that both S and P aim at a basic simplicity but
that P is preferable to S because S contains incidental
complexities in its component hypotheses. This seems to
resolve one of our problems by showing us how we can rank
different types of appeal to simplicity. S and P are
preferable to D, as S and P aim at a more basic type of
simplicity. But S it is claimed is less preferable than P as
S contains an incidental loss of simplicity. This notion of
ranking is clearly very useful.
Unfortunately we have solved one problem about different
types of simplicity but are on the way to uncovering another.
The notion of incidental complexity works just as much to
the disadvantage of P. It can be shown that P also contains
an incidental loss of simplicity. Swinburne says very little
about this. P involves a different type of incidental
complexity. It requires the assumption of an additional
entity namely that in addition to human persons and the
objects investigated by the natural sciences there is also
a personal God. A theory which assumes the existence of more
entities than its rival theories is in that respect less simple
because less parsimonious, or less economical in its ontology
than its rivals.
The issue can be stated thus. We can rank some appeals
to simplicity. Both P and S are preferable to D in that
they aim at a fundamental unity of explanation. But S is
judged inferior to P by some on the grounds that it includes
a clutter of complex hypotheses, while P is judged inferior to
S (or S') by others on the ground that it lacks ontological
economy. It is hard to resolve this latter clash by ranking
the different types of simplicity. We are faced with a choice
of additional hypotheses or an additional entity.
We need to specify a little more precisely what this
last loss of simplicity might be. Swinburne's version of
theism involves assuming the existence of an additional
personal being who is nevertheless very different from the
other persons with whom we are already familiar. In this
respect it seems a more complex theory, because it requires
more assumptions and includes reference to more beings. This
loss of simplicity in the form of loss of economy might be
acceptable if it were offset by a gain on some other criteria,
such as a gain in explanatory power.
Before proceeding to that issue, however, one further
argument needs to be considered. This is that there is a
qualitative simplicity which needs to be taken into account.
It runs:
'Theism postulates God as a being with intentions, beliefs,
21S
and capacities, "but ones of a very simple kind, so simple
that it postulates the simplest kind of person that there
could he.'
This is a rather strange argument which appeals to a very
special sense of the term 'simple'» It depends on the view
that a finite quantity demands further explanation while
an infinite one does not and that the latter is therefore in
this sense 'simpler'. Even if we were to concede this for the
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sake of argument it does not meet our objection noted above.
A theory which includes this additional qualitatively 'simple'
being is still less simple because less economical than one
which does not.
So let us consider the procedure of offsetting a loss
in simplicity with a gain elsewhere, for example, with a gain
in explanatory power. This might help if our aim is to show
that the effect of a metaphysical argument for theism is to
increase the probability of the conclusion. If simplicity
is thought to measure prior probability, and explanatory-
power then to give us the posterior probability, a loss on
the former and a gain in the latter gives us a rise in
probability. But this Bayesian analysis is one we have already
questioned. More seriously the crucial question is whether
the argument is one to which the conclusion is more probable
than not. For this we need as high a score on each of the
criteria as possible. All the same losses in one place can
be offset by gains in another provided that our favoured
theory does better than all its rivals.
The problem is that as with simplicity so with the
procedure of offsetting gains and losses, different people
will evaluate the application of the criteria differently.
Thus a supporter of D could claim that though dualism is a
less unified theory it scores highly on accuracy in that it
doesn't make problematical claims about reducing p to s or
s to P1. Meanwhile a supporter of S or S' could claim that
though P gains on explanatory power, S and S' gain a
predictive success every time a mental event is correlated
with a brain event. Thus S and S' can appeal to fruitfulness
in making predictions. Our larger exploration must continue
with a look at these criteria. Meanwhile we can draw some
interim conclusions about simplicity.
l) It is possible to compare metaphysical arguments on
grounds of simplicity. 2) Different types of simplicity
need to be distinguished. 3) When we can rank these different
types of simplicity we can resolve a clash, but not all of
them can be ranked. 4) Simplicity needs to be considered
in relation to other criteria and not used too much too
soon in isolation from them. Simplicity is of value in making
a preliminary sifting of rival candidates for rational belief.
But in the last resort it has to be used in conjunction with
other criteria.
(3) Explanatory Power
The criterion of explanatory power has already been
mentioned and here it must be considered more specifically.
We must look at its role as a criterion of rational
metaphysical belief. Let us begin by considering the
contention that a theory is preferable and so more rationally
believable if it explains a greater variety of facts than its
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rivals do. To this proposal we would immediately need to
append a series of qualifications about the rivals being
comparable in accuracy, fruitfulness, simplicity-and the like.
We would also need to specify the domain within which a greater
variety of facts is explained by one theory than by its rivals.
But we must proceed in stages one step at a time.
Generality is in some instances a virtue. We prefer the
view that copper conducts electricity to the view that this
piece of copper does so this afternoon. But we also prefer
precision to vagueness. We prefer the view water boils at
100°C to the view that water boils when heated enough. But
we also prefer the addition of restrictions demanded by
accuracy. Thus we find that water boils at 100°G at sea level.
A theory which explains the boiling of water at given
temperatures and pressures is more preferable still. It is
more preferable because it explains anomalies which upset its
predecessor, and also enables us to make new tests. It is
general and yet specifies precise qualities, and it accounts
for more data than the competing theories mentioned above.
In the case of the explanatory power of beliefs about
historical events we have already noted that it is more often
the case that an explanation renders an event probable than
that it renders it deductively certain. In an earlier
chapter the example was cited of troops defecting. The
historical statement discussed there implied a theory to the
effect that troops are more likely to defect if unpaid. But
a further factor was also included. If the troops in question
differ in religious allegiance from the rest of the array the
likelihood of their defection may well he increased. Let us
call the first explanatory theory h^ and the second We
would well argue that h^ plus h^ has greater explanatory power
than either h^ or h^alone or several rival theories. The
more complex hut also more precise theory which includes h-^
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and h^ would explain more cases of desertion than h^ alone.
Thus h^ alone might help to explain the defection of the
Ghassanid prince discussed in an earlier chapter, hut the
addition of h^ to the theory would not only explain that event
better, hut would also explain events such as the defection
of Druze soldiers from the Israeli army during the occupation
of Lebanon in more recent times. The difference of religious
allegiance was there a crucial factor. So a theory has greater
explanatory power the more instances and the more varied
instances it can explain.
This provisional account of explanatory power will need
to he refined further and its hearing on the comparison of
metaphysical beliefs then explored. I propose to do this by
continuing to draw on the points made in an earlier chapter
about historical explanation. These will help to elucidate
criterion of explanatory power which is under discussion
here. I argued earlier that historical judgements imply
belief in theories which explain historical events. These
theories can he formulated as laws which declare certain
events to he probable given specified antecedent conditions.
The current issue is the claim that the more events such
theories explain, and the more varied those events, the greater
the explanatory power of the theory. Can we further clarify
the notion of comparative explanatory power?
One could argue that a theory only really explains a
set of events if the statement that those events will occur
is deducihle from rather than made probable by the theory.
This line of argument would suggest that a theory which declares
the occurrence of e-^ to certain rather than probable has
greater explanatory power than a theory which declares e^ to
merely probable. One could support this with the argument
that unless a theory said why an event did occur, rather than
why it was likely to occur, we have not fully explained the
event. But while deductive explanations might be preferable
in general they may not be available or may be offered but
rejected for various reasons. For instance I am told that
Quantum Mechanics (QM) plus a theory of hidden variables (HY)
would render some explanations in physics deductively certain
rather than statistically probable. But though the theory
Oil + HV might seem preferable because in this sense stronger
in explanatory power it is so far treated only as a speculative
possibility. The reason for that is that attempts to test
plausible hidden variable hypotheses have so far ended in
failure.
The attractiveness of a determirndic theory in this
context is that it would have greater explanatory power in
the sense that it would make the effects certain rather than
probable. But as we have seen, in some cases the preference
for a theory with greater explanatory power in this sense
is resisted. A similar resistance can be seen in the case
of theories of historical determinism. If there were laws
of history which made historical events inevitable rather
than probable the theories incorporating such laws would
have a similar advantage in explanatory power over more
probabilistic kinds of historical explanation. Yet here too
such an advantage in explanatory power is treated with
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suspicion at least in some quarters. Our current concern
is with this criterion of explanatory power and we cannot
digress into detailed arguments over historical inevitability.
It is possible however to see that a gain in explanatory
power does give a belief in hidden variables or a belief in
historical determinism a certain initial gain in plausibility.
What then is the constraining factor which prevents such an
advantage being clear and decisive? In the one case it is
the failure of predictions which would be expected if the
hidden variable theory were true. In the other case there
are notoriously many objections. These would include conflict
with other theories about human responsibility, and the
failure to specify precise mechanisms for historical determinism.
Our concern is with criteria, and here I propose only to maintain
the following conclusion. A gain in explanatory power of the
kind specified above renders a theory preferable (a belief
more rational) unless it is achieved at the expense of a setback
in relation to one of the other criteria. Such a setback could
be characterized by a failure in expected prediction, or a clash
with another well supported theory, or a lack of accuracy and
precision.
We could also consider a gain in explanatory power of a
less extreme kind. A non—deterministic theory might render
the event in question e more probable than it was on other
theories. In this case the preferred theory remains a
probabilistic one but one which makes the event more likely
than the rival theory does. (if we describe this as a
qualitative gain, then we could describe the more deterministic
version of the previous paragraph as a maximally qualitative
gain in explanatory power.). As an instance of a theory which
renders the event e more probable than it was before, we could
again draw on an example from the chapter on historical study
above (Chapter 4). There we considered the example of an
historian pointing out that conditions were favourable to a
revolution as the government had no military forces to hand
and there was acute unemployment. The implied generalization
is the following. Eevolution is likely if unemployment is
acute and the government has no military forces at hand. This
theory has more explanatory power than a theory which specifies
either of the two conditions alone. High unemployment alone
does not so often lead to revolution, nor do governments without
strong forces regularly invite revolution. But the two factors
combined make the event e much more probable. The gain in
explanatory power is qualitative in that the preferred belief
renders the event e more probable, and the preferred belief
is therefore to that extent more rational.
There are other ways in which a gain in explanatory power
can be registered. One of these is that a theory A is
rationally preferable to theory B if A explains more facts
than B. In this case we seem to have quantitative rather
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than a qualitative advantage in explanatory power for A over
B. I propose to consider two cases where such an advantage
might he claimed. In the first case (within an explanatory
schema) we can infer from theory B evidence e^ to e^. (The
qualification is important as we need to distinguish cases
of inference within an explanatory schema from other cases of
inference. A rogue theory such asP&Q&R&S.... therefore
Q & R & S.... would allow us to infer any number of facts but
would have no explanatory power.). From the explanatory
theory B we can infer evidence e^ to e^. But from the rival
theory A (which is also explanatory) we can infer evidence
e, to e .. In this case I am stioulating that evidence e,1 n+i ° 1
to e consists of evidence which is already to hand, but e
n ' n
to en+^ also contains novel data which are predicted by theory
A and are successfully observed after the prediction is made.
I wish to distinguish this type of gain in explanatory power
from a more basic kind. In this case I propose to argue that
what we have is really an instance of fruitfulness in making
predictions. This is a criterion which overlaps the criterion
of explanatory power but which I propose to consider at a
later point as a separate issue.
Having distinguished the case of the prediction of novel
data I can now turn to the more basic example with which I am
chiefly here concerned. This is where a pair of rival theories
C and D differ in explanatory power as follows. From D we
can infer e0 to e but from C we can infer e, to e . C therefored n In
explains all that D explains and at least one other datum
additionally. I propose to call this a quantitative gain or
advantage in explanatory power . The question at issue now
concerns the preferahility of the theory with the quantitative
advantage in explanatory power.
The comparison of C and D in the previous paragraph
attempts to set out in slightly more formal terms part of what
is involved in the earlier discussion. The case of the defecting
soldiers was the example there. In history, as in science, we
prefer a theory with greater explanatory power of this kind.
A theory which explains the defection of the Ghassanid prince
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from Heraclius and of Druze soldiers from the Israeli army
is preferable to one which explains only the one event or the
one type of event.
I therefore propose the following account of the notion
of a gain in explanatory power. Such a gain is qualitative
if it renders the data in question more probable than they
would otherwise have been. Such a gain is maximally qualitative
if it renders the data in question certain rather than probable.
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Such a gain is quantitative if the new theoiy explains more
data and especially more varied data than its competitors
explained. We have looked at examples of such gains or possible
advantages in the case of rational beliefs about history and
the like. Can an analogous case be made for greater explanatory
power as a virtue of metaphysical beliefs?
As in earlier sections of this chapter I propose to
discuss this issue with reference to an example selected from
one of Swinburne's arguments. I have specified various ways
in which an advantage in explanatory power might be estimated.
Swinburne is, of course, working on Bayesian assumptions about
epistemic probability. So he discusses explanatory power in
these terms. He sees explanatory power as expressible in
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terms of that part of Bayes* theorem which assesses
P(e/h.k)/P(e/k). In informal language explanatory power is
determined by the probability of the evidence given the
hypothesis (or theory) in question and our background knowledge,
divided by the probability of the evidence on background
knowledge alone. Applied to this particular example what is
being assessed is whether the universe we experience is more
likely to have come about given the truth of theism than given
the truth of some rival theory. Despite my other reservations
about the use of Bayesian probability theory, I do think that
this part of his account is acceptable as long as one
recognizes the importance of other criteria such as coherence,
accuracy, scope and fruitfulness, Swinburne is long on
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coherence and simplicity and rather short on the others.
But the account of; explanatory power is acceptable given this
qualification.
In order to look more closely at Swinburne's use of the
criterion of explanatory power I propose to select quotations
from one of his arguments and discuss these. Again I do
not intend to take issue with every point on which I might
disagree with Swinburne, but rather to use his work as an
argument which makes an appeal to explanatory power. He
maintains:
'... the occurrence of certain phenomena will confirm,
i.e. raise the probability of the existence of God,
if and only if it is more probable that those phenomena
will occur if there is a God than if there is not.'
He continues by saying that one assesses the explanatory
power of theism with regard to those phenomena by asking:
'... how much more likely does the existence of God make
the occurrence of those phenomena than it would be if
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we do not assume the existence of God.'
It is clear at the outset that Swinburne has decided
to focus on one of the options outlined above rather than the
other. He is not discussing an argument which claims that
theism explains more data than its rivals. He is propounding
an argument which claims that theism makes 'the phenomena' more
likely than rival theories do. This supports my interpretation
of what he is doing which I gave earlier. Whether or not this
is how he ought to proceed, this is how he does proceed.
I agree that it might be possible to restrict the rival theories
to those scientific theories which remain strictly within
the limits of physics and argue that science explains data
within the universe whereas theism offers a quantitative
advantage in explanatory power in providing an explanation
of why there is this universe as well as the data within it.
But this is not the example under disoussion and not what
Swinburne is considering. He is arguing for what is (on my
classification) a qualitative rather than a quantitative
advantage in explanatory power. He probably has his reasons
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for doing so.
Having established which kind of argument this example
provides we can now go on to consider it in a little more detail.
Is Swinburne arguing for a maximally qualitative advantage?
Is he in other words claiming that given the truth of (his
version of) theism the universe as we know it is a deductively
certain consequence? Again no. This is not the argument he
puts forward. He considers and rejects such an argument:
'On that view God has an obligation, or at any rate an
overriding reason, to create the best of all possible
worlds. This answer... has the consequence that the only
states of affairs which we can expect to exist, if there is
a God, will be ones belonging to the best of all possible
worlds. The probability, if there is a God, that they will
exist is l'f the probability that any other state will exist
is 0.'
He goes on
'This answer seems to me to be mistaken. A God will not
necessarily bring about the best of all possible worlds.
For there is every reason to suppose that there is no
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unique best of all possible worlds.'
Our concern is not with whether he is right or wrong to reject
the notion of a best of all possible worlds. It is to note
that he does not argue for the rationality of that view which
offers maximal qualitative explanatory power. In fact he rejects
such a view. Though in the main Swinburne claims to follow
Leibniz here, he drops this element of Leibniz's argument.
What Swinburne does do is to reformulate a version of one
of the eighteenth century arguments as one of his own 'C-inductive
arguments'. He claims that the universe is 'very unlikely to
come about but for God's agency' and so 'the existence of a
complex physical universe ... is a good C-inductive argument'
\r>
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for theism. One of his reasons for choosing the version of
the argument given by Leihniz rather than that of Clarke is
the full treatment given to the latter hy R.L.Rowe in 1975*
Swinburne is however somewhat over-confident about the similarity
between different versions of the argument.
• In so far as I consider one detailed example of a
cosmological argument, I shall consider Leibniz's version,
but most of my remarks will apply to most versions of the
argument. ■ 14T
This cheerful assumption was printed a year earlier than the
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careful monograph on the history of the argument by Craig
which argues impressively for a classification of different
types of such argument. Craig pays careful attention to the
Arabic kalam argument as well as to Aquinas and Leibniz. He
argues strongly for the difference between these versions and
against the assimilation of the arguments by Aquinas to those
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of Leibniz. I mention this as J.L.Mackie, whom I shall also
cite, had the advantage of writing after Craig's work was
published. This can be seen in his criticism of Swinburne.
'Although his starting-point is like Leibniz's, his conclusion
is more like that of the Kalam argument, in talcing creation
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by a person as the one satisfactory beginning of things.'
This is not just a historical niggle. The arguments are different
in character and use different premises. If Craig is right,
there is a crucial difference between the principles used as,
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or assumed by, the different premises. But our concern here
is with the criterion of explanatory power. Here we can see
that Swinburne and Mackie are both using such a criterion, but
differing over whether it has "been enqployed successfully.
This is for us the important issue, not whether different
versions of the cosmological argument have been inadequately
distinguished. Both writers see greater explanatory power as
an advantage.
Mackie's remarks clearly suggest that if the unexplained
element were reduced this would he an advantage. His tactic
is therefore to argue that there is no gain in explanatory
power. He says of Swinburne:
'But without introducing the concept of something that
contains its own sufficient reason, or whose essence includes
existence - unsatisfactory though, in the end, these notions
are - he has nothing to support the claim that by adding
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a god to the world we reduce the unexplained element.'
(The italics are his.)
This does not fairly describe Swinburne's position in fact,
but we must let that pass. The point at issue which concerns
us is the claim which Mackie rejects but which Swinburne asserts.
This is the claim that theism 'reduces the unexplained element'.
What Swinburne claims is that the universe is 'unlikely to have
come about but for God's agency'. For him therefore theism
gains in explanatory power if it can account for something
which is otherwise unlikely. The gain in explanatory power
which is claimed by Swinburne is what I have classified as a
qualitative gain. His argument is that the universe is more likely
to exist, as it does, given theism, than otherwise.
In fact J.L.Mackie is not wholly correct in saying that
Swinburne's argument is like the Kalam argument. Swinburne
does briefly consider a version of the argument which claims
the universe to be of finite duration, and explained by a
person who caused its first state. But he gives much more
weight to those forms of the argument which allow for the
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universe being 'infinitely old'. But much more important
for our purpose is the character of the gain in explanatory
power which is claimed by Swinburne. This is a very complex
issue but I hope that the main point at issue for our purposes
will become apparent as the argument proceeds.
Swinburne is not in reality arguing that the existence of
God makes the universe as it is more likely (than it would
otherwise have been) in the same way as a law L and preceding
conditions C make a historical event E more likely than it would
otherwise have been. In each case we are confronted with a
belief which is commended to us on the grounds that it explains
what we experience. But the type of explanatory power in each
case is different. In the one case L and C explain E because
L and C cause E in the way that other events are caused. But in
the case of Swinburne' a Leibnizian argument the type of
explanation is different. He points to the
'claim that everything not metaphysically necessary has
153
an explanation in something metaphysically necessary.'
He is very cautious in his treatment of this element in Leibniz's
argument. What he does say is
'Leibniz claims that the universe is not metaphysically
necessary, and so that its existence needs explanation.
He may be right, but I cannot see how you can argue for
this claim except in terms of the relatively greater
1-U-o
simplicity and explanatory power of a potential
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explanans.'
If I understand him correctly, Swinburne is saying that such
a claim is defensible, but by his mode of arguing by appeal
to explanatory power.
It is clear enough that Mackie and Swinburne are evaluating
metaphysical beliefs by considering their explanatory power.
Even if the one claims, and the other denies, that the belief
in question reduces the unexplained element, this is how they
argue. But has the criterion here been pressed beyond its normal
limits? I suppose we should not be surprised that a metaphysical
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argument should invoke explanation in metaphysical terms. It
seems clear enough that the type of explanatory power is similar
in one respect to what we considered earlier and different from
it in another. It is similar in that the claim is that the
belief in question renders the evidence more probable than it
would otherwise have been. The claimed gain in explanatory
power is qualitative. But it is different in at least one
crucial respect. The kalam version of the argument seems to
use a notion of explanatory power closer to historical and
scientific appeals to explanatory power. But Swinburne's
Leibnizian argument appeals to explanation over and above that
provided by reference to laws and preceding conditions. If the
more Leibnizian version is regarded as the version of the
argument at issue, then it raises difficulties for assessment
in terms of the criterion of explanatory power used elsewhere.
Swinburne discusses both types of argument. In the case
of the more Leibnizian version he envisages a situation such
as the following. For each of the (in this case infinite)
sequence of states of the universe (s) God (G) brings it about
that the appropriate law (L) operates and so brings about the
next state. He writes
'We suppose that such a person G brings it about at each
instant of time, that L operates, and so brings it about
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that for each S _ that S , brings about S .1
n + 1 n + 1 0 n
It is clear from the quotation from Leibniz which follows, that
he envisages this as providing a gain in explanatory power in
the following way. The reason for what is not metaphysically
necessary (the world) is something which is metaphysically
necessary. J.L.Mackie rejects the original form of this
Leibnizian argument on the grounds that the principle on which
it relies is not demonstrable. But Swinburne makes the more
qualified claim that the principle scores in having greater
explanatory power. Against this J.L.Mackie only replies that
'the concept of something that contains its own sufficient
reason' is 'unsatisfactory', and so the unexplained element
is 'not reduced'. This does not fully meet Swinburne's point.
Swinburne's point is that there is a gain in explanatory power.
Unless some more effective argument is deployed to exclude the
type of gain which he is pointing to, he can justifiably claim
that his argument is one which raises the probability of its
conclusion.
There is clearly a case for arguing that theistic
arguments can be scrutinized in terms of the criterion of
explanatory power. There is controversy over how successfully
they meet that criterion. But we can contend that if it is
du¬
rational to assess historical and other arguments for their
explanatory power, then it is at least as rational to assess
these arguments "by a similar criterion. Perhaps in some cases
the criterion of explanatory power is "being used in a way which
goes beyond the historical and other examples we selected for
comparison. If so that may be ground for caution, but not for
rejecting such an extended use of the criterion. We would need
a more effective counter-argument before our caution turns to
rejection.
Perhaps some such counter-argument will oblige us to add
a further qualification and to exclude certain types of gain
in explanatory power. But that is not to hand. In the meantime
I propose the following principle.
EP1 'A belief which at least equals its competitors
on the other criteria and exceeds them in explanatory
power is to be preferred to its competitors.'
If the more sceptical protest that this principle is too liberal,
I would offer the following reply. Of course we do not accept
just any gain in explanatory power, but those gains which we
reject, we do so precisely because they are achieved at the
expense of losses on other criteria. Unless some further ground
for rejecting gains in explanatory power is provided I stand
by EP1. This concludes my consideration of explanatory power.
We must move on to the discussion of the remaining criteria.
(4) Fruitfulness
A further criterion which is much debated in other contexts
is that of fruitfulness in making predictions. We could formulate
this criterion provisionally as follows. 'A theory which
successfully predicts novel evidence is preferable to a rival
theory which is less successful in so doing, other things
being equal'. We need to discuss the role of such a criterion,
its requirements, and above all its suitability as a criterion
for assessing metaphysical beliefs.
At this point it is possible to draw in some features of
the earlier discussion. The issue of fruitfulness in making
predictions was touched on at two earlier points in this work.
In Chapter 5 I discussed it in relation to Swinburne's use of
Bayesian conditionalization. It was raised there as that issue
is a fundamental one which affects the whole of Swinburne's
argument. It is central to his use of Bayes' theorem. The way
he selects the evidence on which he assesses the probability of
theism is a crucial matter. In assessing the probability of h
on e it is essential to be clear just what e represents.
Swinburne faithfully follows a standard Bayesian procedure in
adjusting e whenever further evidence is fed into the argument.
But I pointed out that this procedure was designed for the
successive inclusion of fresh evidence. Swinburne, however,
uses it almost exclusively for feeding in additional evidence
from a set of evidence which is already to hand at the outset.
This latter element is not in itself a ground for rejecting
his argument. It is quite in order to consider existing
evidence as forming a cumulative case. That I am not contesting.
Indeed I positively endorse that part of his procedure. But
the lack of consideration of fresh evidence is a different
matter. This departs from the methods and criteria used in
other disciplines. The users of Bayesian conditionalization,
and the followers of Lakatos, and others, are agreed on the
importance of the prediction of fresh evidence in the natural
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sciences. Fruitfulness in making predictions is there a
central criterion. We must now take up again the question
of whether it can he given a much reduced or even negligible
role in the assessment of metaphysical beliefs as Swinburne
contends.
At this point another element in our earlier discussion
comes into play. In Chapter 4 the role of historical
argumentation was discussed. In that earlier discussion I
considered the place in historical study of the criterion of
fruitfulness in predicting fresh evidence. The availability
of fresh evidence to historians is relatively rare. New
documents do become available, previously unknown records appear,
sometimes whole cities are rediscovered by a chance event which
precipitates archaeological excavation. But the testing of
historical theories by such novel discoveries is relatively
rare. It does not happen with the frequency that theorists
such as Lakatos claim that it does in the natural sciences.
There is therefore something of a case for arguing that at
least in historical study this criterion occupies a lesser
place. One might then argue that an analogy between historical
and metaphysical beliefs would warrant us in giving predictive
success a much lower place in the latter domain also. But
considerable caution is needed in any such use of an argument
for similarity between historical and metaphysical beliefs.
I argued earlier that prediction plays a very small
overt role in historical study, but that it has an important
implicit role. Historians usually reject with vigour any
suggestion that their study of the past has lessons for the
future. But that is not the sense in which prediction is
being discussed here. I argued earlier that the role of
implicit prediction in historical study is central to the
notion of historical reconstruction of the past. The account
of the past that we construct is a provisional one. Implicit
in our conclusions about the historical past is a condition.
The condition is that if fresh evidence becomes available,
our account can be reassessed. Of course even the fresh
evidence is itself interpreted evidence. That I do not deny.
But if we make a new discovery the statement or statements
describing that discovery can be used to test the earlier account.
The consistency between the two sets of statements is tested.
If the two sets are inconsistent at least one must be revised
or rejected.
In the examples I discussed earlier the discoveries of
Coptic texts were seen to have raised the probability of the
theory of an independent early Gnosticism. Fresh discoveries
also led to the revision of judgements about the date of an
ancient Jewish synagogue. To these examples one could add a
more recent case. Under the Treaty of Versailles in 1919
responsibility for starting the war in Europe in 1914 was fixed
by the allies on Germany. Liberal historians later tried to
discredit this theory, and sought to prove that all the major
powers were responsible. However the work of Fritz FiBcher
in I96I vindicated the theory in the eyes of many modern
German historians. Fischer used documents others had not
tracked down, or considered relevant. Here we see a
theory which "began as a highly political accusation and which
was later contested. However it contained an implicit prediction
which subsequent study of previously unused documents strikingly
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vindicated. What had been discredited as political
propaganda, much later acquired considerable new support from
an unexpected quarter.
Fruitfulness in making predictions is an important criterion
for testing theories. I have recapitulated points made earlier
in this work in order to underscore the relevance of those
earlier discussions to this issue. The earlier discussions
draw attention to the role of the criterion in the work of
philosophers of science, and also to the implied use of the
criterion in historical argumentation. But what are we to
make of this criterion in relation to the assessment of
metaphysical beliefs? We must approach that issue step by step.
I have suggested that we consider a formula such as the
following:
F1 'Other things being equal a theory which successfully
predicts novel evidence is preferable to a rival theory
which is less successful in so doing' .
The initial clause is intended to remind us that other criteria
are also being used. The formula is suggested as a provisional
account of the criterion of fruitfulness. Various amendments
are no doubt needed of which one might be
F2 'Where statements describing novel evidence are in
conflict with theory B but are predicted by theory A
2LI
•we should prefer theory A (unless there is good
reason to doubt those statements).'
Here the clause stating the exception reminds us that statements
describing evidence are themselves theory—laden and themselves
subject to scrutiny. (This is ground for caution, hut not
ground for thorough scepticism about the assessment of theories.
I have already at an earlier point argued against the view that
theory-ladenness leads to radical incommensurability.)
One of the issues raised by F1 and F2 is the provision of
a suitable account of what constitutes 'novel' evidence. This
has been much discussed. One account defines novel evidence
as evidence that was previously unknown. But this excludes too
many instances of theories which have been strikingly confirmed
by evidence which was known to others but not considered by the
159person who constructed the theory. Another suggestion
attempts to capture this distinction in two clauses which
mention
a) cases where the theory entails facts previously unknown
to the scientific community
or b) cases where it was unknown to the scientific community
that the theory explains these facts.
I propose a variation on the latter which runs as follows:
N1 'If e is a statement describing evidence, then e is
novel if the evidence which e describes was previously
not available to the academic community or if e was
not seen by the academic community to be predicted by
the theory in question.'
This would allow for cases where scientific or historical
evidence has long been available, but where it is suddenly
realized that it confirms a theory which had been formulated
without reference to that evidence.
The criterion of fruitfulness is closely related to two
similar criteria for testing theories. One of these is the
criterion of refutability or criticizability. The other is
the requirement that a theory be open to testing by means of
a 'crucial experiment'. The latter demand is more severe if
it is envisaged as demanding that we must be actually able
to devise an experiment which would decide between rival theories.
Theories would not be distinguishable if no such experiment
were imaginable, but being able to imagine a 'crucial experiment',
and being able to devise one, are very different matters. My
formulation of F2 above is aimed at capturing that element in
the demand for a 'crucial experiment' which lies between these
two cases. It is neither so vague as to allow the novel
situation to be purely notional, nor so strong as to assume
that a 'crucial experiment' can always actually be devised.
With regard to criticizability the situation is a little different.
A much earlier debate focussed on falsifiability as a criterion
of meaningfulness, ^ The issue under discussion here is
different. It is concerned with rational preference for one
* ,
belief as against its competitors. Falsifiability or
criticizability is a factor here also. It could be described
as the capacity for a theory or a belief to live dangerously,
by exposing itself to refutation, while not being refuted.
It is some kind of index of successful brinkmanship
(especially as Popper describes it). How then is it related
to ray F1 and F2? I would argue the following. A theory, if
it is to he at all rationally believable, must at least expose
itself to the risk of 'falsification'; it must be criticizable.
But it is the more rationally believable the more it risks
predictions which are successful, and the less its rivals do
this. I do not claim that F1 and F2 provide a definitive
account of the criterion we are considering. But I formulate
them as provisional accounts, intended to sketch out some of
the issues involved. The need to subject such formulations to
further improvement is clearly endemic in the whole discussion
of such criteria.
What then are we to make of the applicability of some
such criterion to metaphysical beliefs and especially to our
chosen example? Swinburne does mention the criterion but argues
against its necessity as follows:
'It will be useful... to make another important point...
It is sometimes said that we are only justified in
accepting a hypothesis if we have tested it by finding
that it predicts certain events and then waited to see
whether or not those events happen... although we often test
hypotheses in this way, we do not have to do so if they are
to be rendered probable by our evidence...'
The last point is no doubt correct, as is his statement that
successful prediction is not implied by Bayes theorem. But
Bayesian conditionalization does envisage just such a test,
and Swinburne does not mention the point, though he uses one of
the main elements of Bayesian conditionalization, namely the
successive adjustment of e to accommodate more and more evidence.
iSo
Also even if the criterion of prediction were in conflict with
Bayes' theorem, that might he ground either for suspecting the
total adequacy of Bayesian confirmation theory, or perhaps
more justifiably, the reliability of a particular way of using
Bayes' theorem.
Swinburne continues his argument by saying that Newton's
theory of motion was judged highly probable on the evidence
then available, though making no new immediately testable
predictions. But that point can be accommodated by my formulation
of the critericn of fruitfulness. My PI and F2 do not demand
fruitfulness of every theory, but merely say that a fruitful
theory (or progression research programme) is preferable to a
less fruitful one (or to a degenerative research programme).
If a theory scores highly on other criteria and no more
successful rival threatens it, then that, I agree, is sufficient
to make it rationally believable.
Another objection by Swinburne runs as follows, and turns
on a clause which has already given us trouble:
'More generally, whether e renders h probable surely cannot
depend crucially on whether we had thought of h before we
saw e. Probability would become a highly subjective
matter... if that were so.'
This does point to a real difficulty, but it is not so great
a difficulty if we phrase the requirement relating to fresh
evidence carefully. The crucial factor is the comparative success
of rival theories in the face of novel evidence. If we previously
considered e unlikely in any event, or unlikely on our
previously favoured theory, then the occurrence of e, or the
IT/
realization that e is likely on that theory, will oblige us to
reassess the probability of the theory. In any case we cannot
make of Bayes a shibboleth. Bayesians have recently had to
defend their view in terms of its adaptability to requirements
seen to be appropriate on other grounds. For instance they
have come to argue that they can cope with the notion that
successive positive instances raise the confirmation of a
theory by decreasing amounts. The controversy between
Bayesians and others is an exceedingly complex matter and cannot
be given short shrift. This is why I object to particular
elements in Swinburne's arguments over Bayesianism, but reserve
judgement about the outcome of that larger issue.
Despite the fact that Swinburne minimizes the role of the
criterion of fruitfulness, he does himself reject a rival
theological view on the ground that it is ad hoc. He discusses
Plantinga's use of the free will defence to account for natural
evil as caused by free agents such as fallen angels. This
Swinburne rejects as follows:
'For if the hypothesis that these angels exist and have
power over nature is added to the hypothesis of theism
to save it from falsification, then it has the status of
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an ad hoc hypothesis'.
He urges against this the objection that an ad hoc hypothesis
complicates a theory to which it is added and so lowers its
probability. But that is not the only factor. (Some might
argue that Plantinga's defence is not ad hoc, but part of
traditional theism, but we are discussing criteria, and must
let issues of this other kind alone.) What constitutes an
ad. hoc element in a theory has heen extensively debated by
Lakatos and his followers and opponents. In this context a
hypothesis is judged ad hoc in various ways. One distinction
is between an addition which is ad hoC| (it doesn't predict)and one which
predicts but is ad hoc^ because unsuccessful. On either of
these views the description of a supplementary hypothesis as
ad hoc is crucially linked with the criterion of predictive
fruitfulness. No doubt Plantinga could, if so minded, adopt a
defence similar to that of Hick. He could argue that his
theism, plus a free will defence citing fallen angels, is not
ad hoc. He could invoke eschatological verification, and
argue as follows. Not only does theism predict that the
faithful will find themselves in the divine presence, but also
that the unrepentant and the unfaithful will find themselves,
like Faust, in the clutches of those fallen angels which his
version of theism mentions. The argument between Swinburne
and Plantinga does have interesting points at which the
criterion of predictive fruitfulness does become relevant.
So far I have considered the criterion in question as
a positive one. It favours theories which score, or promise,
predictive success. But what of theories which undergo
disconfirmation? These can be said to make explicit or
implicit predictions which fail. Surely we must interpret the
criterion in such a way as to capture this point also. Let us
construct an example which attempts to capture a relatively
unsophisticated view of the disconfirmation of certain forms
of theistic argument. Some such positions might be thought
to have contained overt, or implicit, predictions that the
earth was the centre of the universe, that human "beings did
not descend from other species by natural selection, and that
the Bible does not contain historical error or self-contradictions
on historical or other topics. Of course such matters could be
classed as peripheral hypotheses, rather than part of the central
theory. But the disconfirmation of such hypotheses, though
peripheral, does have some implication for the rational credibility
of the central core of a theory.
It might be argued that there are other versions of theistic
belief, which do not contain the peripheral items in question.
So those who now hold such beliefs could claim that their
position is unaffected by predictive failures of this kind. This
is fine as long as one works with a static view of the testing
of theories. But if one takes seriously the concept of long
term research programmes being progressive or degenerating,
the situation looks very different. According to this view,
theories and beliefs are not independent items which each stand
or fall on their own merits. The method of evaluating research
programmes looks at sequences of theories. It asks how they
stand up to successive tests, and how they have been revised
over time. It is the particular genius of Lakatos that he
identified, and articulated, this aspect of the study of method
and criteria.
From this perspective, a series of theories which undergoes
successive disconfirmations is non-progressive. If, after a
failure, a theory is restated so as to make fresh predictions
which succeed, it is reinstated as part of a progressive
165research programme. But if a tradition staggers from one
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disconfirmation to another, and survives by dropping peripheral
hypotheses it is making use of a content-reducing strategem.
This issue is put sharply, hut Lakatos was never one to
pull his punches. Can such a forthright insistence on the
rigorous use of this criterion he resisted? It captures and
goes beyond Popper's thesis of the asymmetry"*"^ between
confirmation and disconfirmation. For Popper one additional
1 corroborating' instance only slightly raises the degree of
corroboration whereas one 'falsifying' instance damages a
theory heavily. This is a point often overlooked by conservative
defenders of biblical narratives. In pointing to cases where
they claim that archaeology proves the bible true, they overlook
the asymmetrical impact of even one disconfirmation. But
Lakatos goes beyond Popper. He is concerned not only with
isolated predictive successes and failures, but with the effect
of a series of successes or a series of reverses, the latter
forming what he calls a 'degenerating problem-shift'.
Can the crude example cited above be countered by
sophisticated defence in terms of the criteria and methods to
be used? One line of defence would be to argue that as long
as the reverses only affect peripheral hypotheses, the reverses
are not serious. This defence could appeal to Glymour's
maxim that we should prefer theories whose central rather
than whose peripheral hypotheses are tested. Provided that
some clear distinction between central and peripheral items
is on offer, and provided that the central core is tested,
this defence seems promising.
Another supporting line of defence would be the following.
1*5
It can "be argued that long established theories or beliefs are
less in need of testing against novel evidence. If a theory has
stood the test of long experience, we would not expect it either
to produce or to require predictions of novel data. We might
however wish to stipulate that it should be free of disconfirmation,
especially (as argued above) in relation to its central core.
A long standing belief can also, it would seem reasonable, afford
to shed a few incidental elements. Indeed we would expect it to do
so. Very few scientific or historical beliefs survive totally
unchanged over a long period of time. But on the other hand
many of our beliefs do remain substantially intact even when
Kuhn's 'paradigm shifts' cause metaphorical earthquakes elsewhere.
Though I have from the outset agreed with some fallibilists that
any one of our beliefs may be false, I would still maintain that
some of our beliefs about history and science have survived
relatively unchanged. In such cases to demand fruitfulness in
making new predictions is inappropriate. This line of defence
is preferable to some other arguments. For instance the
contention that history uses the criterion less does not offer
nearly so promising a line of argument as I have indicated
above. The criterion is important there, when implicit predictions
can be tested.
Another factor which deserves mention is the notion of
tenacity in persevering with a theory. Both in history and in
other disciplines a theory is not abandoned as soon as it
suffers some disconfirmation. It can be considered rational
to persevere with a theory. The theory can be modified, or
the disconfirmatory evidence challenged. Or it can be argued
that future evidence will shift the balance of probability in
favour of a theory which has suffered a temporary reverse. In
such circumstances it may be rational to go on maintaining the
belief in question, especially if non-evidential considerations
come into play. I discussed earlier, in chapter two, the
issue of maintaining a belief on non-evidential grounds. Here
the issue is the virtue of tenacity as a rational factor. The
success of one theory over its rivals can, we are told by the
theorists of theory, only be decided in the long run. But
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how long is the long run? This principle of tenacity can
be considered as a technical equivalent of part of what is
involved in regarding faith as involving greater commitment than
mere belief. But our concern is with criteria for rational
belief, rather than with those aspects of faith which go beyond
the bounds of rational belief. In the case of beliefs about
matters of history and natural science, tenacity is recommended
in the hope that a research programme which is at present in
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decline will become progressive again. In other words it
implicitly predicts future success in terms of the criterion
of fruitfulness which we are considering.
What then of that criterion? When I formulated my version
of F1 and F2 I did so in a way which took account of some of
the points about fruitfulness we have just considered. This
version of the criterion does not make fruitfulness a sine
qua non. It is rather a matter of evaluating competing beliefs to
determine which it is most rational to hold. A belief may be
a rational belief if it is consistent, and accurate, and has
good explanatory power, and is not unduly complex, without
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predicting novel facts, provided that certain other conditions
are met. Ho rival belief should exceed it in accuracy,
simplicity and explanatory power. The preferred theory should
not undergo predictive failure at least with regard to its
central core. Also there must not be a competing theory which
is at least equal to it on the other criteria, and also
superior to it in fruitfulness.
This formulates the criterion of fruitfulness in
comparative rather than in absolute terms. It attempts to
capture the notion that we may rationally believe something
despite its unfruitfulness in making successful predictions,
provided that an otherwise equally credible belief does not
exceed it in fruitfulness. This last consideration raises an
issue which will continue to give trouble and remain unresolved.
There are likely to be cases of clashes between the criteria.
One belief or set of beliefs may prevail on some of the
criteria, and a competitor do better on other criteria. But
before confessing that this issue remains unresolved we must
turn to the criterion of accuracy.
(5) Accuracy
The last of the criteria which I propose to examine is that
of accuracy. Though discussed last I would rank it earlier. It
has certain obvious connections with earlier criteria. Also,
if as I suggested earlier, the criterion of simplicity should
be given a lower ranking then that could be ranked fifth and
accuracy placed second. But any ranking that can be given
will only be a weak one, as I shall argue later.
It is appropriate that any beliefs which we hold should
actually do "better justice to the evidence than any of its
rivals. In this sense it must be accurate. But what is it
to 'do justice to the evidence' or 'give an account of the
evidence' in the sense here intended? Clearly it must he
something different from fruitfulness in predictive success.
The requirement of accuracy is that a theory account for
existing evidence. How then does it differ from explanatory
power? An accurate belief correctly describes the evidence in
question. A belief with good explanatory power makes that
evidence more likely or more evidence likely (or more evidence
more likely) than its competitors do. Accuracy is a matter of
correct description rather than explanation, and deals with
existing rather than fresh evidence. Accuracy is also different
from the question of consistency with other beliefs. We overrule
the conclusions of existing beliefs in the interests of accuracy.
All the same there is some connection here. We may decide that
a belief more accurately describes the data because it reduces
anomalies. The estimation of time by use of a pendulum rather
than by a water clock is deemed more accurate as it reduces
anomalies elsewhere. ^
This criterion is close to a requirement specified by
Wewton-Smith in slightly different terms. He requires that
a good theory at least preserve the observational success of its
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predecessors. In the case of historical examples a description
is more accurate if more precise and if it takes account of
more data. So we prefer 'Caesar was assassinated on the Ides
of March 44B.C.' to 'Caesar died in 443.C.' or 'Caesar was
killed on the Ides of March 44B.C.'. The statement that
1*)
Caesar was assassinated uses a term with smaller extension and
172
so more precise than the statement that Caesar was killed.
In some contests between rival beliefs only a certain degree
of accuracy or precision may he of consequence. In the case
of history, and certainly in the case of religious belief,
accuracy might also be invoked in a slightly different sense.
Attention to symbolic, poetic and metaphorical features of
the language in question can be of great importance. This
is a different process from examining accuracy by strict
measurement. It is, however, not wholly dissimilar. Attention
to literary nuances can be as painstaking a matter as that of
measuring minute particles or getting dates right. But it is
not an issue with which I propose to tangle here.
An issue which is of more direct concern here is the
problem of accounts of observation or accounts of data being
theory-laden. Indeed one could go farther and argue that
without prior conceptualization we could not have any
experiences at all, or make any observations. It is, however,
one thing to argue that our accounts of the data are theory-
laden, and another to claim that this renders them incorrigible.
Here an adaptation of my earlier argument against radical
incommensurability is relevant. One astronomer may experience
a star where another experiences a planet. Or one may experience
an object as a star, the other may experience it as a planet.
But in this case at least we can adopt a tactical device to
enable first comparison, and then preference to be made. The
strategem in question could be called 'theoretical descent'
by analogy with 1 semantic ascent'. The two astronomers could
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agree on the observation of a 'bright object' at a certain
place and time. The latter description is still laden with
theory, but with a theory of lower level. For the object
to be designated a star certain other conditions would be
needed, and different ones for it to be described as a
planet. In the case in question the latter did indeed turn
out to be the correct description. I do not necessarily claim
that this argument resolves all cases of conflicting descriptions
of data, but it points to one way of solving such difficulties.
For the moment I wish to stay with the more straightforward
examples of a preference on grounds of accuracy for a particular
theory about events in the historical past.
An example of a gain in accuracy in historical archaeology
can be found in the case of dating by radio-carbon. This method
was developed in 1948 by Libby. By measuring the extent of the
decay of carbon 14 in samples, the date of the samples can be
calculated. Thus the absolute chronology of a whole range of
archaeological finds can be determined by the use of radio-carbon
dating. Given the reliability of the radio-carbon method any
historical theory about ancient artefacts which agrees with
the results of radio-carbon dating is to be preferred as more
accurate than any historical theory which conflicts with such
dating. One must add the proviso that such conflict exceed
the normal margin of error. Even so this is sufficient to
favour many theories against a host of rivals. But this is
not the whole story. Theory A about an ancient city is
preferable to theory B if judged more accurate, because more
in accord with the results of carbon 14 tests. This inference
depends on theory A not suffering some major disadvantage on
another criterion. It also relies of course on the assumption
that radiocarbon dating is more reliable than say analysis
of site strata. But to contest the comparative accuracy of
radio-carbon dating would require a greater disturbance of
our other beliefs than to accept it in this case.
There has, however, been one successful instance of a
challenge to the accuracy of radio-carbon dating. The method
was itself compared with the results of counting tree-rings
on wood up to 8,000 years old. The two systems diverged slightly
As a result the estimates, reached by radio-carbon methods( of
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dates prior to 1,000B.C. have been recalibrated. A crude
radio-carbon date of 2,45C®.C. is now converted to a revised
date of 3jOOOB.C.. The crucial assumption of course is that
which asserts that the quantity of radio-carbon varies more than
the formation of tree rings. But other evidence does support
this assumption, levels of carbon 14 have fluctuated in this
century.
We prefer more accurate to less accurate historical theories
Our judgement of what is an appropriate standard of accuracy
may itself depend on anterior reasoning. For instance, to
reject the greater accuracy of revised radio-carbon dating
would oblige us to discard more of our cherished theories, and
to accept a theory with less predictive and explanatory power.
ITo doubt similar considerations favoured the shift in science
from calculation of time by the water wheel to the use of a
pendulum, and then to quartz vibration. But we must let that
pass.
Is a preference for more accurate theories an appropriate
criterion in the domain of metaphysics? In the case of
Swinburne's metaphysical theism one might argue that even his
C-inductive approach is bound to rely largely on factors which
cannot be measured empirically. So in some cases we might
have to allow that accuracy could be tested, if at all, only
for the peripheral hypotheses of some metaphysical beliefs.
In that case we would have to formulate our criterion rather
carefully.
A1 Prefer a theory which is more accurate than its rivals,
or prefer it if more of its component hypotheses are
accurate than is the case with its rivals, other things
being equal.
Again our last clause in A1 is designed to refer to the role
of the other criteria. But is there an area where a procedure
such as Swinburne's does allow for an estimate of the accuracy
of a theory?
One place where Swinburne does come close to the issue
with which I am concerned is in his discussion of arguments
from religious experience. I wish to say immediately and very
clearly that I have considerable reservations about the nature
of Swinburne's arguments in that chapter. On the one hand
I hold that his principle of credulity is too liberal, and
allows him to make larger claims for the evidential value of
some types of religious experience than is warranted. On the
other hand I would argue that his examples of religious
experience are strange and strangely assessed. Here I think
he has in fact underestimated the impressive character of
certain other types of religious experience and their
evidential value. It may seem strange to criticize him from
two different directions hut my objection is that he has
offered too trite an account of religious experience, and that
his principle of credulity allows him to claim too much from
an inadequately grounded account of the experiences. But I
say this only to make it clear that I in no way subscribe to the
details of.Swinburne's account. The issue of concern here is,
however, whether a metaphysical belief is preferable to its
rivals on grounds of accuracy. We must stay with this issue
of method, and object to points of substance in Swinburne's
account only when strictly necessary.
The crucial factor in Swinburne's argument is his 'principle
of credulity'. He argues that such a principle is needed to
provide a proper account of other experiences and that it
cannot reasonably be excluded as not providing a good account
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of religious experiences. He claims that
'a religious experience apparently of God ought to be
taken as veridical unless it can be shown on other grounds
significantly more probable than not that God does not
exist.'175
In fact he does include some restrictions on this principle.
It is, however, a bold contention even when qualified somewhat.
I take it that he is claiming in effect that a theistic
account of religious experience is preferable to any other
account on the grounds that it is more accurate or more
empirically adequate than its rivals. Even if Swinburne
himself does not use quite that terminology other writers do.
For instance Long regards H.D.Lewis as claiming that religious
experience is only adequately understood if reference is made
to a reality other than the person or persons to whom the
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experience comes. Katz is not so directly concerned with
the transcendental reference of religious experience as with
questioning the thesis that 'mystical experience is always
the same or similar in essence'. He argues that such a claim
would have to he demonstrated hy
'recourse to, and accurate handling of, the evidence,
convincing logical argument, and coherent epistemological
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procedures.'
In fact Katz argues vigorously that equation of nirvana and
devekuth in Buddhist and Jewish mysticism rests on inaccurate
descriptions of the two traditions of mysticism. These writers
do seem to agree that accuracy of description is one factor in
assessing beliefs which rest in one way or another on evidence
of religious experience.
In the case of J.L.Mackie's critique of the more far reachin
claims that religious experience supports theism, he does not
specifically mention accuracy of description. He does, hardly
surprisingly, focus on the question of whether natural histories
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of religion can provide a 'better explanation' of the data.
But though he does not specifically mention the point, there
is nothing in his argument to exclude the principle that other
things being equal we should favour an account of religious
experience which is more accurate in its description of the
experiences. The more serious point is, however, not so much
whether other writers do consider accuracy of description as
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rendering a belief more rational, as whether we can formulate
such a principle satisfactorily. There are several real
difficulties about the notion of an accurate description of
an experience.
One of the main difficulties which will need to be
considered is whether the device of 1 theoretical descent' can
be readily used to enable accounts of religious experience
to be compared. If the kind of religious experience people
have is to some extent bound up with the religious language
and symbols and expectations that each person has, then it will
be very difficult to assess the accuracy of the description in
relation to the experiences. Even so some appeal to accuracy
may be made. In effect Katz does this. Though he points to
the difficulties of distinguishing between interpretation and
experience, he does use an argument which appeals to accuracy.
He rejects the thesis that different types of mystical experience
can be divided into a small class of 1 types' which cut across
cultural boundaries. He does so because he argues the description
of devekuth and the description of nirvana, for instance, have
been inaccurately compared. What is at issue here is not so
much whether Jewish mystics accurately describe their own
experiences, as whether those who compare different traditions
of mysticism have accurately attended to the details of those
descriptions. We could call this a second level application
of a criterion of accuracy.
Some of Swinburne's examples do envisage something more
like our notion of theoretical descent. In this respect his
discussion is valuable, but his examples are sometimes very
~w
strange. For instance it is hard to take seriously discussions
hased on examples such as
11 saw Poseidon standing "by the window' or
' I am alone and seem to see and talk to a figure dressed
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in white which I take to he an angel.'
In each case the context in the appropriate literature (whether
Homer or the Bible) has not been taken into account. "We would
need to take note of stories in which Odysseus says he has been
shipwrecked by the malevolent fury of Poseidon, for instance.
This latter example would at least pay better attention to
literary context.
But Swinburne is on surer ground when he insists on two
basic distinctions. He argues for internal rather than external
description. By this he means that we should use language which
does not prejudge the issue at stake. He distinguishes descriptions
like 'I heard a bus' from those like 'I heard a noise that seemed
to come from a bus', The one does, the other does not prejudge
the issue of whether a bus was there. Then a further distinction
is needed between things which merely seem to be F, and those
which seem to be F in an epistemic sense. In the latter case
we are inclined to think that they are F. Here I adapt and
abbreviate his argument, but I think it makes a useful distinction.
Swinburne's examples fall into five groups. He cites
experiences of God as follows, l) Those mediated by common
phenomena (seeing the world as God's handiwork). 2) Those
mediated by public but unusual events (visions of Mary at
Fatima). 3) Private experiences which can be described by
normal sensory vocabulary (a dream vision of an angel).
4) Private experiences which are hard to describe (some
mystical experiences). 5) Experiences which do not come via
sensations (a conviction that one has a vocation from God
which does not depend on any auditory sensation). Where
Swinburne's account is weak, is in his preference for rather
uncritical accounts of visions. But his classificatory scheme
is superior to the examples which he cites to illustrate it.
Perhaps we could briefly digress for a moment to include some
additional examples, though our main purpose is not to discuss
the problems of arguments from religious experience, but to
claim that in such arguments appeal to a criterion of accuracy
is appropriate.
My additional examples would include one from a 17th century
writer and two from Long's discussion of an argument by H.D.Lewis.
Long cites Lewis as pointing to an awareness of an irreducible
mystery and an enlivened sense of some supreme and transcendent
reality as involved in the being of anything at all. ^ Robert
Barclay, a 17th century writer described his experience of
early Quaker meetings as follows:
'For when I came into the silent assemblies of God's people,
I felt a secret power among them, which touched my heart;
and as I gave way unto it I found the evil weakening in
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me and the good raised up.'
One could add to this example that of a sense of unmerited
grace. A further important element is also found in the arguments
of Lewis as described by Long. This is the character of
prophetic ethical demand descibed as follows:
'we are directed by the prophet beyond the moral insight
itself to the apprehension of the transcendent which is
understood to he the source and ground of these moral
obligations.1
What we must consider is whether an argument which appeals
to such data can he assessed in terms of its accuracy.
Swinburne's way of using such an argument is by appeal
to his principle of credulity. He argues
'If it seems (epistemically) to S that x is present,
that is a good reason for S to believe that it is so, in
the absence of special considerations - whatever x may
be.'183
His special considerations restrict the principle. These ask if
the subject is under an influence which distorts perceptual
judgement, or lacks the required capacities in other contexts,
or has insufficient experience in such matters, or is working
with an inadequate description, or if it is very likely on other
grounds that x was not present. Rowe is highly critical of
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applying a principle of credulity to religious experience
on the grounds that the argument fails if we have no means of
distinguishing between delusory and veridical experiences.
Rowe's riposte seems as dismissive as Swinburne's principle
is optimistic. Attempts to distinguish between genuine and
mistaken accounts of such experiences are not lacking. But our
concern is not with the success or failure of such attempts
as with the principle that a criterion of accuracy is a relevant
test.
There is clearly grave difficulty in transferring principles
(such as that of credulity) from cases where we are dealing
with what is publicly observable to cases chiefly involving
private sensations. However we have already noted at least
one more successful type of appeal to accuracy. We can at
least criticize as inaccurate those theories which rest on
inaccurate accounts of people's descriptions of their experiences.
Thus it can be argued that Swinburne fails to note the special
characteristics of the literary use of dream visions in Matthew.
Also Katz rightly criticizes the thesis that mystical experiences
are similar on the grounds that the descriptions have not been
accurately studied. But can we do more? I would suggest two
possible lines of approach here. The first relates to Katz's
claims that his pluralistic account of mysticism is preferable
because more accurate in that it accommodates all the evidence
and does justice to the specificity of the evidence. His appeal
to secondary accuracy suggests that an appeal to primary accuracy
cannot be made. But if different accounts of experiences of
'God', 'Brahman' and'nirvana' imply incompatible beliefs, we
cannot rest content with pluralism. The primary accuracy of
at least some of the descriptions is called in question, even
if we have, at present, no very definite way of resolving the
dilemma then facing us. Further attention to the question of
primary accuracy is also demanded by the phenomenon of change
of belief. Suppose someone experiences e^ which is closely
bound up with interpretative schema T^ and subsequently
experiences e^ which is closely bound up with interpretative
schema T^. Further let us suppose that this person concludes
that T^ and e^ require a re-evaluation of T^ and e^. In such
a case either T^ and e^ or T^ and e^ is called in question.
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Our concern is with criteria. I have drawn attention
to some more substantive problems in this section simply in
order to show that I am aware that application of a criterion
of accuracy in certain areas is highly problematical. I have,
however, at the same time drawn attention to the relevance
and indeed necessity of citing the criterion even if we do not
always have the means of applying it in every case. The
principle at issue will therefore need to be stated in
comparative rather than in absolute terms. I am not arguing
that only those beliefs are rational which, amongst other things,
are fully tested for accuracy. I am arguing that between rival
beliefs we should prefer as rational that belief which most
satisfies tests of secondary and primary accuracy where such
tests can be applied. Once again this preference is subject to
the comparisons between rival beliefs which we make on the other
criteria.
This concludes the discussion of criteria for rational
belief in this area. Despite the sequence of the sections
I have indicated above a slight preference for a different
order in terms of rank. This would place consistency first
and accuracy second, explanatory power and fruitfulness would
then follow, but simplicity be moved down into fifth place.
But the question of ranking will reappear shortly.
Conclusions
My main conclusion can be stated briefly. It is that
reference to the criteria specified above are at the heart
of assessing the rationality of at least some metaphysical
beliefs as well as being central to the assessment of historical
and other beliefs. These criteria are consistency, accuracy,
explanatory power, fruitfulness and simplicity.
Can we provide an independent justification of the rational
of rationality? That I doubt. Such a task is comparable to the
notoriously problematical tasks of deducing deduction, or
justifying induction. One might provide a more limited defence.
One can argue that any belief which is preferred on these
criteria is defended by a procedure as rational as that used
in preferring other beliefs on these or similar criteria. So
if metaphysical and historical and scientific beliefs are judged
rational by reference to these or similar criteria, then the
method of declaring one set of these beliefs rational is as
rational as that of defending the others. That is not an
insignificant claim.
There might be further ways one could consider the defence
of the criteria for declaring beliefs to be rational. One could
consider the counter arguments of sceptical reasoners, and ask
whether they in fact make moves which depend upon an appeal to
consistency, accuracy, explanatory power, fruitfulness and
simplicity. For instance those who use historical examples to
cast doubt on scientific methods would rightly be criticized
for assuming the reliability of their account of the historical
past, in this case of the history of science, in order to
discredit some instances of scientific method. By such means
one can defend method against those who are against it. But
I only lightly sketch such a defence. It would need a longer
account in some other work.
Does the theory of rational belief which I have outlined
apply to itself? There is no inherent objection to suggesting
that the theory of rational belief itself be assessed with
reference to criteria such as consistency, accuracy, explanatory
power and simplicity. It was one of the merits of advances
made by Popper that his theory of the logic of scientific
discovery was fruitfully applied in other fields. So the
application of such theories to themselves may not be as
problematical as the application of the verification theory
was to itself. I do not claim novelty in citing the criteria,
but only in considering further implications of appealing to
criteria which are already in use.
The chief problem with the whole method of appealing to
criteria as I have, is that which arises when one theory scores
well on some criteria and another theory on other criteria.
The problem of a clash between the criteria does raise difficulties
at least in some cases. Kuhn noted this problem in the case of
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scientific controversy. It also arises in the areas with
which this work is concerned. It is like disputes in textual
criticism. One variant in a text may be preferable on one of
the rules of the discipline, another on another. I regard
this as a more serious difficulty than incommensurability on
the grounds of allegedly radical meaning variance. What is
to be done in the face of a clash of criteria? One suggestion
would "be some kind of ranking. This solution cannot be
pressed too hard as notorious exceptions may upset it. But
should we weakly acquiesce in the view that there is no
decision procedure at all? I think not. ¥e do not have
a decision procedure which will cover every case. But that is
not the same as being without grounds for making preferences in
many cases.
I have already dropped hints about factors which would
favour a weak ranking of the criteria. I have, for instance,
criticized Swinburne for giving simplicity too strong a role.
I have also agreed with a widespread assent to the view that
internal consistency is normally a sine qua non. So internal
consistency is normally the first criterion. Consistency with
other beliefs and accuracy follow closely. Satisfaction of these
criteria should only be overruled when we can argue that the
'other' beliefs are less well supported than the one we are
assessing, or when the massive success of a rival belief obliges
us to reassess the accuracy of our previously favoured belief.
Explanatory power and fruitfulness in making predictions follow
on closely together. A theory which scored well here, but which
lost some simplicity in doing so, is a theory we would prefer.
But we would have reservations about a theory which explained
a lot, or predicted well, but was inconsistent or inaccurate.
So perhaps some kind of weak ranking might help reduce the
problems raised by clashes between criteria. But these clashes
cannot be eliminated altogether. Also a massive advantage
on one criterion might well upset our weak preferences in terms
of ranking. If it really is the case that quantum mechanics
1^
is accepted for its many successful predictions despite
inconsistency with other well grounded beliefs or perhap3
even internal inconsistency, then such a ranking would be
upset. (Unfortunately the extent of the clash in this case
is highly controversial.) In the case of metaphysics some
might argue that theism scores so well in explanatory power
that any incidental inconsistencies whould be resolved by
adjustment, or by toleration of anomalies, rather than by
subordination of the gain to the losses. It is hard to disallow
all such cases of an upset to our weak ranking.
The existence of clashes between criteria must be taken
seriously, but it should not be exaggerated. It does not licence
thorough scepticism or anarchism. In many established disciplines
we have longstanding beliefs which satisfy the criteria. Without
striking agreement on many beliefs, the human community and the
academic community could not function as it does. This is
perhaps a kind of doxastic equivalent to Wittgenstein's dictum
quoted in the opening pages that a doubt which doubts everything
is not a doubt. Yet though there is much agreement, there are
clashes of criteria, and there are disagreements. Whether such
disagreements occur largely in areas where there are clashes in
criteria would be a whole field of study in itself. A positive
correlation would, raise the explanatory power of the view taken
here, but other causes of such disagreement undoubtedly exist.
Interests differ, and differences of interest contribute to
differences of belief. But our concern is with rational belief
and the fascinating variety of other factors affecting diversity
of belief must be left alone here. My aim has been to focus on
what renders a set of beliefs rational and to emphasize this.
I do not deny all voluntary elements in relation to belief,
nor that our interests affect our decisions in this area.
Someone might argue that we should treat rational and
irrational beliefs symmetrically when asking why people believe
what they do. Why, it might be asked, should sociologists
refrain from exploring those interests which encourage people
to hold beliefs we deem rational? Surely they should not regard
irrational beliefs as explicable in terms of interests, and
rational beliefs as different in kind? I have no objection in
principle to the argument that people may arrive at beliefs we
deem rational as a result of factors such as interests. Perhaps
it might be shown that in the past some of the factors which
led past scientists to a heliocentric view of the solar system
were connected with an interest in the occult. But that does
not diminish the rational and scientific grounds for the
heliocentric view of our corner of the universe. Beliefs may
be overdetermined. There may be irrational factors conducive
to the holding of a belief which is on other grounds deemed
rational. This part of the symmetry thesis is not incompatible
with my position. But I would argue that there is also an
element of asymmetry in that irrational beliefs would be
explicable in sociological terms but would lack rational defences
of equal cogency to those available for rational belief. What
I reject is a full blooded relativism which would reduce the
distinction between rational beliefs and others. The theory
of rational belief advocated here is one which appeals to
rational criteria as much as possible, but which admits that
T)L
other factors do operate, especially where there is a clash
of criteria.
I have argued that at least some metaphysical beliefs
can be assessed by appeal to criteria. They are, in other
words, candidates for being rational beliefs. Detailed
application of the tests to particular beliefs goes beyond
the scope of this work. Here however I have argued for a
criterion of demarcation which focusses on the division between
rational and non-rational beliefs. There is also no doubt a
need for a criterion of demarcation between beliefs in different
disciplines. But I consider the distinction between rational
and non rational beliefs more important than that between beliefs
which belong to different disciplines. lie can assess metaphysical
views for their probability on rational criteria. This means
that we should not just dismiss them out of hand on the grounds
that they are not part of science. Nor should we limit ourselves
to asking whether metaphysical views are possible or impossible.
Of course that is an important question. But the comparative
probability is even more important. That we can attempt to
assess by assessing competing beliefs for their comparative
success in satisfying the criteria.
This work has been concerned with rational belief. I have
argued^in several disciplines what we are dealing with are
revisable beliefs. These beliefs are revisable, but we can
argue for their rationality. At the outset we considered the
relation between knowledge and rational belief. Then I defended
the importance of the notion of belief with its implicit
reference to a believing subject. In discussing belief we need
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to consider both dispositions and conscious mental states.
In the case of rational belief we need to assess evidential
support. Even if evidential support is not the sole ground
on which we should rest belief, it is the main one, and this
is especially so for beliefs we claim to be rational. As
beliefs interact and interlock so we must consider larger
complexes of belief. In the case of historical beliefs we
can detect instances of a cumulative case based on an appeal to
criteria. Mitchell argues that there is an analogous way of
arguing for the rationality of metaphysical beliefs. Closer
attention to historical beliefs reveals that though these raise
some special issues, the criteria used there are largely
comparable to those under discussion in the philosophy of
science. Criteria of explanatory power and predictive success
are relevant to historical study even if they are used in slightly
different ways there. In the case of metaphysical beliefs
Swinburne argues for a set of such beliefs by appealing to
criteria such as simplicity and explanatory power. His view
is to be contrasted with those who defend theses of
incommensurability or who depend heavily on a notion of
commitment. Swinburne emphasizes rational scrutiny and on
this general point I am in agreement with him. Yet his use
of Bayesian methods is somewhat problematical. I argue that
some metaphysical beliefs can be assessed by testing them
according to criteria, without necessarily subscribing to a
particular Bayesian method, or agreeing with Swinburne's priorities
about the criteria, or other of his more controversial points.
Consistency, accuracy, explanatory power, fruitfulness and
simplicity are appropriate criteria here as elsewhere. I
would rank the criteria somewhat differently from Swinburne,
especially in giving less emphasis to simplicity. There are
cases where serious clashes between the criteria prevent
decisions from being clear cut. But this should not overshadow
those cases where decisions are more straightforward. In these
cases reference to the criteria outlined above can enable some
beliefs, and some sets of beliefs, to be preferred to others
on rational grounds. There are limits to the rational assessment
of belief. The point at issue is not whether there are such
limits. It is the claim that within those limits we have
criteria for preferring some beliefs as being more rational
than others.
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